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ABSTRACT 
Roberts (1991, p.355) remarked that “the analysis of accounting in systems of accountability (also) offers 
alternative ways to conceive of the transformation of accounting.” This dissertation aims to improve multi-
level understanding of accounting and accountability within the field of social services. Focusing on India’s 
Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (MGNREGS), one of the world’s largest 
social services programs, I examine the role of accounting in accountability practices and change processes 
at macro, meso and micro levels.  
Current social services literature, straddling public, private and third sectors, reveals accounting-
accountability research to be underexplored (Bracci & Llewellyn, 2012) and conspicuously lacking in 
diversity of research sites, yet undergoing significant change (Ebrahim, 2003; Brinkerhoff & Brinkerhoff, 
2004; Llewellyn, 1997; Walz & Ramachandran, 2011). This facilitates a unique set of observations and 
understandings as program delivery and implementation evolve.  
 
This dissertation specifically uses Bourdieu’s notions of field, habitus and capitals, also linking to literatures 
on management control systems, budgeting, routines and sense-making. Following the unfolding of 
MGNREGS over eight years, I raise two main research questions: How are accounting practices and 
artifacts intentionally enlisted in MGNERGS towards notions of accountability across multiple levels of 
program governance? What role do accounting practices in MGNREGS play in larger organizational and 
social change processes?  
 
I examine accounting’s enlistment in an enabling role to “frame” and diffuse accountability and program 
structure on a macro level; in a strategical role, to “construct” accountability at the meso level; and in a 
learning and sense-making role to “implement” accountability at the micro level, where the program’s 
accounting and accountability practices intersect with rural villages. My analysis argues that accounting 
can be mobilized towards emergent change processes both within public organizations and wider social 
practices to impact the daily lives of underprivileged rural citizens. In MGNREGS, accounting as an 
organizational and social practice is not only shaped by organizational objectives but also in turn shapes 
these objectives and the field’s material structure, players, powers, logics and habitus. Accounting practices 
are, thus, an important part of the ordering, (re)organizing and multi-level change processes in the field of 
social services in India. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
As I have come to understand, where there is money there is usually an “account” of it. An account can be 
understood as a type of narrative (Messner, 2012), an oral or written discourse that can be connected to 
notions of responsibility and answerability. It “depends upon the ability to relay a set of sequential events 
with plausible transitions” (Butler, 2005, p.12). This dissertation provides a contextual, non-linear account 
of accounting and accountability practices through the unfolding implementation of a social services 
program. 
 
Growing up in India for me meant having an understanding and appreciation of why public-sector jobs 
remain tremendously coveted. According to the 2011 Indian census, approximately 70% of India’s 
population lives in rural areas (Government of India (GOI), 2011) and over 20% of all Indian citizens are 
clearly below the poverty line, earning less than the $1.90/day measure used by the World Bank (World 
Bank, 2016). The total absence of a national or provincial social safety net for a majority of the population 
fuels the value of what public positions offer: substantial amounts of formal and informal power; social 
standing; job security; and social security in the forms of medical, education support and a pension. My life 
in Canada produced a completely different set of experiences, with a governance–citizen relationship 
expressed through availability of social service programs and access to social security in the form of 
pensions, healthcare and a range of support programs for the underprivileged.  
 
What did not vary across the two countries was the significant amount of public and private funds invested 
into this sector. The field of social services combines social objectives with public and non-public funding 
in complex delivery arrangements that connect macro-level funders to micro-level implementation. As this 
amount of social investment grows, so does the role of accountability connected to program management 
and accounting at multiple process points (Torres & Pina, 2003) such as planning, budgeting, control, 
performance management and financial reporting. Initial conversations with various non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) delivering social welfare programs in Ontario confirmed themes of increased focus 
and pressure on the ability to produce program accounts by public and non-public funders in developed 
nations (Benjamin, 2008). 
 
The insight that emerged for me is that in the field of social services, linking accounting and management 
processes to accountability can be fraught with contextual challenges of conversion, quantifications, and 
implementational realities. My NGO conversations also reflect the variety of interpretations and 
expressions (Ahrens, 1996; Sinclair, 1995) that accountability can represent given the role, position and 
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interest of the stakeholder. Since organizations do not function in silos, singular renditions defining 
accounting are quite meaningless (Malone, 2007; Koppell, 2005) as accountability seems to be an ever-
expanding concept (Mulgan, 2000). Preston, Cooper & Coombs (1992) explore the construction of budgets 
in National Health Service in the United Kingdom, while Ebrahim (2002) examines struggles over 
quantification and control between NGOs and international funders in India. Both studies present instances 
of organizational cycles of framing and translations, processes of evaluation determining the demanding or 
providing of accounts towards the conversion of organizational objectives into practice. So, to my 
perspective, such processes cannot be understood merely through the study of the phenomenon at one 
specific level of inquiry. 
 
My motivation in this dissertation is to better understand the various roles accounting can play in the multi-
level delivery, accountability and change processes in the life-cycle of a social services program as it 
initiates from the central (federal) government office and finds its way into the post office bank account of 
a program beneficiary in a remote Indian village. As Roberts (1991, p.355) outlines, “The analysis of 
accounting in systems of accountability (also) offers alternative ways to conceive the transformation of 
accounting.” Research in NGO funding and accountability (Ebrahim, 2002, 2003) has certainly increased 
but the same cannot be said of accountability research the public sector. An exploration of current literature 
in the field of social services, which straddles the public, private and third sector, reveals accounting-
accountability research to be a particularly underexplored area (Bracci & Llewellyn, 2012) with a 
conspicuous lack of diversity in research sites. This sector is undergoing a period of significant changes in 
terms of funders (Ebrahim, 2002, 2003; Brinkerhoff & Brinkerhoff, 2004), service delivery (Llewellyn, 
1997), performance measurement and accountability (Walz & Ramachandran, 2011) in developed and 
developing countries. These facilitate a unique set of observations and understandings as some of these 
programs evolve, grow and transform. 
 
An otherwise unrelated visit to India brought me into contact with the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural 
Employment Guarantee Scheme (MGNREGS), with substantial media coverage focusing on this program 
on a consistent basis. As Petersilia (1990) outlines, “the ideas embodied in innovative social programs are 
not self-executing.” MGNREGS’s execution of innovative accounting and accountability practices had 
become a political, administrative and financial battleground among the political and administrative wings 
of the government, other implementing agencies, non-governmental organizations, media, social activists 
and citizens (Jayasinghe & Wickramasinghe, 2011). For many years, continuous and tremendous amounts 
of public funds left central and state coffers, ostensibly to be pumped into rural employment through state 
governments. But under conditions of severe systemic corruption, bureaucracy, lack of oversight, 
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insufficient control and accountability mechanisms, and a heavy socioeconomic nexus at the local level, 
arguably a high percentage of this money did not seem to have reached the intended poor and 
underprivileged in rural India. 
 
Two elements of the program emerge as particularly important for this research project. First, the 
MGNREGS program is designed around its various financial and management accounting systems and 
practices with accountability as a core pillar objective. Release of extensive public funds towards national 
social objectives requires the capacity to control or account for such funds at the micro, meso and macro 
levels. For MGNREGS, designing and funding happen at the macro level but conversion and 
implementation happen at the meso and micro state level. The centre (the federal government) neither has 
direct access to village-level implementation, nor can it penalize state governments. The state governance 
itself faces immense geographical, resource and socioeconomic barriers in program implementation, 
control and accountability. Thus, at the heart of the challenges faced by MGNREGS were issues of 
conversion of notions of accountability into practice-based accountability. Decades’ worth of established 
and entrenched patterns and habituated ways of seeing and doing things in public organizations and local 
village governance have created significant barriers for change and the success of innovative practices. So, 
the challenge for accountability is also a challenge for accounting practices. 
 
Second, accounting practices have emerged to have significant roles in organizational and social change 
processes. Here accounting is not a part of the problem but a part of the solution. Though much of the public 
attention to MGNREGS was negative, identifying significant program failings, corruption and 
misappropriation of funds, there were positive voices from some state governments, non-government 
organizations and economists such as Jean Dreze, which were being drowned out. These voices locate sites 
where the program implementation is being turned around – in the state of Andhra Pradesh, for example. 
These can shed light on successful implementation strategies, transition mechanisms and processes that 
provide potential best practices for other Indian states, should they want to focus on MGNREGS. 
 
Considering the challenge of India’s entrenched sociopolitical context, I became very interested in the form, 
purpose and manner in which accounting practices could become enlisted in implementation and 
transformational processes connected to program objectives and accountability at different levels in 
program delivery. 
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The Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (MGNREGS) 
The MGNREGS program was initiated through the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment 
Guarantee Act (NREGA) in 2006. It is a demand-driven social security program, largely centrally 
sponsored (with partial state support), with a public delivery system. The World Bank’s report “The State 
of Social Security Nets, 2015” (World Bank, 2015) ranks MGNREGS as the largest social safety net 
program in the world while the Indian government calls it “perhaps the largest and most ambitious social 
security and public works programme in the world” (Ministry of Rural Development (MoRD), 2012). 
MGNREGS grants the right of employment to the poorest in rural India. 
 
“The MGNREG Act is the first ever law internationally, that guarantees wage employment at an 
unprecedented scale. The primary objective of the Act is augmenting wage employment” (MoRD, 
2010). 
 
India’s MGNREGS guarantees 100 days of employment in one financial year to any rural family willing to 
do unskilled work. The program not only aims to enhance livelihood but targets urban migration, generation 
of local assets and empowerment of women and minorities in local governance. With the 2011 Government 
of India (GOI) census showing approximately 70% of India’s population of 1.21 billion as residing in rural 
India (Chandramoulic, 2011), this is a massive program in every sense – geographical, administrative, 
financial and technological. It initially started with 200 districts in Phase I in 2006 and eventually covered 
all of India except 100% urban areas (MoRD, 2013, p.2). MGNREGS unmatched financial outlay generated 
more than 11 billion person-days of work through an investment of over Rs. (Rupees) 2,124 million or 
Canadian $42 billion from 2006 to 2014 (MoRD, 2013–14, p. 9; 1 Canadian dollar = Rs. 50 approximately). 
The budget outlay for the year 2013–2014 alone was Rs. 330 billion or CAD 6.6 billion (MoRD, 2013–
2014). 
 
MGNREGA, a workfare or “work-for-welfare” program, is a type of non-entitlement welfare program 
providing citizens with state support and benefits conditional on mandatory economic participation in the 
shape of paid work, job search, and study or training (Saunders, 2005). In many developed countries it has 
replaced traditional welfare services support for the unemployed. In developing and underdeveloped 
countries, without a security net for the unprotected, workfare programs have come to fill a variety of 
purposes, from crisis cash and food to income, employment, skill development and building public 
infrastructure, while reflecting a variety of structures, strategies and institutional arrangements. Some, 
called “cash-for-work” or “conditional cash exchange” (Fiszbein, Schady, & Ferreira, 2009; Bourguignon, 
Ferreira & Leite, 2003) programs, are funded by international aid organizations such as the World Bank, 
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while others are “Public Works” (Subbarao, 2003), short- and long-term programs funded by the 
central/federal government. They all involve state support in return for, usually, work. 
 
MGNREGS is considered by the Indian government to be a “paradigm shift from earlier wage employment 
programs” and it is ground breaking in several ways. First, the government has legislated (rights-based) 
citizen participation at the rural level – right to work, participate, and hold to account. Second, the right to 
work is based on self-selection both for employment and public works at the village level. Self-selection 
means work is provided to those who demand it. The village as a collective also has the right to determine 
local assets created through the program’s public works, so long as they are within the types of works 
allowed. The MGNREGS budget, therefore, does not technically have a ceiling, as all verified demand for 
work from rural beneficiaries that comes up in the form of the labour budget must be honoured. The central 
government bears the entire cost of wages of unskilled manual workers and 75% of the cost of materials 
and wages of skilled and semi-skilled workers. The state governments bear the remaining 25% of the cost 
of materials and wages of skilled and semi-skilled workers, administrative expenses of the State 
Employment Guarantee Council (SEGC) and unemployment allowance in case the state is unable to provide 
waged employment on time. Third, MGNREGS is designed with a bottom-up structure, backed by 
legislation; key planning, budgeting, implementation, reporting and accountability processes are designed 
to take place at the village and block (micro) level with rural citizens envisioned as key stakeholders. The 
processes and records they generate are collated up to the block, state (provincial) and central (federal) 
government levels. 
 
Administrative structure 
The MGNREGA administrative architecture draws on India’s and Mahatma Gandhi’s concept of the 
panchayati raj system of self-governance at the local/village level. The panchayati raj is a highly 
decentralized model of governance that flows between the central (federal), state (provincial) and three 
other levels between the state and the rural beneficiary. Starting from the central government, the Ministry 
of Rural Development (MoRD) works with the Central Employment Guarantee Council (CEGC), the latter 
set up as an apex watchdog for the program. At the state level, the state government rural development 
departments work with the State Employment Guarantee Council (SEGC), which is set up for review, 
monitoring and evaluation of MGNREGS performance (Appendix B). 
 
At the micro level, the village elects its own representative committee of five “elders” called the gram 
panchayat (GP) presided over by the panchayat President. The GP is designated as the implementing 
agency for a major portion of the MGNREGS public works at the village level. It is also at the village level 
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that many financial, operational and other implementational records are created and maintained. The 
panchayat Secretary is the state government representative for the program at the village level, and most 
processes and documents need the combined authority and signatures of both the President and the 
Secretary in order to minimize agency issues. As detailed below, between the village and the state are two 
additional levels of governance: district and block. 
 
The various levels of governance include (Appendices A, B) 
 Level One: Ministry of Rural Development, Government of India; CEGC, both responsible to the 
central government and Indian Parliament.  
 Level Two: State governments: Elected cabinet of ministers and the administrative wing; SEGC, 
responsible to the central government for funds spent. 
 Level Three: The district or zilla level, directly under the state level. It consists of the district or 
zilla panchayat and is presided over by the district program coordinator (DPC). The DPC reports 
to the state government (through the SEGC), which in turn reports to the central government 
(through the CEGC and MoRD). 
 Level Four: The block or tehsil level; a block consists of an intermediate block-level janpad 
panchayat and is presided over by the block officer (BO). Each block has from 20 to 100 villages. 
 Level Five: The gram panchayat and the gram sabha (GS), at the village level; the GS is a village-
level public assembly that includes all adults living in the village. 
 
The administrative culture within the government agencies can be seen through the lens of an official 
habitus (Bourdieu, 1980). This refers to the visible and underlying rules of the game – the positional 
distributions, understandings, knowledge, attitudes, preferences and conditioning that influence the way the 
inner workings of an organization and its employees. Such a habitus can be communicated, diffused and 
reproduced through logics, understandings and acceptances that are internalized by employees. The village, 
though not an organization, functions on its own set of logics, rules and habitus. These social, cultural and 
economic understandings do not have to be explained to its members. They are accumulated tacitly through 
lived experiences that are internalized. These rules, relationships and arrangements deeply influence what 
is acceptable, who has the power, and the way things are done. We will explore this concept in more detail 
in the following chapters. 
 
Process map 
The MGNREGS program is constituted of a complex mix of structures, practices and personnel combined 
into various concurrent and nested processes that make up the program. In this section, I discuss some of 
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the process and workflow maps for the program as a whole as well as specific subprocesses, in order to 
provide a clearer framework for understanding an annual program cycle (Appendices C, D and E). 
 
The NREG Legislative Act created a macro governance vision which, combined with elements such as its 
political-administrative environment, shapes the overall framework, practices and systems for the national 
program. This process outlines boundary conditions – enabling and limiting factors within which program 
(and accounting) practices, artifacts and interactions must function. The central government in its initial 
role is the designer, funder and facilitator. Its program framework is communicated and diffused to the 
meso level through the MoRD’s Operational Guidelines and other government communications. Each state 
is entrusted with the public resources, powers and responsibilities to convert the larger national vision into 
state-specific visions, objectives and guidelines. Some states have chosen to create new program 
departments for MGNREGS, while others have assigned the program to existing rural development 
departments running existing programs. After the approval of state-level guidelines and objectives by the 
political wing, the administrative wing works on producing supporting policies, rulings, commitment of 
resources, systems and practices that put the program into real motion. These state departments, connected 
to rural development, are responsible for the larger planning, implementation, reporting, control, auditing 
and accountability processes relating to the program. State-level data is also collated and analyzed at this 
level for state functioning and central reporting. The program is then put in practice at the village level 
through various line and staff departments at district, block and local governance levels, working with 
elected village representatives. 
 
Planning and works module – The program process initiates with the planning and works module at the 
village level. Dates for village meetings called gram sabhas (GS’s) are declared well in advance. At the GS 
in each village, all adults in the village, block and district government representatives, and NGOs and 
community-based organizations (CBOs) can be present. The GS is a participative process where the 
stakeholders mentioned above discuss alternatives for village projects, present works proposed for the 
village, and finally approve an agreed-upon shelf of public works. This shelf of works then moves to the 
block level for technical, administrative and financial approval. Upon approval, it is converted into that 
village’s MGNREGS labour budget. This budget is collated from each village to the block level, which is 
why state support, resources and manpower are required at each village and block level. From the block 
panchayat and block-level administrative office, this budget travels to the district-level panchayat office for 
further approval and collation. It then finally reaches the MGNREGS office at the state level to become a 
consolidated state MGNREGS labour budget. Each state level budget is send to the central MoRD where, 
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upon approval of performance parameters, it becomes the national labour budget for the MGNREGS 
program. 
 
Demand and implementation module – The second module is connected to the work demand and 
implementation processes that take place at the village level. GPs in most states are the responsible agency 
for these processes. Players at the village level include government officials, contracted employees, elected 
village representatives, NGOs and rural citizens. The workflow process kicks off by the GS asking villagers 
who want to work through MGNREGS to register for a job card. This registration is meant to allow each 
village to estimate demand for work. The GP then issues job cards to each individual who has requested for 
work under the program. Upon technical approval of the public works by the engineer and assistant 
engineers at the block level (Appendix D), which is the output of the planning module, government officers 
and contracted government agents – “mates” – go to the village and physically map out the dimension of 
each work project and the labour it will employ. Materials required in the processes are bought through 
contractors. Program beneficiaries then begin work on these public works projects in and around their own 
villages. The end of this process is signified by the completion of a public works project and creation of a 
village asset. Connected to this level are requirements of creation, maintenance and transmission of 
extensive financial and operational documents, registers and accounts. 
 
Fund transfer module – At the state and central level, the planning function and labour budget of each 
state is connected to performance management indicators, on the basis of which the central government, 
represented by the MoRD, approves the release of program funds. Once various meetings and subprocesses 
towards funds approval are successfully completed, the centre transfers approved program funds to state 
government coffers. The states add their share of contribution to this fund, and depending on the delivery 
mode and pattern selected, these funds are then transferred to the District Program Coordinator (DPC) for 
further conveyance to the village panchayat President and Secretary. Based on job cards issued, village 
musters, and work progress registers that track the projects and hours worked, the program funds are then 
supposed to reach the rural beneficiaries through the village Secretary.  
 
This multi-level transmission of funds from level to level, until they reach the village, has created ample 
opportunity for misappropriation. For example, collusion between the village President and Secretary 
allowed the creation and verification of ghost workers. Wages issued to these non-existing workers were 
then siphoned off by both these players. In the later years of program implementation, states such as 
Rajasthan invested in building an internal audit department. States such as Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, which 
fared poorly in MGNREGS program implementation, invested less in supporting accountable reporting and 
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fund control measures. The state of Andhra Pradesh, then home to the technological hub city of Hyderabad, 
invested in fund transfer technologies and an electronic fund management system (eFMS) (Appendix L) 
for a more direct and traceable transmission of billions of rupees of public funds from the government to 
the beneficiaries. Connected to this are newer work cycles associated with muster rolls and payment. 
Appendix M provides a visual illustration of a muster roll payment cycle in the state of Andhra Pradesh, 
where the interval from the opening of the muster to the payment of wages to program beneficiaries is just 
13 days. 
 
Accounting practices and artifacts 
Accounting artifacts represent stakeholder-shaped and -prepared physical objects, including process 
records (works registers, project costing, job cards and registers for expenditure, asset and cash), financial 
accounting records (cash books, receipts and payment statements; bank and post office reconciliation 
statements), the MGNREGS labour budget (budget documents), various policy documents, sub-state 
performance measures (work-days generated, wages disbursed, complaints resolved, utilization certificates) 
and financial and operational audits reports at the village, block, district and state levels. At the central 
level, accounting and financial artifacts include national labour budgets, state performance measures as well 
as other measures such as committee reports, national monitor audit reports, fund transfer orders, and 
utilization certificates. At the local/micro level, construction of accounts is the key activity around which 
the program and other related processes revolve. Many key process documents, such as job card 
registrations, job cards issued, and works, materials and complaints registers, are maintained at the village 
level. 
 
The program planning, implementation, fund disbursal and performance management processes that 
populate MGNREGS are supported by numerous accounting artifacts and interactions in the multiple levels 
of MGNREGS. These artifacts play several important roles in MGNREGS. These constructions provide 
insights into the distribution of powers and resources. They are also a source and expression of field-level 
logics and stakeholder perceptions of themselves and others. They act as process guides, revealing various 
economic, political and administrative influences that shape and direct the program. At the village level, 
the shelf of projects, labour budget and social audit report provide a platform for stakeholders to interact 
and create understandings associated with accounting and accountability. The artifacts also provide a basis 
for interactions between the various levels of governance while also storing and communicating financial 
and accounting data. The latent understandings, attitudes and socializations that come with lived 
experiences, including construction of accounting artifacts and the interactions around such construction(s), 
shape the positional powers and actions of multiple stakeholders. So, to better understand the inner working 
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of the program we have to better understand how accounting artifacts are designed, enlisted and utilized at 
different levels of governance. 
 
The state management control system (MCS) has the potential to plan, implement and control program 
objectives, policies and rulings connected to state-wide program implementation, but it is dependent on the 
quality of the system itself and its capacity to capture timely and relevant program data through mechanisms 
such as the management information system (MIS) and audits. It connects to the state MGNREGS labour 
budget in the planning function as well as through various fund management systems. The state of Andhra 
Pradesh, for example, invested early into an electronic fund management system (eFMS) (Appendix L) to 
reduce unproductive parking of central funds. Financial and operational audits have been used by state 
governments with varying intensities and degrees of success. The state of Rajasthan, for example, has been 
particularly successful in building and running a large internal audit department. Other states such as Tamil 
Nadu have built stronger audit practices supported by vigilance, judicial and legal resources. Poorer states 
such as Uttar Pradesh, Odissa, Bihar and Assam have been less successful in job creation and building 
systems and accounting artifacts to track performance and funds (Darooka, 2016). These decisions are 
specific to states and their internal objectives and goals. 
 
The state-level management information systems (MIS) are a key mechanism of the state MCS and so are 
critical to overall successful program implementation and control (Appendix J). The MIS was envisioned 
with the potential to be the information hub and backbone of this geographically extensive program, 
facilitating more efficient governance-at-a-distance for the state and central governments. Every state has 
the power and the responsibility to manage its MIS platform structure, technology, policy and resources 
decisions so long as it aligns with the overall MGNREG Act and the MoRD vision. At the meso level, the 
state MIS platform was envisioned to be responsible for the recording and reporting of financial and 
operational activities from the village level up. It was to follow the progress of thousands of concurrent 
public work sites across geographical and administrative state distances, and to connect to the central 
government system on one side, while on the other side it would align with the state MCS and financial 
system consisting of banks and post office accounts at block and village levels. At both meso and micro 
levels, transparency, accountability and implementation depend on system quality and on timeliness of 
reporting and program data uploaded from block office computers at the micro level. This requires not only 
communication and data technology but also infrastructure and information technology (IT) personnel to 
input and upload data. A larger commitment of resources and personnel is required towards vigilance and 
enforcement of construction and reporting of accounting and operational data at the village and block levels. 
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The central-government MIS platform was initially envisioned as a network system maintained by the 
MoRD, which would connect to each state MIS. This platform was to provide the essential link between 
the centre and state level, as the centre itself was not directly connected to program implementation. This 
would enable the MoRD to access and track state performances and provide public access to records of 
spending and disbursal in millions of public works sites across the country. This was its potential; but the 
actual system was unable to accomplish much of this in the first few cycles, although some states have 
made strides towards it.  
 
Challenge of established patterns 
Connected to the program landscape and its substantial challenges are some major legacy issues: 
 
Financial and control issues (management control and information systems) – Given the considerable 
funds allocated to the program, many of the key problems can be traced back to struggles of power and lack 
of control and accountability for public funds. The distributed accountability model of the program and the 
inability of central and state governments to track such a large-scale program created significant 
opportunities for inefficiency and fund leakages, especially at the micro level. Lack of coordination between 
various levels of government, archaic financial reporting processes, inadequate administrative and 
management control systems, outdated fund disbursal and delivery systems and ineffectual performance 
measures are only a few of the issues that aided in creating low levels of vigilance, control and 
accountability and high levels of corruption. Though separate departments for MGNREGS were created at 
the state level by several state governments, most others did not seem to have the resources, vision or 
processes to run the program well. In most cases personnel, technological, financial infrastructure 
connected to the MIS, fund management systems, materials management and performance evaluation were 
underdeveloped or missing altogether. At the micro level, rural infrastructure connecting the state to 
districts, blocks and villages was also rudimentary, making it difficult to oversee and support the program. 
This included lack of adequate roads, vehicles, computers and phones to allow physical and technological 
access for state government representatives to visit, implement, audit and observe. For some states, as the 
program progressed, efforts and investments into the program produced improvements in many of these 
issues. 
 
Governance issues (Corruption, inefficiency and weak delivery system) – The relationship between 
governance, corruption and internal control mechanisms has been outlined by both academic and industry 
think-tank research alike. Findings from Ashcroft, McGregor, & Swales (2005) at the Economic and 
Research Council on Devolution, and from other related studies (Pearce & Ayres, 2007) in the UK, reflect 
12 
 
the success of devolved governance towards creating “more transparent, collaborative and democratically 
accountable government” in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales. Academic studies such as Sargiacomo, 
Ianni, D’Andreamatteo, & Servalli (2015) and Neu, Everett, & Rahaman (2015) also outline spaces of 
governance that house corrupt practices and the roles played by internal management, financial control and 
vigilance mechanisms.  
 
India is making progress in practice in this regard but there remains substantial space for change and 
improved functioning. The country has a history of established bureaucracy and a lack of efficient 
mechanisms of governance and accountability, combined with rampant corruption. Most central- and state‐
sponsored welfare programs in India have been found to be hamstrung by corruption and inefficiency 
(Saxena, 2001; Niehaus and Sukhtankar 2012), with both the government and targeted poor paying a high 
cost for the persistence of weak delivery systems. “The fatalist ordinary Indian has learnt to live with these 
varieties of corruption as easily as with his pantheon of Gods” (Saxena, 2001). The benefits received by the 
poor typically are a fraction of the fiscal outlay awarded to them (Mukhopadhyay, Muralidharan, Niehaus, 
& Sukhtankar, 2013, p. 5). Media articles such as “Is corruption in our DNA?” (Sharma, 2011) and quotes 
from Indian political leaders such as Montek Singh Ahluwalia (Times of India, 2009) support the presence 
of substantial, unchecked leakage of public funds sanctioned and disbursed for the poor. The Right to 
Information Act (RTI) was passed in 2005 towards civil society activism and citizen-based government 
accountability and transparency. The Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) report tabled in Parliament 
in April, 2013 called the monitoring of the MGNREGS program by the Central government 
“unsatisfactory” (Times of India, 2013). The entrenched, outdated administrative and control systems 
combined with government officers secure in their jobs created barriers for the assigning of responsibility 
and resistance to change. Over time, this environment created an underlying apathy to systemic 
inefficiencies and ideas of efficiency and accountability. Misuse of public funds at most levels is considered 
culturally acceptable, normalized and deemed a standard practice. 
 
Administrative scope and political challenges – The connection between accounting practices and 
administrative and political influences leads us an immense body of literature that includes public 
accounting practices, accounting standard setting, and social and environmental accounting (Tinker, 1980; 
Cooper & Sherer, 1984; Zeff, 2002; Wickramasinghe & Hopper, 2005). To get a better sense of India’s 
administrative scope, India is the seventh largest nation in the world geographically and the second largest 
by population, being home to over 1.2 billion people. The MGNREGS is currently applicable to all the rural 
districts in the country. Currently India’s 29 states and 7 union territories have a total of 655 districts, 589 
district panchayats, 6,316 block panchayats and 239,510 gram panchayats (Ministry of Panchayati Raj, 
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GOI). The program serves approximately 70% of the total Indian population in 2013 (World Bank, 2016) 
across a vast geographical stretch that occupies most of the Indian subcontinent. Portions of the country are 
still underdeveloped in terms of infrastructure, including electricity, roads, telephones, computers and 
internet.  
 
As further insight into the scale of the program, in 2006–07 the program completed over 38,700 public 
works, with more than 44,800 works in progress; and 905 million person-days of work were provided with 
an expenditure of Rs. 88.23 billion (MoRD, 2006–07, p. 31). In comparison in the year 2012–13, 41.6 
million households (Appendix F) were provided employment and 1.41 billion person-days of employment 
were generated (MoRD Report to the People, 2013, pp. 17–18). In 2013–14, the program produced 1.35 
billion person-days of work employment, undertaking 11.16 million works (including new works and spill-
over from the previous financial year) with an expenditure of Rs. 178.32 billion (MoRD, 2013–14, pp. 19–
34). The program structure is stipulated by the NREG Act to be decentralized, participative and localized. 
At the micro level, program planning and implementation are attached to the existing, embattled system of 
panchayati raj institutions (PRIs), mired in its own agency challenges of large-scale local nexus. In the PRI 
system, the village is the base administrative unit, governing itself. Therefore, each of the 239,510 gram 
panchayats/villages mentioned above must hold its individual special gram sabha and construct its own 
village-specific shelf of projects and its own labour budget.  
 
The panchayat Secretaries appointed at village level report to the block development officers at the block 
level, who in turn report to Program Officers at the district level, who in turn report to the state government. 
The state governments have to demonstrate their program needs to the Centre (MoRD, 2013). The 
administration wings in the Indian government are staffed and managed by the bureaucratic layer – public 
officers at various designations and levels. The elected political leaders sit atop this power pyramid. The 
political wing at the state level is responsible to its citizens, while the political wing at the central level is 
responsible to Parliament and to Indian citizens in toto. With multiple layers of governance and bureaucratic 
communication, activities at each level generate copious amounts of financial and administrative documents 
for reporting purposes as well as record maintenance. Even so, it seems difficult to hold any persons or 
departments responsible for the performance of the program. 
 
Any public program, let alone one as large as MGNREGS, would require not only vertical but also 
horizontal coordination between various public agencies at multiple tiers of governance, each with their 
own aligned or divergent set of funding, motivations, objectives and agendas. The agency issues may 
become further exacerbated if the interests of both the administrative and political parties align, so that they 
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further each other’s interests. Alternatively, joint support of a program can contribute to a turnaround, such 
as we see in Andhra Pradesh. Added to this coordination equation are the decentralized layers of the 
panchayati raj system – district or zilla panchayat at the district level; block or mandal/taluk Panchayat at 
the block level, and village-level panchayat – that also have roles to play. This has traditionally been a 
severely deficient area for control and accountability in the public sector and its rural development 
departments. A similar pattern also emerged for MGNREGS in terms of inefficiency in program delivery 
and underperformance of the program in many implementations. 
 
For a program of this financial and operation scale to do well and reach the intended target, overcoming 
systemic issues, the administrative and political wings also have to work together towards a common goal. 
History reflects a lack of administrative autonomy due to political interference and intervention as well as 
lack of political support for programs such as MGNREGS. If the objectives envisioned for MGNERGS had 
to be nudged into reality, the starting point would have to be the political support of the ruling government 
so that the administrative wing could be provided the resources, support and motivation towards better 
program implementation and a higher percentage of the program benefits reaching the rural poor (MoRD, 
2008). 
 
Management and technical challenges – The inherited legacy information systems were severely outdated 
and fragmented at both state and central levels. The initial organizational infrastructure could not support 
even basic program functioning for budgeting, public works and fund flow of such a massive program. The 
myriad implementational hurdles included incomplete, lagged and unverified information such as work 
registrations, issue of job cards, work and financial estimates, disbursal of wages and resolving of 
grievances. This meant that state governments did not have access to meso and micro program information 
towards their management control processes, let alone the capacity to link with the central system. 
Management accounting and other information could not be collated towards planning, setting of 
objectives, program implementation, vigilance, performance measurement and control. The lack of ability 
to access or assimilate village-level data and generate reports also created a strong window of criminal 
opportunity for, amongst others, local officials, as financial accountability could not be enforced in this 
distributed architecture. 
 
Sociocultural barriers – Developing nations are known to have culturally distinct notions of accountability 
that differ from those of developed nations, making it difficult to understand them through traditional, pre-
existing Western models (Dar, 2014). A key factor in India is the setup of social and cultural life at the 
micro level (Dar, 2014, pp. 132–133). The MGNREGS program was visualized as a means for the poorest 
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subsection of society to earn a living and participate in governance and implementation decisions, while 
holding other stakeholders accountable. At the village level, different but nevertheless significant patterns 
of dominance, corruption and interference are run by the locally powerful – the elected village panchayat, 
money lenders, land owners, and those with physical and financial means and powers. The average rural 
citizen lives in poverty with little power and awareness, while those with some awareness would not have 
the resources to resist such pressures, knowing that this is how the system works. The rural citizens are thus 
the largest but least dominant stakeholder in the program. A major enabler in corruption at the local level 
has been found to be the collusion between the elected village representatives and public and/or technical 
officers. As Ram Jethmalani, a prominent and highly respected lawyer and politician, has written: 
 
Evidence from the field suggests that it (panchayati raj) has certainly decentralized corruption that 
now runs through new pipelines from New Delhi to state capitals to the villages of India, and 
created a new breed of village despots and exploiters of the aam admi (common man). And it is 
highly likely that the amount of 10 paisa (10%) reaching the aam admi has reduced further 
(Jethmalani, n.d.). 
 
Research questions 
Much has been written about the gap between accounting research and practice. This research–practice gap 
is also voiced in other areas such as government-sponsored health services and programs (Green, Ottoson, 
Garcia, & Hiatt, 2009) in the public sector. Within this setting, research in accounting practice and 
accountability in governmental activity are still quite limited. The field of social services, in specific, with 
its extensive financial allocations, newer, cross-sector delivery formats and social impact, remains 
conspicuously underrepresented in conversations about accounting. The rise of NGO-delivered programs 
has led to a growing body of literature looking at social programs and accountability in developmental and 
non-profit organizational settings (Ebrahim, 2003). But notions of accountability in developed nations, as 
well as their models of understanding developing nations, point to strong differences in Western and non-
Western accountability (Dar, 2014). 
 
Complexity in modern governance is juxtaposed with the integral element of public-sector accountability, 
including policy, organizational and management performance (Aucoin & Heintzman, 2000, pp. 244–245). 
Here accountability can be connected to multiple purposes: control for misuse of public authority, misuse 
of public funds, and tools to improve public management (Aucoin & Heintzman, 2000, pp. 244–245). 
Accounting studies connected to Power’s (1997) “audit society” and drawing on frameworks such as 
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Foucault’s disciplinary power (Hoskin & Macve, 1986) explore this connection between governance and 
the exercise of power in governance settings. 
 
Potentially transformative programs with immense budgets such as MGNREGS can place strong demands 
on accountability and answerability for government departments. MGNREGS brings the social dimension 
into the financial and the financial into the social. Rise in fund allocations and newer delivery formats that 
include civil society and citizen participation in social services and welfare programs challenge traditional 
definitions. They create additional layers of stakeholders and accountability, raising questions about public 
money in terms of conveyance, dispensing, expenditure and effectiveness. In MGNERGS, financial and 
management accounting practices and artifacts have been enlisted in multiple roles and functions at each 
layer of program planning, implementation and control. Additionally, the program connects public sector 
accountability to notions of financial and operational transparency and citizen-based accountability. 
 
The high levels of corruption, inefficiency and misappropriation of public funds found in MGNREGS create 
significant challenges for achieving program objectives. So how can the central and state governments deal 
with such extensive corruption, accountability and other systemic issues towards better multi-level program 
implementation for MGNREGS? How can state governments address entrenched public-sector mindsets 
within the meso organizational level and the unfavourable socioeconomic environment at the micro village 
level? Is the level of commitment to the program constant across all Indian states? From an accounting 
perspective and program implementation that spans eight annual cycles, what role did accounting systems 
and practice play in constructing the initial structure of the program and its notions of accountability? How 
were accounting systems, processes, practices and artifacts subsequently enlisted towards program 
objectives of financial and operational transparency and citizen-oriented accountability? What strategies, 
policies, mechanisms and choices were utilized by specific state governments to improve implementation 
and accountability in MGNREGS? What resources were available and required by governments to create 
financial and operational transparency and a shift in program circumstances at the meso and micro level? 
Did the internal MCS have a role to play in the creation of a systemic shift? What role did accounting 
practices and rural citizens play in change processes at the micro level that unfolded over an eight-year 
period? 
 
Looking at the questions outlined above, I examined many different ways in which financial and 
management accounting were enlisted at the research sites and considered multiple ways in which research 
questions could be framed (Atkinson, Balakrishnan, Booth, et al., 1997). Following the unfolding of 
MGNREGA across eight years, this discussion raises two major questions that need to be addressed: 
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1. How are accounting practices and artifacts intentionally enlisted in MGNERGS towards notions of 
accountability across multiple levels of program governance? Specifically: 
 Framing of notions of accountability at the macro level – how is accounting enlisted by the central 
government (the MoRD) towards the framing and diffusion of a national program vision, 
objectives and specific notions of accountability for state governments? 
 Construction of accountability at the meso level – What is the role of strategic accounting practices 
in the construction of accountability and reform at the state governance level? 
 Implementation of accountability at the micro level – Against the backdrop of MGNREGS’s larger 
centre/state MCS strategy, how are accounting processes implicated in accountability at the village 
level? 
 
2. What role do accounting practices in MGNREGS play in larger, multi-level organizational and social 
change processes: 
 in the distribution of capitals and habitus, at multiple program levels?  
 in routines, learning and emancipation at the micro level? 
 
I draw upon framing, construction and implementation to represent different stages of accountability in the 
program. The change processes include public strategy and reform at macro and meso levels; and routines, 
learning and citizen emancipation (Gallhofer & Haslam, 2004; Alawattage & Wickramasinghe, 2009) at 
the meso-micro level. 
 
Importance of research 
This research is important for several reasons. First, it looks at innovative public accounting practices that 
differ from existing frameworks of devolved governance in the public sector and participative models in 
the private and developmental sector. Second, it provides a practice-based empirical analysis of the 
intersection of accounting and notions of accountability at multiple tiers of governance. Third, it speaks to 
a deep need to explore the potential role of social and critical accounting as an agent for emancipation 
(Spence, 2009; Molisa, 2011). Finally, workfare and social services programs are an underrepresented area 
in accounting research, as well as in less developed countries (LDCs). Workfare programs, albeit in 
remarkably different institutional and sociocultural settings, are increasingly being used in countries such 
as India, Brazil, Liberia, Argentina and the Philippines. Workfare programs reach grassroots and involve 
significant budgeting, fund dispersal, financial and operational control, and accountability of public funds 
at a local level, so it is hard not to envision an important role for accounting systems at the micro level. In 
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response to calls for more current and more relevant research for management control systems (Chenhall, 
2003, p.130) in general and LDCs in particular (Hopper et al., 2009), this dissertation provides an empirical 
opportunity to study a non-Eurocentric (Gray, Dillard & Spence, 2009) workfare program built around its 
innovative multi-hierarchical accounting practices and systems that serve as both inputs and outputs. 
 
Research contribution 
The research questions contribute to current literature, both theoretically and empirically in several ways.  
First, on a theoretical level, Bourdieu notes that habitus as accumulated history (Bourdieu, 1986), a lasting 
system of dispositions, emerges through an addition of past experiences and understandings. In this 
dissertation, I extend this understanding to present habitus as a process in the field of social services. I 
provide a temporal analysis of an eight-year program unfolding, with contextual environment and strategic 
elements reflecting the understanding and absorption of new understandings, attitudes and actions 
connected to accounting practices, processes and accountability. In effect, drawing on Bourdieu, I provide 
an analysis of a set of conditions, and a progression that produces the circumstances and conditioning, 
towards making and changing of the individual and collective habitus of players. 
 
Second, literature on strategic accounting and MCS is garnering increasing attention but has not yet 
connected to the public sector in a significant manner. Accompanied with dramatic changes in economic, 
political and cultural landscapes (Neu, Everett, & Rahaman, 2009), centralized governance has seen 
significant decline in its role and power through new public management–based reforms (Bardhan, 2002). 
The social services sector has also witnessed its own sets of reform in developed nations and international 
developmental problems delivered by non-governmental organizations. In light of the changing structural 
and informational need of effective modern governance, I add to this body of research by arguing that in 
the delivery of social services programs, accounting and strategic MCS can become enlisted to bring to 
shape the material arrangements of a field through management strategy (Langfield-Smith, 1997, 2008) and 
through distribution of resources and selection of control mechanisms (Kober, Ng, & Paul, 2007; Henri, 
2006). The relationship between accounting practices, artifacts and interactions populates MGNREGS 
towards program implementation and control. 
 
Third, accountability in a context such as MGNREGS presents issues steeped in economic, political, 
sociocultural contexts, articulating complicated connection of interests and relationships (Gray, Bebbington 
& Collison, 2006, p.320-322; Dillard, 2008). The ingrained patterns of ineffectiveness, high bureaucracy 
and low levels of transparency and responsibility have been perpetuated for decades through conditioning 
and localized understandings of the “rules of the game,” as has also been seen in other developing nations. 
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The dominant public interpretation and discourse of MGNERGS reflects these conditions and its inability 
to fight the status quo at every level. Sidelined in this discourse is the awareness that the program also 
presents important sites of change, reform and learning. In conditions such as these, it is important to focus 
on how accounting can be a part of change processes and solutions in the public sector in terms of effective 
management and multi-level accountability. By examining various primary and secondary accounts of 
accountability at multiple levels, in this dissertation I highlight the role played by accounting in alternate 
interpretations and possibilities. 
 
Fourth, fields and sub-fields are nested into each other, representing individual and collective-level 
behaviour, strategy and action (Payne, Moore, Griffis, & Autry, 2011), yet a large percentage of research 
is focused on single-level analysis. Wider phenomena such as nationally run welfare programs run across 
multiple levels. The field in such programs is produced, reproduced and potentially transformed through 
the interactions among the specific configuration of frameworks. This includes policies, resources, 
infrastructure, socioeconomic contexts, and technology, as well as a collection of actors that includes 
central, state and local governance, politicians, rural citizens, civil society, and NGOs (Geels, 2011, p. 24). 
Limiting research in such phenomena to a single level is believed to yield incomplete understanding of such 
areas (Hitt, Beamish, Jackson, & Mathieu, 2007). Multi-level perspective (MLP) (Geels, 2011), research 
and analysis allows for richer insights into the processes that go through purposive and non-purposive 
longer-term unfolding and transition involving multiple actors. MLP also allows an investigation of 
influences, affects and effects that move from one tier to the next. In MGNREGS, multi-level focus is 
especially important because each level represents a build-up of the program that passes on to the next level. 
We see dramatically different pictures of stakeholders, habitus, interests and sociopolitical environment at 
each level. Adding to the limited multi-level research studies in accounting, this dissertation provides 
gridlines on a larger scale to trace the framing, construction and implementation of accountability. 
 
Fifth, in line with Neu (2001), accounting research has to move away from banality to connect to activities 
and practices that are of interest and relevance to the lived life of the world’s population. In part, this is 
because of a publishing focus on developed, first-world countries (Neu, 2001, p.320; Dillard, 2008; Gray, 
Dillard, & Spence, 2009). A large proportion of existing accounting research on developing nations focuses 
on supernational organizations such as UNDP and the World Bank and what they bring (Uddin & Hopper, 
2001, Neu & Ocampo, 2007). Amongst all this, ground-level micro research is fairly limited (Alawattage, 
Hopper, & Wickramasinghe, 2007) due to many issues, including geographical access. One of the reasons 
this research project is important is that through management accounting practices, it opens the black box 
of the potential of accounting in developing nations for the smallest unit of the program – the rural citizen. 
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Through this process, this research also attempts to present what social services and developmental 
programs in developing nations represent, the challenges they face and the socioeconomic circumstances 
under which they operate. 
 
Sixth, divergence between the interests of the larger social and those of locally powerful individuals can 
create circumstances in which individual rights become disregarded, oppressed or contested. As Adorno 
(1963) states, “Moral questions have always arisen when moral norms of behavior have ceased to be self-
evident and unquestioned in the life of a community” (as cited in Butler, 2005, p. 3). Structure and practices 
go hand in hand to create embedded cognitive systems – Bourdieu’s “habitus” – in individuals and the 
social collective The Indian villages in Andhra Pradesh present one such site of contestation, of social and 
cultural conditioning, wherein the downtrodden continue to contribute to their own position, which 
Bourdieu calls “symbolic violence.” Echoing the realization that individuals, organizations and systems all 
over the world are interconnected and interdependent, this dissertation connects the macro to the micro and 
structure to agency. Such an analysis – emancipatory accounting – provides a reconceptualization of 
accounting’s role in macro-meso strategy and micro change processes in the relationship between the state 
and the daily life of the rural poor (Alawattage & Wickramasinghe, 2009, p. 380). In contrast to normative 
and objective views, accounting in this dissertation is found to have the potential to reflect and compound 
a larger and deeper sphere of influence connected to the social and the habitus. This includes latent 
understandings, positional attitudes, behavior and actions, on both the individual and the group level. 
 
Outline of the dissertation 
MGNREGS is a vast and complicated program and one of the challenges and purposes of this discourse, 
with the extensive amount of data available, is to provide a clear, understandable and digestible level of 
contextual detail. Included in this discourse are strategic intentions as well as narratives that point to tacit 
perceptions, beliefs, behavior and actions beyond pure intentionality. As Bourdieu outlines, the field is 
shaped by more than just the aggregate of individual players’ strategies (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p.9, 
25). The process of planning, implementing program practices, construction of artifacts and the 
giving/demanding of account influences and shapes the internal structures, distribution of resources and 
understandings of a field and its actors. From this perspective, it is important to shed more light on 
accountability in practice, the purposes for which accounting can be put into motion, interactions with 
accounting practices and artifacts and finally the influences that shape the field and the “rules of the game.” 
 
Important to this discourse is the multi-tier setting of the analysis. Accountability can represent a variety of 
ideas and relationships – democratic governance, ethical behaviour, individual or organizational 
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responsibility, efficiency and result orientation, best practices, and transparency. Moreover, accounting 
practices, systems and artifacts have a vital role to play in the each of these representations of accountability. 
As I mentioned earlier, I draw upon “framing,” “construction” and “implementation” to represent different 
stages of accountability at a different governance level in MGNREGS. Starting at the macro central-
government level with the Ministry of Rural Development (MoRD), the meso level is represented by the 
state government, consisting of the administrative departments that run the state and the political wing; and 
finally the micro level includes local governance, elected village governance committees and rural citizens. 
Included at the meso-micro level are the layers of district, block and local governance that exist between 
the state level and the elected village governance committee. 
 
The role of accounting in the “framing” of accountability at the macro central-government level represents 
the work done towards creating the base framework for the program in terms of objectives, approaches and 
choices available to state governments. These provide initial form to the notions accountability can stand 
for, how it can function, what can be included and excluded and what it has the potential to accomplish – 
democratic governance, ethical behaviour, individual or organizational responsibility, efficiency and 
effectiveness, impact and result orientation, best practices, or transparency. In the case of the MGNRGA, 
notions of accountability are strongly connected to transparency and citizen accountability, both in the 
Central Legislative Act and the MoRD’s Operational Guidelines for states. 
 
The location of accounting in the “construction” phase of accountability represents the second step of the 
cycle. Here the state governments draw on the NREG Act and the MoRD’s Operational Guidelines and 
create the internal structures and components to support the centrally established framework. This 
populating of program implementation processes and accountability practices includes a strong function of 
interpretation allowed by the centre in order for state government to create state-specific program delivery 
mechanisms. The mobilization of precise state-selected accounting mechanisms such as control systems, 
MIS, reporting and performance measures in active roles allows these instruments to render abstract notions 
of accountability. 
 
Finally, the “implementation” stage happens between state and village levels. It represents the execution of 
accounting and accountability practices in the subfield. In conjunction with the characteristics and 
distribution of resources in the subfield, it is here that we see more clearly a meshing of the intentional and 
unintentional elements, the in-work unfolding of the practices, gaps and loopholes, and the influences that 
shape them towards the creation of accountability at the micro level. 
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In Chapter 2, I introduce the larger literature connecting accounting to accountability as well as various 
literatures connected to budgeting, MCS, social audit and learning. Chapter 3 is devoted to an in-depth 
discussion of the conceptual tools and the interpretive approach using a sociological theoretical framework 
I have drawn upon to conduct an analysis of the role of accounting in the implementation of accountability 
in social services. I explore specific elements of practice theory that include Bourdieu’s theory of practice 
– field, capitals and habitus – and Schatzki’s concepts of artifacts and interactions that mediate practice. I 
also explore frameworks connected to change and learning. 
 
Chapter 4 is the first analytical chapter. MGNREGA’s vision of accountability is aligned with transparency 
and citizen-based accountability. It is the task of the central government agency, the MoRD, to figure out 
the framework and outline that houses the bare bones of the program as well as what accountability is 
deemed to represent. We see reflected in this process the intent of the NREG Act as well as the MoRD 
vision of accountability for the state governments. Chapter 5 looks at accounting and accountability in 
MGNREGS at the state (provincial) level. I argue that the strategic mobilization of precise accounting 
mechanisms such as MCS and MIS, reporting and performance measurement in active roles allows the 
rendering of abstract notions of accountability. Chapter 6 explores the program implementation at the micro 
level stage. It analyzes the role of accounting practices as a learning and emancipation agent towards the 
creation of the objective of accountability. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
The MGNREGA program setting infuses the social into the financial and the financial into the social. In 
this dissertation, I study the unfolding of specific assemblages of accounting practices, artifacts and 
interactions (Neu, Everett, & Rahaman, 2009) towards accountability. Across three tiers of governance and 
eight years of program implementation, I investigate the design and enabling role of accounting at the macro 
level, as well as the strategic, constructive role of MCS in program implementation and accountability at 
the meso-micro level and learning, sense-making and emancipative role at the micro level. I argue that 
accounting practices can become enlisted differently across multiple levels of governance to manifest 
varying notions of accountability and be a part of the field’s ordering, struggles and reform processes. These 
change processes reconstitute program spaces not only to encourage and support certain types of 
accountabilities but also to affect the larger material arrangements, the distributions of capitals and the 
underlying logics and understandings of the field. 
 
In this chapter my intent is to link with the base literatures that connect to larger areas of research as well 
as specific areas connected closely to the analysis chapters. To this end, I begin with a review of accounting 
research in the field of social services and the larger field of accounting and accountability in the public 
sector. I then advance to specific literatures more closely associated with individual research questions: 
strategic management control systems and the enlistment of MCS towards accountability, research 
connected to routines and sense making, and finally power and learning in accounting. The arguments put 
forth in the dissertation connect on many levels to notions of change, which I discuss in more detail in the 
theoretical framework and methodology chapter. But before I start, it is important to outline some 
foundational understandings of accounting and accountability, on the shoulders of which this dissertation 
stands. 
 
Accounting – a dynamic, discursive practice 
The creation of accounts has been represented in mainstream literature as a logical, unbiased and sequential. 
But such activity is an interrelated organizational and social phenomenon working with and through other 
processes. This dissertation is critical of the approach holding that accounting systems and practices emerge 
as fully formed, well-defined technologies that purposively play out in the manner they are designed for 
(Preston, Cooper, & Coombs, 1992). Accounting practices are instead known to be an emergent practice 
with dynamic constructions, characteristics, purposes and uses (Preston, Cooper, & Coombs, 1992) and it 
is only through the processes of imagining, design and implementation that “new possibilities for decision 
making and definitions of responsibility emerge” (Preston, Cooper, & Coombs, 1992). Added to this are 
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notions of discursiveness that include the presence of political, social and cultural rhetoric, discourses and 
environments, as well as moral agency, that play an important role in how accounting practices and artifacts 
may be produced, interacted with and consumed (Francis, 1990, p. 5). As Hopper, Storey, & Wilmott (1987, 
p. 438) write, “Accounting is a set of practices which is both the medium and the outcome of the 
politicoeconomic context in which accounting is embedded.” 
 
Sociopolitical and cultural environments have emerged as critical elements in understanding how 
accounting and accountability are shaped by local contexts. Hopwood’s (1987) call to investigate social 
and organizational settings (p. 289) points to the creation of accounts as a social activity deeply affected by 
its environment. Hopwood’s work on broadening the role and reach of accounting systems from 
organizations to society at large, and Burchell et al.’s (1980) argument for accounting’s ability to become 
implicated in organizational processes, are foundations that sparked a whole genre of alternative accounting 
research. This literature points to the selective information and economic visibility granted by accounting 
systems in control, governance, monitoring, and measurement quantification (Hopwood, 1987, pp. 209–
213; Miller & O’Leary, 1987). In so doing, accounting artifacts contribute to the constitution of a space or 
field that becomes visible and amenable to the creation and demanding of an account (Carmona, Ezzamel, 
& Gutierrez, 2002, p. 240). In turn, the production of such fields is intertwined with underling threads of 
accountability and interactions that frame the social structure, meanings and forms of accounting processes. 
 
Accounting practices can build a progressive account that contributes to the identification, outlining, 
recording and measuring of accountability through latent or overt mechanisms. The creation of a simple 
record of a transaction is an account, as is the creation of a budget, an audit activity or a performance 
indicator. As Butler (2005, as cited in Messner, 2012, p. 924) states: “An account is a type of narrative and, 
as such, it ‘depends upon the ability to relay a set of sequential events with plausible transitions.’” In line 
with this, Dubnik & Justice (2004) suggest investigating accountability not as a word but as a concept with 
specific processes. In tandem, beyond traditional connections between budgeting targets, financialization 
(Ahrens, 1996) and accountability, alternative accounting research has led the way to a more comprehensive 
and nuanced exploration of accounting through its organizational, social and cultural contexts (Roberts & 
Scapens, 1985; Hopwood, Ahrens, & Chapman, 2007, p. 14). 
 
Accountability – a contextual notion that is constructed and implemented 
Modern society’s preoccupation with accountability, transparency and vigilance, combined with myriad 
conceptualizations, meanings and representations for accountability, finds micro-level, empirically 
grounded studies of accountability in accounting to be fairly limited (Dubnik & Justice, 2004). Accounting 
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has emerged as a mechanism serving a variety of accountability purposes, such as minimization of risk and 
uncertainly, increasing financial oversight, fraud detection and prevention, monitoring, and governance 
tools, drawn upon by all sectors alike. It is therefore important to understand not only the different purposes 
for and ways in which accounting is drawn upon for accountability but also how to go about exploring such 
roles for accounting. This dissertation, in part, focuses on the active role through which such specific and 
precise operational accounting artifacts and interactions get mobilized to render abstract notions of 
accountability. It shines a light on two important facets of this perspective. 
 
First, accountability is a diverse notion that can stand for a multitude of competing definitions 
(responsibility, answerability and decision usefulness), relationships (accounting to organization, family, 
society and citizens), forms (verbal, quantitative, formal and vertical) and actions (recording, reporting, 
verbal account-giving, inquiries and audits). Accounting literature strongly reflects this variation in notions 
of accountability in different sociocultural settings. It offers several types of accountability – vertical and 
horizontal; public and internal; formal and informal – of which, vertical and public accountability have 
been studied quite extensively (Roberts, 1991; Goddard, 2005; Pallot 2003). Scott & Lyman (1968) is 
perhaps one of the earliest sociology papers exploring the link between “accounts” and social order, as a 
device that “bridges the gap between action and expectation … and is standardized within cultures” (p. 46). 
Of particular importance is Sinclair’s (1995) work on subjective forms of accountabilities for public sector 
CEO’s: political, managerial, public accountability, professional and personal; as well as managerially 
defined accountabilities – fiscal, process and program accountability, which Goddard’s (2005, p. 195) finds 
limited in its lack of inclusion of external political elements and peer effect. Goddard’s study explores 
culturally distinct frameworks of accountability while Roberts (1991) contrasts and connects formal, 
hierarchical “individualizing” accountability in organizations to informal “socializing” accountability, 
outlining the social origins of accountability. 
 
Second, accountability as a notion and idea requires shape, expression and enactment. It can gain a specific 
form and be implemented through practices such as accounting that include recording and reporting 
processes, financial documents and statements, administrative and financial policies, mechanisms, and 
frameworks. Through such practices, each moment of accountability is performed and enacted, both 
circumscribed and congruent with the creation or giving of a formal or informal account. Aptly voiced by 
Ahrens (1996), the connection between accounting and accountability goes much beyond the traditional 
budgeting, financialization, and targets. The vocalizing of an account is sensitive to specific translations of 
accountability (Hines, 1988; Neu & Graham, 2005). Designing of accountability and “the languages of 
accountability” (p. 11), as Armstrong (2000) writes, can not only be discursive but also constrained by its 
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audience, account makers and contextual elements. Accountability can therefore be seen as stylized and 
impacted by its environment and medium of transmission (Davison & Warren, 2009). 
 
The multi-level perspective 
 
Though calls to expand the boundaries and understandings of the impact of organizational and sociocultural 
contexts have been extended, studies that engage in an empirically grounded multi-level accounts in 
accounting are difficult to find. The multi-level perspective (MLP) is a recent stream of research literature 
in organizational science and strategic management that compasses multi-level research and multi-level 
analysis. Multi-level analysis or hierarchical modelling is an offshoot analytical approach based on 
statistical (regression) methods (Gelman, 2012). The MLP approach does not believe that the bifurcation 
of the macro and micro in phenomena and practices (Hitt, Beamish, Jackson & Mathieu, 2007; Rousseau, 
1985; Payne, Moore & Griffis, 2011) that span levels as environment, dynamics and complexities at each 
level have a part to play in the overall shaping of organizational phenomena. Focusing on one level of 
influences to observe larger events, processes or systems may have its limiting challenges. To better 
understand how processes, systems and strategies play out, it is important to explore a larger frame of 
environment and influences to better understand their formulation, adjustment and implementation. This 
perspective is especially relevant for MGNREGS. 
 
MGNREGS offers a complex, dynamic and multi-level planning, strategic and implementational unfolding 
(Hitt, Beamish, Jackson, & Mathieu, 2007) and it is important to attempt a wider understanding of the 
connections and dynamics that shape its accounting and accountability practices. The practice-based 
research enlisted in this dissertation offers an analytical framework that spans and connects to all the levels 
investigated. 
 
Literature review 
The developing-nation setting presents a different set of sociocultural circumstances that have been 
underexplored in past accounting literatures. And as Alawattage, Hopper, & Wickramasinghe (2007, 
p. 184) outline in their introduction, there have also been issues with getting access to research sites, data 
and official sources. In light of these factors, this literature review maps multiple research streams to 
identify connected terrain in accounting, accountability, strategy and change to provide an anchor for the 
research topics and multi-level analysis in this dissertation. 
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The field of social services 
Public sector research in developed nations, earlier focused on probity, compliance and control (Broadbent 
and Guthrie, 1992, p.3), has since moved towards “new public management” or NPM. The modern ideology 
of the welfare state and the resulting social security system, a prominent element of social life in developed 
nations, has become the centre of theoretical, political and practical debates from diverse lenses including 
political science, political economy, economics, government policy and sociology. These debates stem from 
its form, implementation, delivery, coverage, sustainability, efficiency and efficacy. Welfare reform in 
developed nations ushered in an era of change, which saw traditional public sector welfare states move 
towards decentralized (Lapsley, 1999) and newer formats such as workfare programs, offering government 
support or welfare to poor and unemployed citizens based on conditional work or training requirements. 
These changes, and more involvement of non-public delivery partners, decreased the direct role of 
government in the field of social services. 
 
However, social security and its associated workfare programs in developing countries reflect a marked 
variation in role, demographics, ideologies, structures, relationships and sociopolitical environment, which 
has had a significant impact on the economic shape of such programs (Tinker, 1980, p.158). Battling larger 
populations, poverty and corruption, relationships between central (federal), state (provincial) and 
municipal governments, not-for-profits (NFPs), non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and civil society, 
such programs are trying to push towards reform, poverty reduction as well as efficient and effective 
program implementation (World Bank, 2005). A World Bank report points to similar characteristics seen 
in both low- and high-income developing countries: a top-down governance approach, a limited or non-
existent culture of performance evaluation, insufficient effectiveness and efficiency, lack of institutional 
capacity in terms of human resources, and a tendency for focus on Central governance (World Bank, 2005, 
p. xiii). In addition, this report argues that reforms in developing countries are largely applied at the central 
or federal level, whereas state or provincial and other government levels are largely left to only implement 
performance measurements (World Bank, 2005, p. xii). The research site of MGNREGS therefore presents 
an interesting set of conditions towards our understanding of local governance and accounting as state 
governments play key roles in how the program rolls out. 
 
Among the more recent studies, Bracci & Llewellyn (2012) looks at the connection between accounting 
and accountability in the field of social service provision in Italy. The study explores public reforms and 
their effect on what it calls “people-changing” and “people-processing” approaches. Smyth (2012) looks at 
neoliberalism and movements around the world that attempt to keep critical citizen services such as the 
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social housing sector within the public realm, which at the end of the day boils down to accountability. 
Preston, Chua, & Neu (1997) investigate the sensitive topic of government rationing and rationalizing of 
healthcare for the elderly. Accounting is enlisted here to play a strategic role as a “knowledge-impregnated” 
(p. 161) technology that facilitates calculations to make sensitive medical decisions at a distance. Chua & 
Preston (1994) explore the constitutive cost control and containment in the healthcare sector and the rise of 
a new rhetoric of financialization through accounting. Llewellyn (1998a) investigates the boundaries 
between costing and caring as front line social services professionals delivering social program adjust to 
the financialization as a part of their job responsibility and overall change in sector. The two studies of 
Preston, Cooper, & Coombs (1992) and Preston, Chua, & Neu (1997) focus on budget construction in the 
delivery of medical services in hospitals. Dillard & Smith (1999) offer another study that provides an 
analysis of the significant and impactful role of accounting in the delivery of healthcare services. Finally, 
Preston, Cooper, & Coombs (1992) focus on the construction of a budgeting system. They argue that 
systems are designed and implemented for an initial, general set of purposes and characteristics. The 
dynamic and flexible unfolding of accounting provides a chance to observe newer potentials for decision 
making and responsibility. These studies reflect a strong research focus on the United Kingdom’s National 
Health Service (NHS) and an overall under exploration and lack of diversification in studies connected to 
social services. However, we also see common threads in such literature connecting accounting, social 
services and accountability. 
 
The relationships between accounting, state and the socioeconomic life of individuals are well documented 
(Miller & Rose, 1992; Miller & O’Leary, 1987; Lapsley & Pallot, 2000; Goddard, 2005; Neu, 2000) in 
accounting but the paucity of accounting literature in the social services field is very surprising given the 
magnitude of public funds invested in this sector, the increasing complexity in delivery partnerships and 
the role these services can play in our lives. This sector has experienced significant reform that includes 
changing boundaries, shifts in traditional top-down formal, prescriptive, hierarchical governance 
(Wildavsky, 1986; Llewellyn, 1998a, p.292), financialization of caring (Llewellyn, 1998b) and multi-
organizational models of program delivery that lean of cooperation-collaboration between the public, 
private, third (voluntary), and civil sectors (Ansell & Gash, 2007, p. 547). Welfare reform has introduced a 
new set of environment factors that affect the purposes for and manner in which accounting is enlisted, the 
intended and unintended ways in which accounting functions and the manner in which accounting integrates 
with larger organizational and social processes. However, as can be observed in the paragraph before, 
within the social service sector hospital and medical systems have received the vast majority of research 
attention. Accounting research in the field of social services remains seriously small, limited only to a 
handful of studies. 
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Public sector and accountability 
The problematization of accountability in the public sector has enlisted management control systems 
(MCS), financial audit and other accounting processes in a range of direct or indirectly enabling and 
constitutive roles (Hood, 1995; Sinclair, 1995). Overall, traditional structures and definitions of formal 
accountability in private and public sector are considered largely well defined, “a view in which the world 
comprises an array of defined organizations (principally companies) typically intersecting via markets” 
(Gray et al., 2006, p. 320). Here, mechanisms such as financial audits conducted by external independent 
auditors are “partly a technical verification job” (Owen, Swift, Humphrey, & Bowerman, 2000, p. 93) that 
hold organizations accountable for their financial performance. This dissertation presents an alternative 
window into understanding the variation in design, delivery and styles of accountability (Ahrens, 1996) and 
its connection to accounting practices in the context of social services programs in developing countries. 
 
The alternative accounting literature (Broadbent & Guthrie, 1992, p. 5) explores the changing domain of 
the public sector moving beyond traditional ownership and vertical structures (Broadbent & Guthrie, 1992) 
to include horizontal inter-agency, higher private sector, and stakeholder participation. To present some 
connected studies, Preston et al. (1992) focus on the public sector healthcare in the United Kingdom to 
explore how budgets are dynamic and contextually fabricated. Miller (1990), Rose (1991) and Miller & 
Rose (1990) explore the role of accounting numbers in public spaces, governance and in change processes. 
Miller & Rose (1992) draw on Foucault’s conception of governmentality to position accounting within 
modern forms of political governance and power conducted through new types of alliances where “power 
is not so much a matter of imposing constraints upon citizens as of ‘making up’ citizens capable of bearing 
a kind of regulated freedom” (p. 174). 
 
Connected to the functioning of the public sector in developing nations are accounts of public sector 
performance measurement and corruption (Putu, Mimba, Helden, & Tillema. 2007; Allawattage, Hopper, 
& Wickramasinghe, 2007) that also outline the difficulty in obtaining primary data by surveys and official 
sources. Literature points to the selective information and economic visibility granted by accounting 
systems in control, governance, monitoring, and measurement quantification (Hopwood, 1987, pp. 209–
213; Miller & O’Leary, 1987). Linking to notions of ethics and morality, some of this literature outlines the 
discretionary public administrative and political spaces where internal cultures of corruption can encourage 
practices such as bribery to thrive (Sargiacomo, Ianni, D’Andreamatteo, & Servalli, 2015). Some of these 
studies focus on accounting, internal controls and policy guidelines as contributing to the building of ethical 
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and self-disciplined subjects (Neu, Everett, & Rahaman, 2015, p. 50) while others view accounting in the 
role of an enabler of corruption (Neu, Everett, Rahaman, & Martinez, 2013). 
 
However, research in accounting is still considered piecemeal in terms of analysis of practice (Roberts & 
Scapens, 1985, p. 443; Baldvinsdottir et al., 2010, p. 80) with fragmented focus on particular aspects like 
efficiency and increased accountability (Roberts & Scapens, 1985, p. 445). Accounting researchers have 
pointed to the need to focus on non-technical context (Roberts & Scapens, 1985; Ahrens & Chapman, 
2006), underlying socioeconomic processes, and the taken for granted (Hopwood, 1987; Humphrey & 
Miller, 2012). Accountability studies in accounting largely focus on a single organization’s accounts or 
activity at non-micro level, offering limited insight and connection to practice (Gray et al., 1997; Pallot, 
2003; Gray 1999, 2001; Bebbington & Gray 2001). A significant portion of social accountability studies 
focus on private sector organizations (Unerman & O’Dwyer, 2006, p. 350; Gray et al., 1997) in developed 
nations such as the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia. On the other hand, though the third 
sector is seeing increasing demands for performance and transparency (Ebrahim, 2005; Unerman & 
O’Dwyer, 2006), accounting conversations around responsibility, visibility and accountability in NGOs 
and civil society remain somewhat sparse. 
 
MCS and accountability 
Strategic MCS – major frameworks – Though there are no singularly defined definitions of strategic 
MCS, according to Simons (1987) “the provision and analysis of management accounting data about a 
business and its competitors for use in developing and monitoring business strategy” (Simons, 1987, p. 26). 
A common theme in line with Bourdieu’s work finds strategy to be “a logic underlying an organization’s 
interactions with the environment” (Dent, 1990, p. 5), determining its allocation of resources. Is a MCS a 
function of what the organization requires it to do, shaped by the strategic objectives (Chenhall, 2005), or 
can it also have an active hand in influencing its own environment (Langfield-Smith, 1997) and in the 
shaping of organizational strategy (Skaerbaek & Tryggestad, 2010) that enlist it in the first place? There 
are limited studies that explore the activities connected to strategic change processes, the interactions of 
accounting with actors, and the interactions among such actors. It is here that accounting has the potential 
to be a transformative agent (Chua & Preston, 1994). 
 
Corporate strategy and the strategy-making processes have evolved to be a continuous and “chronic feature 
of organizational life” (Johnson, Melin & Whittington, 2003, p. 5). Taking a strategic perspective on 
accounting connects to this growing body of literature. The most dominant perspective in accounting 
research connected to strategy is contingency theory (Chenhall, 2003; Chapman, 1997; Gerdin & Greve, 
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2004) where the MCS design and tools are seen as passive instruments matched to competitive and 
performance management based strategic goals (Otley, 1999; Ittner & Larker, 2002; Kaplan, 1994). Major 
research themes in the field of strategy-MCS tackle design, planning, modification, mediation and results 
of MCS in line with organizational strategy (Simons, 1987; Gerdin & Greve, 2004). Studies also target 
specific elements of the MCS including accounting information, competitive strategy (Bromwich, 1990; 
Roberts, 1990); budgets and strategy (Abernethy & Brownell, 1999); and measures of design, costing and 
performance in the manufacturing sector (Abernethy & Lillis, 1995; Perera, Harrison, & Poole, 1997). 
Performance management systems and the translation of strategy into financial and non-financial measures 
have also attracted particular interest (Chenhall, 2005) and provide an expansive literature. For a more in-
depth review of mainstream strategy and accounting literature, see Chenhall (2005). 
 
The second important theoretical perspective(s) connected to strategy and change comprises the alternative 
schools of thought that encompass social constructivist, behavioural and sociopolitical perspectives. 
Though this field is broad and proves difficult in terms of presenting a conceptually unified perspective 
(Seidl, 2007 as cited in Carter, Clegg, & Kornberger, 2010, p. 578), these studies move away from a 
positivist, rationalistic outlook to focus on a different dimension of understanding the connection between 
accounting and strategy (Chua, 2007). They explore varying roles of accounting in strategy. Some 
investigate a more active and bidirectional relationship between MCS and strategy (Henri & Journeault, 
2010; Hopwood 1987; Draft & Macintosh 1984; Kober, Ng, & Paul, 2007, pp. 425–426). Others draw on 
a wide range of theories such as actor network theory, a resource-based view (Toms, 2010; Bowman & 
Toms, 2010), and political power–based perspectives (Lapsley & Giordano, 2010; Wilson et. al., 2010; 
Abernethy & Vagnoni, 2004) to investigate accounting-based practices such as budgeting, performance 
measurement (Henri, 2006), control systems (Simons, 1987) and balanced scorecard (Hansen & Mouritsen, 
2005; Modell, 2009) enlisted towards organizational objectives and strategy. To present a link between 
accounting practice, strategy and sociological research perspective, Kinley, Carter, Pezet, & Clegg (2010) 
draw on the sociological framework of Foucault’s governmentality to connect accounting techniques such 
as standard costing and scientific management to the study of power and strategy as a social practice and 
the sociopolitical context of accounting information systems, power, politics and decision making 
(Abernethy & Vagnoni, 2004). 
 
Taking MCS beyond its traditional role, studies like Hansen & Mouritsen (2005) argue that it is important 
to ask what strategy represents. They present accounting as an instrument for implementing strategy rather 
than formulating it. Naranjo-Gil & Hartmann (2006) investigate the manner in which top management 
teams use management accounting systems for strategy formulation, while Mouritsen & Kreiner (2003) 
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focus on the active role of accounting devices in the playing out of a successful strategy. Also important 
are studies such as Simon (1990) that focus on the role of MCS in uncertain strategic conditions and its 
critical role in initial strategy formulation. Skaerbaek & Tryggestad (2010) provide a more recent case study 
extending accounting from an active role to an evolving formulative and (re)formulative role in strategic 
change (Skaerbaek & Tryggestad, 2010) and organizational environment through performance and 
performativity (Boedker, 2010; Hansen & Mouritsen, 2005) and legitimation and distribution of authority 
and power (Covaleski & Dirsmith, 1986). 
 
However, in reviewing the literature one sees that much of it is US-centric (Carter, Clegg, & Kornberger, 
2010, p. 578), homogenous (Chua, 2007, p. 489) and focused on a cross-sectional picture of strategic 
accounting and change (Kober, Ng, & Paul, 2003, pp. 199–200). Moreover, the relative lack of connection 
between academic research and actual practice is much lamented by academics and accounting 
professionals alike. Langfield-Smith (1997) concludes in her study that our knowledge of the relationship 
between MCS and strategy is quite limited and could benefit from further investigation. For a more in-
depth critical review of strategy and accounting literature, see Carter, Clegg, & Kornberger (2010) and 
Langfield-Smith (2005). Current perspectives tend to downplay the influence of context in process- and 
(Johnson et al., 2003, p. 6) “activity”-based routines. In addition, with its different set of organizing 
principles and resources, such literature is especially limited for the public and third sectors. This 
dissertation adds to this line of investigation by focusing on a developing-nation context, investigating the 
delivery of a social service program through multi-level research that follows the program unfolding at 
macro, meso and micro levels. 
 
Within the various components of MCS discussed above, MGNREGS has particularly strong labour budget 
and social audit practices, particularly so in the state of Andhra Pradesh. These budgeting and social audit 
processes present significant sites of the framing, construction and implementation of accountability at 
multiple levels in the delivery of MGNREGS. I now explore research literatures connected to these 
elements. 
 
MCS – budgeting and social audit – The budgeting-accountability literature is quite established, but is 
again strongly attentive to developed-country settings. It answers to vertical and horizontal internal 
accountability in public organizations. Accountability built into the public sectors of democratic nations is 
associated with governance, financial efficiency, and performance management connected to public and 
political accountability. Wildavsky’s (1964) seminal work on the political underpinnings of public sector 
budgeting has sparked a huge accounting literature. Gray & Jenkins (1993, p. 53) define accountability in 
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the public sector as “an obligation to present an account for an answer for the execution of responsibilities 
to those who entrusted those responsibilities. On this obligation depends the allocation of praise and blame, 
award and sanction so often seen as the hallmarks of accountability in action.” 
 
Budgeting systems in mainstream research, in both private and public sectors, have traditionally been 
conceptualized as a technical tool for hierarchical planning, allocation of resources, control and evaluation 
(Chenhall, 2003) with power cresting at the top (Shields & Shields, 1998, p. 66). Alternative management 
accounting has expanded to address this gap in MCS, drawing on alternate (Hopwood, 1972; Chapman, 
1997, p. 192), pluralistic schools of thought (see Baxter & Chua, 2003) that shed light on diverse aspects 
of what MCS touches. Sociological management accounting research views budgets as socially and 
politically constructed (Coveleski & Dirsmith, 1986, 1988) and socially embedded (Baxter & Chua, 2003), 
an expression of “practical politics.” These literatures open dialogues to situate and understand accounting 
and budgeting systems not only within larger organizational and sociopolitical contexts but also connected 
to systems of power, legitimacy and control (Covaleski & Aiken, 1986; Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1988). 
Llewellyn (1998) is one of a few papers that explores budgeting practices and managing of financial 
resources in the social services sector at the level of front-line managers. The paper is particularly important 
because it highlights the connection between aggregated budgets at the top, devolved budgets at lower 
levels as disciplinary power and finally the inability of such delegation to track individual responsibility. 
 
Modernized governance frameworks and connected research have now expanded to include newer, 
participative formats of social accounts and devolved budgeting that have created spaces for citizens and 
civil society in public accountability systems. Connected to this field are notions of accountability in NGOs 
and welfare programs like MGNREGS that are proving to be increasingly more complex and difficult to 
define (Dixon et al., 2006, p.407). 
 
Devolved budgeting encompasses a smaller stream of accounting literature largely focused on the public 
sector after the advent of New Public Management and devolved public management. Studies like Mayston 
(1998) explore public-sector devolved budgeting and formula funding in the UK education system. Collier 
(2001) focuses on budgeting and financial processes in publicly funded organizations such as the police 
force, drawing on institutional theory to explore “relations of power” and shifts therein. Ezzamel et al. 
(2007) explores budget construction processes and the situatedness of accounting practices in newly 
devolved institutions in the post-NPM United Kingdom. There are also a few studies that look at the NHS 
in the United Kingdom and the impact of reform on accounting and budgeting processes (Lapsley, 2001; 
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Preston, 1992; Preston et al., 1992). Llewellyn (1998) looks at the social services sector and the demarcation 
between “costing” and “caring” by social-service professionals in light of their new financial roles. 
 
Social audit is a newer participative accountability mechanism seen in social services governance 
frameworks in developing nations, especially those funded by agencies such as the World Bank. Today, 
changing social roles, social investing and relationships between the private, public and third sectors have 
created space for contested ideas of multiple stakeholder engagement (Owen et al., 2001) and accountability 
in the shape of social audits at micro levels. In India, social audit has been invoked by the central 
government in its MGNREG workfare program and used extensively in states such as Andhra Pradesh. 
Power (1994) highlights current social preoccupation with scrutiny and the rise of an “audit society,” 
leading to an expansion in internal and external audits, including regulatory, energy, quality, performance 
and environmental audits. Social audit was initially argued to be a “looser” form of audit (Cotton et al., 
2000. p. 5) but is now being used extensively in many developmental programs to extend the principles of 
traditional audit, responsibility and transparency, in the interests of stakeholders and wider society (Owen 
et al, 2001, p. 83). Accounting research has largely explored social accountability and audit through the 
role of NGOs (Unerman & O’Dwyer, 2006; Bebbington et al., 1999; Collison, 2003; Gray, 1983; Gray et 
al., 1996). Organizations such as the World Bank and NGOs such as Oxfam (Dawson, 1998) are using 
social audit in a big way to monitor and create accountability for the social and economic impact of 
developmental programs (Dawson, 1998; World Bank regional database, n.d.) and for budget transparency 
and accountability. Social audit has also become a key accountability tool in workfare-style conditional 
cash transfer (CCT) programs, wherein the World Bank focuses on the development of local capacities to 
monitor program impact and effectiveness in communities. Accountability in these settings fits with Gray’s 
definition: 
 
In the broadest sense, the social audit is being used by society or a group within society to hold the 
entity to account whether it likes it or not…. It is therefore an essentially democratic activity, even 
if the body undertaking the action is not itself an elected body (Gray, 2001, p. 9). 
 
Though studies like Dey (2007) find that accounting practices intended to focus on increasing stakeholder 
involvement and accountability did lead to change, other studies in areas such as environmental accounting 
in corporate (Owen, Gray, & Bebbington, 1997) and non-governmental aid organizations (O’Dwyer, 2005; 
Dey, 2007; Raynard, 1998) also find external social reporting standards to lack teeth with respect to 
powerful stakeholders, making such reporting merely an exercise in strategy without increasing 
accountability and transparency (Owen, Swift, & Hunt, 2001).  
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Routines and learning 
Linked to the analysis in this dissertation’s final analysis chapter, in this subsection I focus on the literature 
on organizational routines, conceptualized by Pentland & Feldman (2005, p. 793) as “generative systems 
with internal structures and dynamics”. Bourdieu has argued that it is a combination of the social and 
cognitive structures (habitus) in the field that create social reproduction and domination (Bourdieu & 
Wacquant, 1992, pp. 13–14). In agreement with many elements of Bourdieu’s practice theory, theories of 
routines offer a unit of analysis that can explore not only reproduction of practices but also the internal 
systems and contextual factors that support, influence and stabilize them. They have much to contribute to 
better understanding of learning, flexibility, transfer and change (Pentland & Feldman, 2005, p. 793). 
 
This subsection also follows a theme that emerged through state-level interviews where organizational 
memory was communicated as a key outcome in building of Andhra Pradesh’s public network to create 
knowledge building and continuity in the delivery of MGNREGS. Connected to such literature is research 
on strategic performance management systems, such as the balanced scorecard (BSC), that track 
development of competencies, learning and growth (Kaplan & Norton, 1996) and theories of organizational 
routines (Burns & Scapens, 2008; Perren & Grant, 2000) and organizational learning (Levitt & March, 
1988; Huber, 1991; Fiol & Lyles, 1985). Not directly connected to accounting, there is also the literature 
in the field of strategy analysis, which has produced frameworks to measure success and capacity in an 
organization (Collins, 2006; Connolly et al., 2003). 
 
Earlier research is found to focus on a conventional view of routines, which are seen as mechanical and 
static. I focus on studies like Feldman (2000) and Howard-Grenville (2005) that draw upon the 
performative, dynamic and generative aspect of routines (Pentland & Feldman, 2005, p. 794) to connect 
them to learning and change. Routines are defined here as “particular and repeated patterns of actions 
inscribed within certain customs and rules” (Feldman, 2000, p. 611; emphasis added). Miner & Estler 
(1985), for example, argue that changes in routine can come from a redefinition of job responsibility that 
affects settled ways of activity. Such studies provide a bridge between the structure and process created by 
MGNREGS’s new routines and the gradual collective memory and habitus collected, accumulated and/or 
replaced through years of individual and group learning, knowledge and experiences, both within the state 
department and at the village level. 
 
Learning and sense-making frameworks – The literature on change has connected to terms such as 
“learning,” “adaptation” and “adjustment,” based on various cognitive and behavioral approaches (Fiol & 
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Lyles, 1985). A significant body of strategy literature has explored organizational change, learning, 
knowledge and sense making (Argyris & Schön, 1978; Thomas, Sussman, & Henderson, 2001; Weick, 
1995) and organizational routines (Howard-Grenville, 2005) and organizational empowerment (Labiance, 
Gray and Brass, 2000). One of the theoretical issues underlying such lines of inquiry is the altering of 
fundamental sense-making parameters connected to cognitive and generative models of learning (Osborne 
& Wittrock, 1983; Weick, 1995; Thomas, Sussman, & Henderson, 2001, p.331; Brown & Duguid, 1991) 
and knowledge creation. More detailed studies draw on cognitive behavioural frameworks such as the 
schema theory (Anderson, 1978; Labiance, Gray, & Brass, 2000): 
 
The concept behind the Generative Learning Theory lies on “schemata,” which are outlined in 
Frederic Bartlett's Schema Theory. It suggests that the learning process is based on the memory 
that is already stored in our brains, wherein new data is added to our long-term memory and 
becomes part of our knowledge base. The Theory of Generative Learning is based on the 
assumption that the human brain does not just passively observe its environment or the events it 
experiences, but that it constructs its own perceptions about problems, scenarios, and experiences 
(Osbourne & Wittrock, 1983). 
 
The rational model focuses on learning through reasoning, wherein cause and effect relationships help 
individuals understand process knowledge and the outcomes of their decisions (Dooley, Skilton, & 
Anderson, 1998). Set a little apart from this is research that focuses on cognitive learning in individuals, 
based on a variety of social and cultural conditionings. Here, observations and past experiences play a 
particularly important role in individual learning processes. The social cognitive theory developed by 
Bandura (1989) focuses on social and environmental influences and reinforcement as well as past 
experiences, through which individuals learn. It creates a triad of the individual, the environment, and the 
behavior. 
 
Extant research has also looked at the phenomenon of sense making in organizations through rational and 
social processes (Weick, 1995; Maitlis, 2005; Allard-Poesi, 2005). Such processes are considered to be 
critical in dynamic and changing environments and have been linked to construction of identities, images 
and responses, (Maitlis, 2005, p. 1; Pratt & Foreman, 2000). The social construction school of thought 
(Berger & Luckmann, 1966; Chua, 1986) looks at “reality” as a socially constructed sense-making 
phenomenon that is established through interactions with others and from accounts that help them 
understand and (re)act. Bourdieu’s major contribution to sense making is through his notions of interactive 
habitus, capitals and strategy. He argues that individuals are bound by the collective habitus of a field that 
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resides within each player and is reproduced through individual action. Different players work with the 
capitals and powers they have and strategize to maximize their total capital and position in the field. 
Bourdieu’s notion of change is however limited to this collective sense of capital distribution and habitus. 
Many organizational studies have argued that for individuals to feel empowered in a shared decision-
making process, there must be a transformative change in the employee’s or individual’s belief system (or 
habitus) towards those in power and towards the sharing of influence amongst hierarchical and social 
unequals. This can impact team or group participation, change and development (Labianca, Gray, & Brass, 
2000, p. 235; Argyris & Schön, 1978; Bartunek & Moch, 1987). 
 
Accounting – power and emancipation 
In accounting, connections among strategy, knowledge and power-based change have been explored from 
a variety of perspectives, including social frameworks offered by Bourdieu, Foucault and Weber. Recent 
research such as that of Ezzamel & Willmott (2004) and Kornberger & Clegg (2011) understands the social 
through relationships of power and meaning that reflect hegemony, field struggles and resistance. Studies 
such as Neu et al. (2006) analyze accounting as technologies of governance and regulation of behavior, 
leading to a restructuring of habitus. Kornberger & Clegg (2011) discuss the notion of performativity of 
strategy and its power effects in mobilizing certain voices and in the shaping of subjects. Studies such as 
Lowe (2004) and Richardson (1987) explore the performative roles of accounting: “Our views of the 
morality of our world, how social structures affect ways of knowing, and what disrupts and challenges the 
status quo are particularly of concern to promote social transformation and justice” (Lehman, 2013, p. 136). 
However, power remains a nebulous and underexplored concept in accounting research. 
 
Newer streams of research such as emancipatory, developmental and enabling accounting (Alawattage & 
Wickramasinghe, 2009; Jayasinghe & Wickramasinghe, 2011; Gallhofer & Haslam, 2003; Gallhofer & 
Haslam, 2006) provide fresher and more nuanced interpretive accounting classifications. These 
classifications radically align the role of embedding of accounting in social structures (Gallhofer & Haslam, 
2005) and its potential as a change agent connected to distribution of powers at the meso and micro level. 
Gallhofer and Haslam (2006), for example, focus in particular on the underexplored role of accounting as 
a progressive and emancipatory change agent. The enabling function of accounting as an agent of power 
and change can also be seen reflected in studies such as Neu (2000a, b) that explore accounting’s ability to 
convert objectives into practices in imperial settings; and Neu & Graham (2006), wherein accounting 
technologies are enlisted by federal government to create hegemonic policy for indigenous groups. 
Specifically important and pertinent to the focus of this dissertation chapter is Jayasinghe & 
Wickramasinghe’s (2011) exploration of rural empowerment through mechanisms that allow local 
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participation and accountability. The study provides a strong instance of how accounting and accountability 
can be connected to participation, power and change. However, this is a newer stream of literature still in 
its infancy. 
 
The next chapter outlines the theoretical and conceptual tools that I draw on to address some of the research 
gaps and limitations outlined above, and add to the accounting literature in this field. I begin with 
Bourdieusian field, habitus and capitals for theoretical constructs. 
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Chapter 3 - Theoretical Framework and Methodology 
 
“Theorizing management accounting practice is about understanding how people in organizations 
make specific uses of widely available solutions, how such solutions came to be their disposal and 
how their use might change existing accountings and give rise to new accounting solutions that 
others can use. It is about the changing possibilities for uses of accounting, often explored through 
the detailed study of specific instances…” (Ahrens & Chapman 2007, p. 99) 
 
This dissertation answers the call for linking with modern “wider rationales” (p. 139) that mobilize 
accounting in the field of social services towards emergent transformations within the organization and 
broader social practices that impact the socioeconomic struggles faced by citizens (Neu, Cooper, & Everett, 
2001, p. 1). The analysis offers a methodological exploration of the activity in macro, meso and micro sites 
in which accounting becomes embodied (Schatzki, 2001, p. 11), employed and implicated in accountability, 
reform and change processes. Following program implementation, over eight years of program 
implementation enable a practice-based analysis of how the field, capitals and habitus interact with program 
objectives and sociopolitical contexts at various levels to put specific accounting practices to multiple uses 
towards accountability. These practices also contribute to the (re)organizing (Neu, 2006, p. 391) of material 
arrangements of the field through reform, change and the reshaping of the habitus (Bourdieu, 1990) in the 
field of delivery of social services in India. 
 
The first half of this chapter is devoted to an in-depth discussion of the conceptual and theoretical tools 
drawn upon to conduct the analysis in this dissertation. I explore specific elements of practice theory that 
include Bourdieu’s theory of practice: field, capitals and habitus; Schatzki’s concepts of artifacts and 
interactions that mediate practice and discourse analysis. Bourdieu provides a conceptual link between 
sociocultural elements and economic structures and decisions (Li, Pickles, & Savage, 2005). Bourdieu’s 
practice theory offers strong conceptual tools for this dissertation. His notions of habitus, capital and field 
have been and can be drawn upon and enlisted in multiple fields of research. 
 
The second part of the chapter focuses on research methodology, multi-tier research and an interpretive 
approach using a sociological framework. Notions of shifts in habitus and change are particularly important 
to my empirical research settings and arguments, so this section includes a discussion of analytical 
frameworks connected to change. To provide a deeper analysis of the large amount of data collected in the 
form of primary interview transcripts and secondary data, including public reports, financial and non-
financial data, documents and articles on the program, I enlist some additional analytical tools. Discourse 
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analysis allows me to connect verbal and written communication as a social function (Jones, 2012, p. 9), 
interpreting the field and its power relations, distributions of capitals and habitus. Towards this, I enlist 
Ruiz’ paper (2009) on “Sociological discourse analysis: Methods and logic,” in which he explains his multi-
level analytical approach, comprising a combination of textual analysis, contextual analysis and 
sociological (interpretive) analysis. 
 
The governmental functioning of a social program such as MGNREGS can be considered a social system 
that produces and perpetuates shared practices. On a multi-level basis, its structured dispositions and habitus 
can become expressed and dispersed down the line through decisions and judgments made in processes of 
reporting and control, setting of objectives and policy frameworks. On a singular level, shared rules, 
behaviours and tacit knowledge of the way an organization internally functions can not only affect 
behaviour and actions but also be shared and learned by newer employees. In Edwards, Ezzamel, McLean, 
& Robson (2000), we see an example of the emergence of the accounting system based on the government’s 
vision and strategy. The production and reproduction of such subfields is intertwined with underlying 
threads of accountability and interactions that can frame the particular mode of enlisting of accounting.  
 
Practice theory: Bourdieu’s practices, field and habitus 
The social theory of practice is the study of the interaction between practice, its sociocultural background 
and human action (Ortner, 1984, p. 150) – the total nexus of interconnected human practices (Schatzki, 
Knorr-Cetina, & Von Savigny, 2001, p. 11). Practices are not just bodily actions (Reckwitz, 2002) like 
walking or writing, but represent a specific (Schatzki, 2001, p. 11) bundle or grouping of human-constructed 
activities that are embodied and materially mediated around shared practical understandings (internalized 
or tacit knowledge, mental settings, and strategic actions) within the social (Fenwick, 2012). This social 
space or field is the setting in which the nature and transformation of practices is studied (Schatzki, 2001, 
p. 11). 
 
Theories of practice are gathering increasing interest and employment in the organizational and accounting 
literature. Practice theory is constituted by the work of multiple theorists, including Bourdieu, Foucault, 
Latour and Schatzki, who offer “new organizing concepts for theorizing social life” (Schatzki, 1997, 
p. 284). They do not have a unified theory or methodology (Ortner 1984, p. 127) but draw on different 
theoretical and methodological perspectives. Schatzki divides practice theorists into philosophical practice 
thinkers, social theorists, ethno-methodologists and culture theorists (Schtazki, 2001). Reckwitz (2002) 
finds all practice theorists including Bourdieu, Foucault, Giddens and Schtazki (2001) to fall under the 
definition of culture theorists while Ortner (1984) considers them to be “modern” practice theorists. 
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In accounting literature, Ahrens & Chapman (2006, 2007) are among the earliest to enlist practice theory. 
Ahrens & Chapman (2006), for example, is one of the earlier papers building on Schatzki’s theory of 
practice towards management control as a strategic practice. Similarly, Baxter & Chua (2008) enlist 
Bourdieu’s practice theory in exploring the enactment of being a Chief Financial Officer and a CFO’s 
strategy, responsibilities and habitus. Others, such as Jorgensen & Messner (2010), have worked to extend 
this perspective. In organizational theory, studies such as Whittington (2006) and Rasche & Chia (2009) 
have paved the way for a more nuanced understanding of this approach: “The orthodox language of social 
science including organizational studies carves up phenomenon into three levels: from the very micro (what 
people say and do) to the meso (routines) to the macro institutions” (Miettinen, Samra-Fredericks, & Yano, 
2009, pp. 1309–10). 
 
A practice theory framework is specifically pertinent to the study of social services programs, as both are 
built around structures, perpetuated practices, shared internalized meanings, human agency and actions. 
The delivery of programs such as MGNREGS is made up field-specific clusters of activities and processes, 
a “sequence of programmed actions” (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 73) that connects networks of people, money, 
artifacts and interactions. The structure of such programs includes an assemblage of a particular kind of 
environment (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 72), arrangement of stakeholders, habitus of accountability, and “objective 
potentialities” (p. 76), wherein various position holders intend to maximize their interest given their 
capitals. Specific notions of accountability and habitus are embodied in the arrangement and configuration 
of individuals that hold certain powers of account. In practice settings, this structure also includes existing 
policy, legal and administrative regulations, positional connections and arrangements between donors, 
implementers and recipients, and non-formal sources of power. Practice theory can thus help us better 
understand a program built around its reporting, funding and control systems, its enlistment of specific 
accounting practices and artifacts, and how and for what purposes they are used to deliver accountabilities. 
 
Practice-based research not only allows but also challenges investigations and development of vocabularies 
that transcend divisions of internal and external; individual and social; and levels of analysis (Miettinen, 
Samra-Fredericks, & Yano, 2009). For the analysis in this dissertation, two elements foreground the 
practice approach outlined (Rouse, 2006; Reckwitz, 2002) by theorists such as Bourdieu, Giddens, and 
Schatzki: 
 
First, practice theory calls for detailed empirical accounts and analysis of the everyday activities and 
practices that would otherwise be hidden or taken for granted. Such practices form “the smallest unit of 
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social analysis” (Beckwitz, 2002, p. 249). The focus is on “publically accessible” (Rouse, 2006, p. 505) 
activities that happen on a physical level external to the actors, rather than internal or mental activity. This 
leads to logic, process and practice questions regarding how and why certain activities are done a certain 
way and also creates awareness of the objective structures and embedded, internalized meanings and 
understandings (Ahrens & Chaman, 2007, p. 9) that underlie such practices. 
 
Second, practice theory represents the interconnectedness rather than dichotomy of social structure or order 
and individual agency or human action. The social/cultural plays a significant role through embedded and 
shared understandings, both supported and constrained by the structure of the field. In turn, social order, 
structure and culture are understood through the production and transfer of such practices (Rouse, p. 505). 
Individual actions and agents that constitute practice are components of the larger social. Accounts drawing 
on the practice approach question how practices make up the social field and how the social becomes 
embedded in such practices. This leads to questions regarding how the contextual and environmental 
elements influence practices and how players create and perpetuate practices within social and cultural 
settings. In the words of Ortner, 
 
“The modern versions of practice theory appear unique in accepting all three sides of the … 
Triangle: that society is a system, that the system is powerfully constraining, and yet the system 
can be made and unmade through human action and interaction” (Ortner, 1984, p. 159). 
 
Bourdieu’s practice theory 
Like Foucault, Bourdieu has emerged as one of the most influential sociologists for the critical study of 
accounting in a variety of settings. In his research on the Kablya tribe, Bourdieu is seen to draw upon 
language, meaning and intention to connect social structure and individual action. This provides an 
understanding to his relational and symbolic construction of notions of power. Bourdieu’s social is 
understood through the objective material conditions that organize a field and exist and durably continue 
before and after the individual (Brubaker, 2004). These conditions affect individual belief and dispositions 
and mediate subjective individual actions as they try to maximize their interest based on the resources and 
options available – “the social constitution of various modes of interest” (Brubaker, 2004, pp. 33–35). 
Bourdieusian studies explore that which is taken for granted, practices that answer to “this is how it’s done” 
and sociocultural settings that impact the relationship between social groups and practice. Most 
Bourdieusian accounting studies mobilize in full or in part his notions of field, habitus and capitals; power 
and symbolic violence; logic of practice; and reflexive research (see Malsch, Gendron, & Grazzini, 2011). 
 
43 
 
Elements of Bourdieu’s practice theory 
 
Field, habitus and capitals – Bourdieu’s reflexive construction of notions of field, habitus and capitals 
provides excellent empirical tools to explore the hierarchical construction of accountability as a practice in 
different sociocultural settings. Bourdieu argues against the classical division in dialectic social theory 
between objective and subjective as insufficient to understand social life. Bourdieu’s account of practice or 
“the theory of the mode of generation of practices” (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 72) juxtaposes the concept of field 
or structure with that of subjectivity of habitus. These dualities outline his notion of relationality, explored 
through an analysis of social positions, habitus or dispositions and choices made by agents (Bourdieu, 1998, 
p. 6). Hence, his understanding of a social or symbolic space or class is based on immersion and empirical 
exploration of the subjective (Bourdieu, 1998, p. 2). Studies such as Rahaman, Everett, & Neu (2007) 
investigate the role of accounting in the privatization of water services in Africa. In part, they draw on 
Bourdieu to study a “restricted” field and how a practice becomes legitimized. They explore the use of 
accounting as symbolic capital wherein economic capital held by actors in the larger field allows them to 
reshape accounting numbers and extend the boundaries of the field. 
 
Bourdieu’s field is a structured domain that runs on its own special logic and history as well as on the 
positioning of players and capitals. It explores macro-meso social aspects, while capitals, habitus and the 
notion of game playing cross over to look also at human choices and actions, in an approach similar to 
psychoanalysis (Swatrz & Zolberg, 2004, p. 9). The position of a particular player is a function of this 
habitus, capital and game-playing skills. The field structures the habitus and relational capitals or powers 
held by players. It is also the background against which humans act and strategize using their capitals to 
their advantage. This arrangement is the site for struggles to define new arrangements. However, not all 
moves are based on logic and reason. Habitus, dispositions and doxa represent the internalized social order 
that constrains these players and also determines which capitals hold greater legitimacy in the field. 
 
Habitus – individual and organizational 
Bourdieu sees the social world as accumulated history (Bourdieu, 1986). His notion of habitus mediates the 
relationship between field and practice, subjective and objective, social and human. It is constituted by 
internalized and embedded structural and cultural dispositions, sensibilities and references that structure 
and give meaning to the field and can be “understood as a system of lasting, transposable dispositions 
which, integrating past experiences, functions at every moment as a matrix of perceptions, appreciations, 
and actions and makes possible the achievement of infinitely diversified tasks” (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 83). 
Habitus reproduces practices and established order through a combination of objective structures (also a 
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product of historical practices), subjective social conditions and durable dispositions that become 
internalized (pp. 85, 164). A particular set of conditions produces conditionings that become habitus. Just 
as the structure produces a specific habitus, the habitus produces individual and collective practices through 
becoming “deposited” in and reproduced by humans over time. Thus, practices are “defined by the fact that 
their temporal structure, direction and rhythm are constitutive of their meaning” (p. 9). 
 
Bourdieu has conceived of habitus largely in an individual sense, where it becomes integrated, largely 
unconsciously, into the way an individual thinks, feels and acts. It is considered a permanent disposition 
and is associated with its acquisition from an early age through acculturalization into social groups such as 
those based on family, social status, geographical location, gender, organization, etc. Combined with the 
individual’s own specific personality, a specific individual habitus emerges, where she/he may have things 
in common with others in their social group but also include specific individual elements (Bourdieu, 2005; 
Fleming, 20051). 
 
In this dissertation, I extend this concept to an organizational level. My argument is that Bourdieu’s habitus 
can be enlisted to bridge the gap between micro-macro (Reay, 2004). Beyond notions of culture and context, 
the strength of Bourdieu’s practice theory is that the habitus does not stand alone. Its interplay with the field 
(macro level structure) and capitals (powers) allows an investigation into the construction of a practice as 
a part of a larger social analysis (Everett, 2002, p. 57), and herein lies my reasoning for drawing upon 
Bourdieu.  
 
The intent is not to dilute Bourdieu’s conception but to draw upon it to reflect what I interpret as somewhat 
similar internalization, action and change at an organizational level. I argue that organizations, like social 
groups, can acquire norms, preferences, thinking, conditionings and a sense of tradition specific to their 
environment. Similar to the individual habitus, habitus on an organizational level, or what I have refer to 
as organizational habitus, is also acquired over time, can be a durable disposition (though not as durable as 
the habitus in the individual psyche) and resides in the organization identity. Such an organizational habitus 
is expressed consciously and unconsciously through the manner in which an organization (and its officers) 
perceives its role in the food chain, the construction of its vision, its internal patterns of functioning and 
decision-making. This further extends to how it strategizes and acts to make the best use of its capitals and 
reach its objectives. This habitus can be carried within its employees as well as its structures, processes, 
                                                          
1 http://ist-socrates.berkeley.edu/~fl3min4/130/bourdieu.html 
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vision, goal and decisions. It is reproduced in new employees through organizational learning and 
understandings – including what is considered acceptable and legitimate in terms of thinking and doing. It 
also contributes to their individual habitus.  
 
Agents in a field do not base all decisions and actions on precisely calculated probabilities to create the best 
chances for a successful outcome or a conscious readjustment given the outcomes available to them. In 
these conditions, internalized conditionings reinforce structures and practices for which players reflexively 
know the realm of possibilities and options available to them (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 54). This is the correlation 
between “constructed objective probabilities” of the fields and “subjective aspirations” of the agents. 
Though this habitus with these conditionings is durable, transposable and reproductive (p. 53), given the 
right conditions and stimuli it carries within it a number of possible outcomes that can result from different 
human choices, leading to other “probable, upcoming future(s)” (p. 53). Here conditions for shifts and 
changes in outcomes exists if players see the opportunity: “stimuli do not exist for practice in their objective 
truth, (but) as conditional, conventional triggers, acting only on condition that they encounter agents 
conditioned to recognize them” (Bourdieu, 1990, pp. 53–54). 
 
Capitals 
Bourdieu’s capitals represent accumulated labour (Bourdieu, 1986) that can be converted into social energy 
and advantage in a field. They include economic, cultural, political and symbolic capitals. Being both the 
underlying “principle” of fields and also circumscribed by objective structures and subjective 
understandings, capitals are the source of power, resources and possibility (Bourdieu, 2011, p. 81). 
Economic capital represents financial resources, the root of all other capitals (p. 89). Social capital is “a 
durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition.” In 
other words, membership of a group that provides members with backing, recognition or beneficial 
connections such as a school, a party, club or family name (p. 86). Cultural capital presents another form 
of non-financial asset that includes education, knowledge, attitude, specific know-how and skillsets that are 
valued in a field. As can be seen in the analysis produced in this dissertation, in reality these capitals are 
not held exclusively of each other. Economic capital can provide the abilities and possibilities of 
transformation into other forms of capitals that are more highly valued or more effective in a field. Therefore 
economic capitals can come disguised as cultural or social capital. Though there are costs associated with 
such conversions, economic capital can influence the level of symbolic capital held by a player. In turn, 
possession of social capital in a field can be a function of the quantity of economic and cultural capital held. 
 
Practice  
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Practices are seen to have a “generating, organizing theme,” a practical logic that accumulates through “an 
imprecise but systematic principle of selections and realization, tending through steadily directed 
adjustments and corrections…” (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 8). Habitus, created by a particular type of 
environment, harmonizes the social experiences of individuals in a group (p. 80). The practices created by 
this habitus follow and reproduce objective structures that create it. Through a collection of tacit knowledge, 
history, and the past, habitus contains the possibility of production of unlimited types of thought, choices, 
perceptions and actions inherent to a certain set of conditions, at once both deterministic and free, allowing 
for conscious and unconscious conditioning as well as creativity to play out at individual and social levels 
limited only by the conditions of its production (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 55). Here the “habitus is what makes it 
possible to produce an infinite number of practices that are relatively unpredictable but also limited in their 
diversity” (p. 55).  
 
Symbolic violence – A major theme in Bourdieu’s academic and political work is that of inequality, 
reflected in his notion of symbolic violence. Based on the idea of differentiating amounts of capitals or 
powers and cognitive understandings held by agents in a field, Bourdieu defines symbolic violence as 
“violence which is exercised upon a social agent with his or her complicity” (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 
p. 272). This varying balance of capitals creates an inherent space for power and capitals to be used by 
some actors to advantageously influence their interest or to dominate others in a field where these other 
actors lack the habitus, knowledge and/or capital to protect their interests. Through their perceptions and 
understandings of their own particular status in the larger social structure and order, such actors actually 
contribute to and are instrumental in their own domination (Bourdieu & Wacquant, p. 273). This theme is 
played out in many accounting studies using Bourdieusian frameworks (Rahaman, Everett, & Neu, 2007; 
Neu et al., 2013). 
 
The MGNREG program’s bureaucratic administrative and complex reporting structures produce extensive 
amounts of emails, instructions, policy documents and stipulations, directives and reports, as well as other 
physical accounting, financial and operational reports, documents, registers, performance data and minutes. 
Utilizing Bourdieu’s analytical tools, I highlight the manner in which the accounting processes and artifacts 
become enlisted in the constitution of a social space that encourages and supports certain types of financial 
and non-financial visibility and through (re)production over time, makes it more amenable to the creation 
and demanding of a multi-level account (Carmona, Ezzamel, & Gutierrez, 2002, p.240). The next section 
explores accounting artifacts and interactions that populate the program. 
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Accounting artifacts and interactions 
The MGNREG program’s physical administrative and accounting artifacts provide an important empirical 
medium to explore its accounting and accountability arrangements. The building of a budget or performance 
indicator or conducting of a social audit allows the division of the program cycle into separate moments 
where the practiced notions of accountability can be isolated and studied. Each such moment, constituted 
by its field, habitus and positioning of players, enlists its specific combination of artifacts and 
communications or interactions. Following the accounting artifacts, therefore, provides a powerful 
empirical anchoring tool to explore accounting and accountability practices at these sites. Artifacts and the 
interactions surrounding them are also key empirical resources in field research where direct observation is 
not possible, ineffective, or occurs in infrequent settings (Ramduny-Ellis et al., 2005). 
 
Artifacts have a wide literature in ethnography in areas such as cognitive action and collaborative work 
(Paay et al., 2009; Ramduny-Ellis, 2005). Within the setting of a field and this dissertation, accounting 
artifacts represents physical objects like reports, statements and account registers, but also includes physical 
activities like meetings and public gathering for accounting and financial decision making, around which 
interactions take place and which generate physical artifacts. The specific arrangements in each subfield 
allow selected contextual information to become visible while also providing physical, public objects 
around which interactions are structured. Here artifacts can be both instruments (D’Adderio, 2011) and 
instrumental (Miller & O’Leary, 2007) in the organization of a formal governance process. In accounting, 
studies such as Skaerbaek & Tryggestad (2010) draw on actor-network theory to focus on the performative 
connection between physical accounting “devices” and redrawing of organizational strategy. 
 
Most practice theorists would agree that activity is embodied and that nexuses of practices are 
mediated by artifacts, hybrids, and natural objects, disagreements reign about the nature of 
embodiment, the pertinence of thematizing it when analyzing practices, the sorts of entities that 
mediate activity, and whether these entities are relevant to practices as more than mere 
intermediaries among humans (Schatzki, Knorr-Cetina, & Von Savigny, 2011, p. 11). 
 
In this dissertation, I focus on the role of artifacts as a medium of investigation on the following themes: 
 
Accounting artifacts as process maps to field and subfields – The construction of accounting artifacts 
reifies governance structures, while habitus can facilitate governance at a distance (Miller & Rose, 1990). 
Artifacts are an expression of the material arrangements in fields and subfields and they provide a mapping 
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of the administrative and sociopolitical processes and influences that contribute to a practice-based process 
and its habitus connected to accountability. Though the management control system in MGNREGS is top-
down, accounting artifacts in the control processes show immense diversity in their construction, use and 
density at different levels and players in different states. At the meso-micro level, the granting of the power 
to construct, gather, consolidate and report data; to fill in, maintain and ratify artifacts; and to account for 
artifacts maps positional and symbolic capitals at the meso-micro level. Following accounting artifacts in 
an accounting practice can outline the embedded actor-roles as well as the vision, objectives and goals 
embodied in that practice’s format. Artifacts thus have the potential to express shifts in distribution of 
capitals and power through the manner in which accounts are created, moved, demanded or negotiated. 
 
Artifacts as mediators (through) and communicators (around) in collaborative settings – The gram 
sabha is invested with the legislative power to make collaborative decisions in the interest of the village, 
placing the social into the financial. The cyclical annual and biannual processes of labour budget and social 
audit are designed with the aim of engaging citizens in financial and non-financial issues including labour, 
costs and asset construction as well as knowledge of due process and their rights, putting the financial into 
the social. Construction and progression of each artifact, such as the shelf of works for the village labour 
budget, also includes interactions and processes of engagement, communication and negotiation on 
platforms such as the village-level public assembly, or gram sabha, and the committee meeting at central 
and state levels. These interactions reflect how accounting and accountability processes work in practice 
and the manner and purpose for which specific artifacts are drawn upon at different levels. The combination 
of artifacts and platform for interactions create a specific kind of ability to hold individuals and positions 
to account. The specific arrangements in each subfield allow contextual information to become visible and 
also provide physical, public objects around which interactions are structured. 
 
Artifacts as triggers for action and record keepers for transparency and accountability – In the setting 
of MGNREGS, budgeting and other accounting artifacts provide interpretable physical objects that initiate, 
trigger or support interactions, around which various micro stakeholders organize, engage and articulate 
their interests, issues and understandings (Paay et al., 2009; Blackmore & Wenger, 2010). For example, the 
reading of a social audit report includes both a record of and a voice for the rural villagers facing issues 
such as underpayment or non-payment of wages, underemployment, and other corrupt practices. These 
documents, reports and statements are the resultant financial repository of local learning experiences and 
micro level data that facilitate the movement of program data up the system and the tracking of funding 
down the system. Nothing is hidden anymore. 
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Density of artifacts – Density of artifacts, as mentioned above, is a theme that emerged in the open-ended 
interviews at the macro level, at the very beginning of the data collection process. This theme connects 
concentration of artifacts to the quality of accountability. Based on this, although there is little extant 
literature with which to connect, I included this element in my subsequent interviews at other sites at the 
meso and micro level. Although some levels expressed more sensitivity to the link between density of 
artifacts and accountability, the direction of this link seems varied. This means that across all levels of 
investigation, a higher number of accounting artifacts did not always translate into perceptions of higher 
accountability. This research project is not oriented towards exploring quantitative expressions of 
accountability, but this theme is nevertheless interesting to note in the context of the current project and 
future research. 
 
Analysis of change  
Hopwood (1990, p. 8) notes that locating accounting as a part of complex processes of change may not be 
an easy endeavour. The problematic of defining change, its socio-organizational context, and resistance to 
it has been explored through a range of frameworks including resource dependence, contingency theory 
and actor-network theory (Quattrone & Hopper, 2001; Scapens & Roberts, 1993; Brier & Chua, 2001; 
Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998). Scapens & Roberts (1993) provide a particularly relevant account through their 
study of the introduction of a management accounting system in a large multidivisional company. Their 
paper finds decentralization, resistance, and communication gaps between production and accounting, 
leading to the non-acceptance of the new system. 
 
One of the dilemmas of empirical research in this field is that change, and increase in organizational 
knowledge may not be completely visible or possible to quantitatively measure. Change can therefore 
become a contested notion (Carter, Clegg, & Kromberg, 2010, p. 583) unless represented by essential 
markers. Conducting such research in the public sector presents additional challenges, as public 
organizations are constructed and managed differently and access to primary and secondary data is a 
challenge.  Kloot (1997, p. 47) defines organizational learning as organizations responding to change (p. 48) 
where the MCS by definition can have reactive and proactive roles to play in both change and organizational 
learning. Management accounting can thus be seen as an actant that leads and contributes to organizational 
changes. And it can also be the change itself, through its very structure and the information it provides and 
makes visible (Atkinson, Balakrishnan, Booth et al., 1997). 
 
Resource dependence theory would perhaps look at the ecology of connected and interdependent 
organizations that fight for power originating from control over resources (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978, p. 1). 
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On the surface this would help in interpreting the conscious context here but it would not have the ability 
to take into account the latent leanings and understandings absorbed by organizations, as reflected in the 
blueprints, judgments and perceptions of accountability expressed in future programs like MGNREGS. 
 
Changes in budgetary control and process adjustments to MCS can be observed in studies such as Lapsley 
(1994), but central-level changes go beyond the contingency theory–based scope of adjustment to resources 
available. This process would require a matching of organizational structure and circumstances to specific 
kinds of accounting systems (Otley, 1980), which the central and state government did accomplish in part 
in the recent years. But as the data and extant literature demonstrate, structural characteristics and notions 
of Western accountability can differ vastly from what exists in rapidly developing nations such as India 
(Dar, 2014). Relevant to this discussion are also theories of organizational culture (Henri, 2006) and 
organizational learning (Chenhall & Euske, 2007), a term first used by Argyris and Schön in the 1970s 
(Hilden & Tikamaki, 2013). These studies draw on contingency-based theories and lean towards a pure 
cause and effect model that does not coincide with the research perspective, goals and possibilities of this 
dissertation. 
 
Cyert & Marsh (1963) and Argyris & Schön (1978) put forth the notion of the “learning organization,” 
while Huber’s (1991) more expansive behavioural view looks at learning for an entity or individual as a 
change in its response and behaviour through the processing of information (p. 89). Also connected are 
studies that focus on the conscious transfer of knowledge in an organization (Greenhalgh, Robert, 
McFarlane et al., 2004) as well as others like Haldin-Herrgard (2000) that explore the diffusion of tacit 
knowledge in organizations. Both Huber (1991, pp. 87–90) and Kloot (1997, p. 47) draw on the same four 
constructs connected to organizational learning that MCS design can help with: knowledge acquisition, 
information distribution, information interpretation and organizational memory. 
 
In this dissertation, I adapt and use Fiol & Lyles’ (1985) summarized range of outcomes through which 
organizational shifts can be identified and analyzed. These include new insights and knowledge; new 
structures; new systems; new actions; or a combination of these options (p. 803). The probability for 
learning to happen is connected to four contextual factors: culture, strategy, organizational structure and 
environment. In the chapters devoted to analysis, I explore changes in structure, system and actor actions 
as well as the role played by new understandings, insights and knowledge at macro, meso and micro level. 
 
51 
 
Habitus as a process: temporality, change and learning 
A crucial part of the argument set forth in this dissertation is connected to changes in habitus. 
Understandings, perception, attitudes, positional strategies and action, connected to our understanding of 
habitus, are all gathered and acquired by individuals, organizations and the social over periods of time. 
 
In the previous section, I discussed tracking and analysis of change and learning in research. In delivering 
a social program such as MGNREGS on larger scale across different levels, an overarching argument and 
analysis theme is to connect the various habitus in the MGNREGS field as a process connected to reform 
on the organizational level and transformation through knowledge and learning at the village level. Such a 
process is an extension of the Bourdieu notion of habitus as accumulated history. I propose that in 
MGNREGS, the habitus adapts and shifts based on environmental conditions and actor strategies. 
 
An important element in this proposition is the connection between habitus and temporality. I argue that 
development and change be seen from the perspective of a process that gathers steadily over time. The 
habitus has a teleological character with a set of possible outcomes (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 53) where the 
production (and reproduction) of objective-subjective data and communication is embedded within 
sociopolitical struggles, understandings and meanings, while also being a part of the production of such 
struggles, understandings and meanings (Ruiz, 2009). As one looks at critical elements of temporality and 
collective adaptability in the establishment of in-practice procedure, practices remain flexible to shifts in 
the underlying conditionings and symbolic capital and are therefore open to specific possibilities of change 
and transformation (Calhoun, 2006). 
 
In accounting research, Everett (2000) draws on Bourdieu’s field and capital to connect accountability and 
accounting to the shaping of political influences. He explores a specific management technique of 
comprehensive auditing, analyzing struggles for legitimacy, naming rights, and accumulation of capital. 
His argument is that the reproduction of dominant capitals did not produce the solutions required – which 
is particularly relevant to my discussions of the triggers that can initiate change in the distribution of capitals 
as well as habitus. Such triggers and the adoption of change, specifically in the public sector, have also 
been explored by studies such as Modell (2011) that connect to the role of managers and of management 
accounting mechanisms such as performance measurement. 
 
Institutional aspects of performance measurement (PM) in public sector organizations are attracting 
increasing research interest. Only recently, however, has the literature on this topic recognized the 
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pertinent critique of neo-institutional sociology (NIS) pivoting around its view of managers and 
organizations as primarily passive adaptors to change (Modell, 2001). 
 
Looking at the temporality and cycles of internalizations involved in delivering a social program such as 
MGNREGS, we can visualize the important role of top management decisions and judgments in reporting, 
control, setting of objectives and policy frameworks. Such decisions set the standard in terms of 
management dispositions or habitus that become expressed and dispersed down the line. 
 
Stimuli, adaptation and shift/change in habitus 
Though time, strategy and action form one side of the human coin, the other side is represented by the 
presence of a strong sense of adaptation to the conditionings that constitute such a habitus; changes get 
triggered and, given certain human choices and conditions, may happen gradually and without conscious 
aim or strategy on a collective level, becoming a part of the history, conditioning or habitus of a field: 
 
The conditionings associated with a particular class of conditions of existence produce habitus….as 
principles which generate and organize practices and representations that can be objectively 
adapted to their outcomes without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery 
of the operations necessary in order to attain them… they can be collectively orchestrated without 
being the product of the organizing actions of a conductor (Bourdieu, 1990b). 
 
This is specifically relevant for the empirical insights in my field research. I draw on these conceptual tools 
to outline the habitus connected with accountability. 
 
Temporality – Hammer (2011) explores time, temporality and the social (p.11):  
 
[T]ime itself can never be made directly present in experience … it nevertheless permeates and in 
a sense, governs everything that takes place. It dissolves into things, processes, and events as the 
mode of their becoming and yet is typically represented by the means of space and spatiality….  
 
Reproduction and representation of such practices not only have strong sensitivities but are defined by 
human action-choices and temporality: “Practice … being temporally structured is intrinsically defined by 
its tempo” (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 8; emphasis added).  Embedded understandings connected to the habitus, 
the “way things are done,” and legitimacy also have to be considered through the lens of temporality: “Time 
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derives its efficacy from the state of the structure of relations within which it comes to play, which does not 
imply that the model of that structure can leave it out of account” (p. 7). 
 
The history-based reproduction and unfolding of practices and ritualization of interactions are therefore 
affected by both time and strategy: “the habitus, the product of history, produces individual and collective 
practices, and hence history, in accordance with the schemes engendered by history” (Bourdieu, 1990, 
p. 82). On reflexivity, Bourdieu discusses the analysis of “temporal consciousness” (Bourdieu, 1990(b), 
p. 8) as he investigates how a capitalistic economic habitus is acquired by individuals brought up before 
that time. Drawing on Bourdieu’s institutional sociology, Neu, Everett, Rahman, and Martinez (2013) 
provide another example. They outline the network of actors and capitals held by them to explore how 
practices like accounting, over time, mediate the establishment of corrupt practices that become a part of 
that field’s habitus. 
 
Within this dissertation, temporality is reflected in the element of history in the creation of a habitus (a 
collection of history and the past). This historicity gives rise to temporality, a state of existing with reference 
to time or in which time has a significant impact. Though this dissertation follows the MGNREG program 
over an eight-year unfolding period, I explore temporality not in a physical, linear sense but through the 
cyclical and sometimes ritualized (Blattner, 2011) processes through which accounting and accountability 
activities and practices become socialized into the socioeconomic habitus. 
 
In the next section, I discuss my research orientation, methodology and method in detail. 
 
Methodology 
Between governance, accounting and accountability comes the conceptual framework of MGNREGS as a 
social services and social security program. Hunger levels in rural India are alarming high: the cereal intake 
of the poorest 20% of rural India is only 10 kg per month, while access to fruits, vegetables and milk is 
negligible (Darooka, 2016). The role of the government in the MGNREGS vision is for the government 
take care of the weak, the poor, the downtrodden and the underprivileged. This aligns with ideas of 
redistribution of national income, food security, human rights, and self-governance. In doing so, the 
MGNREGS conceptual framework engages with legislative acts, policy and labour decisions as well as 
human and gender rights (Konwar, 2016). Thus, its success is viewed through the lens of its instrumentality 
in creating rural employment, decreasing poverty and increasing access to basic standards of living in rural 
India as well as human and women’s rights. 
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This dissertation takes a qualitative approach, in order to better understand the lived experiences of 
individuals from their viewpoint and in their natural environment. With the view that this discourse and the 
structures it communicates construct, maintain and reflect a particular subjective reality, I draw on the 
interpretive tradition outlined by Berger & Luckman (1984) and Chua (1986), wherein social and 
intersubjective human interactions and experiences lead to the creation and recreation of an objective social 
order. Reality, knowledge and meanings can thus be seen to be constructed and interpreted (Berger & 
Luckman, 1980, p. 19) “by the people, for the people … and the social and physical environment” (Chua, 
1986, p. 603) instead of existing singularly, externally and independently, waiting to be uncovered and 
discovered. It is subjectively created but also objectified through human interactions (Chua, 1986, p. 615). 
Schwandt (1994) describes these terms as sensitizing concepts that steer researchers towards a particular 
outlook:  
 
Proponents of these persuasions (interpretive and constructivist) share the goal of understanding 
the complex world of lived experience from the point of view of those who live it. This goal is 
variously spoken of as an abiding concern for the life world, for the emic point of view, for 
understanding meaning, for grasping the actor’s definition of a situation, for Verstehen. The world 
of lived reality and situation-specific meanings that constitute the general object of investigation is 
thought to be constructed by social actors (p. 118). 
 
In line with these perspectives, accounting and accountability are also constructs of social science, shaped 
by society and culture and situated within human actions and institutions – “a social and organizational 
practice” (Miller, 1994, p. 1). Knowledge of accountability in organizations and daily life is shaped by 
human-defined rules (Hines, 1998, p. 256), based on accumulated history and past knowledge that 
contribute to the construction of reality and social order. An interpretive paradigm (Chua, 1986, p. 612) 
allows me to move away from quantitative and “reliable” data and analysis (Chua, 1986, p. 602) to connect 
to the complex and diverse ways (Meer-Kooistra & Vosselman, 2012, p. 252) in which management 
accounting can be implicated in the empirical experiential life of organizations and of society. 
 
Reflexivity and social praxeology 
Praxeology is the study of human actions and the behaviour that drives it. Bourdieu’s social praxeology is 
a bidimensional system, requiring a double reading that engages both structuralist and constructivist 
perspectives (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 11); it is a mix of objective structures and the subjective 
dispositions around them. In line with this, I begin by examining what Bourdieu calls “objectivity of the 
first order” (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 7), which looks from the outside in at “objective realities” 
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players have to follow. These include the objective structure and distribution of formal material resources, 
conditions and arrangements in a field that provide the means to appropriate that field’s valued capitals. 
Objective elements are amenable to being observed and mapped out (p. 8). Towards this, I investigate the 
setting of the field, the formal organizational and positional structure, the types of major capitals (economic, 
social and cultural) and the formal powers held by key players in the field. I rely on information gathered 
through interviews, reports and other documents published by the government over the years as well as 
secondary data. 
 
However, this in itself may be insufficient to provide an understanding of the inner workings of a social – 
its relational networks and position of power, meaning (p. 7), strategy and logic that guide the underlying 
mental understandings of daily common-sense working in a field. Towards this aim, I draw on Bourdieu’s 
“objectivity of the second order,” though, in no way do I present this as a comprehensive analysis. The 
second order is associated with the inside-out perspective – the “mental and body schemata” connected to 
the habitus and production of internal stratification, understandings, conduct and judgment as social agents 
(Bourdieu & Wacquant, 2012, p. 7) – that provides one way to explore and better understand the subjective 
dimension. The second level of reading is associated with the player’s unwritten lived experience of practice 
and her understanding of it through its doing. These are particularly important to Bourdieu’s sociological 
analysis in uncovering the “buried structures” and mechanisms through which power and the social are 
constructed, perpetuated or transformed (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 7). Thus the second level of my 
analysis draws on Bourdieu’s praxeology as well as primary and secondary levels to focuses on the 
experiential elements such as that context, relationality, informal capitals, the unfolding of practice, the 
unwritten understandings displayed in interview observations, symbolic capitals and resources reflected as 
valued in the field and the manner of communication of interests and the public sector habitus. 
 
Method 
My research sites are situated in India, in the southern states of Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu and the 
northern states of Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh. I focus on the program unfolding in Andhra Pradesh, while 
enlisting insights from other sites towards the analysis. The time period of this research projects is eight 
annual cycles of program implementation from 2006–07 to 2013–14. 
 
My research is sociological in nature. To gain a better understanding of an individual’s or group’s ideas, 
experiences and perceptions, I use an inductive approach. Given an interpretive and subjective reality, the 
major questions in this dissertation are connected to identifying ideas of accountability; and to the processes 
of production, reproduction and change in different sociocultural settings, which enlist accounting in 
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diverse ways (Chua, 1986, p. 614). In keeping with the method outlined by Chua (1986, p. 614), I draw on 
Bourdieu and on Lincoln & Guba’s (1985) naturalistic paradigm of studying processes and experiences of 
actors within their natural environment. This also speaks to Bourdieu’s practice theory and action research 
wherein the cultural understandings and habitus are “constituted in practice and is always oriented towards 
practical functions” and are executed by situating oneself with real activity as it unfolds (Bourdieu, 1990, 
p. 52). Drawing on Bourdieu’s vision, I conduct a field research of MGNREGS’s field, actors, accounting 
and accountability processes, towards making them more visible through such empirical exploration 
(Chapman, 1997, p. 191).  
The research sites were geographically dispersed and the participants could not be invited to travel. And 
for most of them, it would also be difficult to reach them after interviews had been inscribed and my analysis 
was ready. Additionally, context, depth and understanding of personal accounts were important elements 
of the project. In this setting, face-to-face interviews provide an interactive opportunity to gain insights into 
both the phenomena and the participants in their own environment (Richie, Lewis, Nicholls & Ormston, 
2014, p. 60). The interview format connects to the idea that personal language is data (Newton, 2010).  
I chose to conduct semi-structured interviews, as they encourage interviewees to share richer descriptions, 
opinions and experiences based on their position, perceptions and power (DiCicco-Bloom & Crabtree, 
2006). Semi-structured interviews provided me the opportunity of direct observation in terms of context 
and relationality. The language and expressions used by interviewees in such interviews were key elements 
for understanding their account of their own relationality as well as powers, positions and perceptions held 
and shifted. Compared to structured interviews, which are better suited to testing an a priori hypothesis, 
the semi-structured format allowed me to direct the general flow of the interview but also have the flexibility 
to follow the interviewee’s line of thought, views and opinions. Also, semi-structured interviews generate 
data that are amenable to different kinds of analysis, better suited to interpretive analysis and have been 
found to be consistent with participatory and emancipatory models (Newton, 2010) such as the one seen in 
MGNREGS. 
The primary data for the dissertation are gathered from fieldwork through semi-structured interviews and 
direct observation. Secondary data sources include program documents, archival government documents, 
memos, research reports, news articles, and accounting and project registers, while accounting documents 
are also enlisted to provide content analysis. It is acceptable for such interpretive research and inductive 
reasoning not to use control groups. The researcher starts from observed data, develops themes and analyzes 
their connections to provide insights that may or may not be generalized to the larger population. 
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Site selection – Site selection was a particularly important decision and more so when you look at the 
variation in poverty, education, women’s rights and infrastructure between the states. The MoRD gave me 
formal government permission to conduct my field visits in India and also allowed me to conduct interviews 
at the central government levels. But state governments had to provide me with their separate approval in 
order to have access to state and districts offices and to coordinate my visit to block level and village sites. 
Without formal and informal liasoning at the state level, data collection would have not possible as the 
MoRD letter of permission was not enough. 
I began with a preliminary visit to India where I met with the officials at the Ministry of Rural Development, 
Government of India (MoRD, GOI) to both set a basis for future interactions but also get preliminary ideas 
about the workings of the MGNREGS program.  
On the next visit, to start the process, I contacted the MoRD at its offices in the capital city of New Delhi, 
and was assigned a liaison officer. Based on initial meetings, macro level interviews, a review of program 
literature and online data as well as parameters of language access, literacy rates and program performance, 
I presented an initial list of states. I targeted four Indian states, one in each of the north, south, east and west 
of the country. These sites would ensure a broader geographical, program-performance and demographic 
spread, providing insights into how local social, economic and political factors influence relative program 
performance, for both good and the bad. Poorer states such as Bihar, Odissa, Uttar Pradesh and Assam also 
display lower levels of industry in urban areas.  
The liaison officer at MoRD got in touch with state departments formally and informally to them know 
about my research and request access on my behalf. In the field state-level access was a constraining factor 
to be worked through. State governments do not have a fiduciary relationship with the MoRD, so meso and 
micro access were purely based on internal decisions communicated through the liaison officer.  
Of the first set of formal requests, two were declined. Of these two formally declined requests, one was 
communicated relatively quickly, while the other cancelled my visit just a few days before my field visit 
was to begin. The official reason for declining my visit in the first state was lack of personnel bandwidth. 
The second state had recently been in the newspapers with regard to some allegations of corruption. This 
may or may not have been a reason for refusal as none was officially provided.  
Based on discussions with officials at the MoRD, additional set of requests were sent out to more states. 
There were informal declines from two other states. Another state granted me formal access but I was 
unable to conduct interviews on my first visit when I got there. In the next visit, I was granted state 
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interviews but not district and micro level access. However, on the third trip to the state, near the end of my 
field visit to India, I was able to conduct block level interviews as well. Another state had suspended its 
social audit practice, so I could not connected interviews connected to this specific practice. Aside from the 
regular process of getting state government approval and invitations, there were additional issues of national 
calamity, political unrest and declaration of state elections that forced me to reconsider both my list and my 
timing of data collection. Each time, I had to go back to the drawing board to re-make the list.   
 
At the district level, there were two appointment cancellations. At the block level, there were four 
appointment cancellations. The number of comparatively higher cancellations at the block level were in 
line with public reports of higher program fund misappropriation at this level. At the village level, there 
were times when I approached a group of individuals and explained my research, its purpose and my 
intention of wanting to interview them. The event of a researcher doing interviews is an unusual and 
unfamiliar occurrence for village life. Some individuals asked more questions, and then accepted. Others 
walked away at various phases of that conversation or stayed to hear the interview being conducted with 
another individual. Other times, I approached a woman or a group of women in the village and was directed 
to a woman they felt would be willing to talk. Reasons for such redirection could be the unfamiliarity of 
what I was doing, shyness or social norms where an older person talks for the younger individuals or a man 
talks for the women. These instances are a part of the sociocultural environment at the village level. I did 
not consider these as interviews declined but rather a part of snowball sampling.  
Interviews were eventually conducted at five separate sites: state government offices in New Delhi; four 
clusters of sites representing a mix of state, district, block, and local governance and program beneficiaries 
in the northern provinces of Uttar Pradesh and Rajasthan and southern provinces of Tamil Nadu and Andhra 
Pradesh. The southern states of Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu can be considered more industrialized, 
prosperous and educated, while Uttar Pradesh and Rajasthan can be considered to be on a lower scale in 
terms of development, resources, education and poverty. I do not claim that these sites are representative 
of the whole program, as structures, resources, strategy, implementation and sociocultural understandings 
differ from state to state. However, they are sites rich in empirical data that also provided a certain amount 
of variation in demographic and program performance that allowed me to conduct in-depth interviews and 
observe various actors and phenomena in the field.  
As the MGNREGS administrative structure is quite complicated, in my macro-level interviews I invited 
inputs and discussions from the central government liaison and also drew on other interviews at the central 
level to understand the MGNREGS organizational chart and identify key actors. The process at the state 
level began with getting connected to the first key official at each state government level for MGNREGS. 
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This is where I started my state interview process. I then asked for referrals in specific areas including 
finance, MIS and audit as well as other individuals they considered key to the program implementation. 
Each interview led to referral(s) to other actors considered to be important. This was important, as 
administrative, central and state government views and perception of who the key actors are could be similar 
or different. I was unable to reach some individuals because they were unavailable or away.  
 
Though access to state, district, block and village sites was granted, it was a sequential process, and it was 
not possible to set up interviews in advance. Interviews were therefore based on availability and willingness 
to participate. Aside from the state governments mentioned above, there were some cancellations and/or 
declines at the district and block level (Appendix N).   
 
Efforts were made to interview individuals in similar positions and of similar status across all four states, 
but this could not be guaranteed, as each state has structured program implementation differently. In 
addition there were variations in local sociocultural contexts as well as my level of access. Efforts were 
made to conduct interviews individually and in physical spaces that allowed privacy of conversation. In 
Tamil Nadu, the social audit practice was at the second level pilot phased where smaller audits had already 
been conducted but the practice was yet to be roll out state-wide. However, a social audit agency inside the 
state department was already set up, staffed and some pilot audits had been conducted. Interviews with this 
agency brought up many positive and negative elements of their experience. I focused on their particular 
version of public delivery network at the district, block and village levels. In Rajasthan, the social audit 
practice was not sufficiently developed because the internal audit wing had been instead been chosen as the 
chief mechanism of program accountability. It was both a well-developed department and a well-developed 
practice and therefore I interviewed the Chief Financial Officer and some other members at the state level. 
In Uttar Pradesh, in line with interview information, news and audit reports, the state was unable to mount 
a good program implementation and this was reflected in behaviours in micro interviewees as well as a 
visible lack of resources, enthusiasm and fiduciary local relationships among the micro players. A 
Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG, 2016) report found that in Uttar Pradesh’s social audit, critical 
elements of the process such as door-to-door visits and sharing of the audit report with beneficiaries were 
missing. In such states, MGNREGS is administered by government employees responsible for many other 
social services programs, unlike the dedicated department maintained by Andhra Pradesh.    
 
Data in the Indian setting were collected through a sample size of approximately 70 semi-structured 
individual and group interviews of up to 75 minutes conducted in English, India’s national Hindi language, 
and the regional Tamil and Telugu languages (Appendix N). Data collection was done over a period of 
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approximately four months. The selection of interviewees was random and based on a snowball sampling 
technique so as to access a hidden population, gaining the trust of these individuals based on an introduction 
by someone familiar, and also to identify individuals active in the MGNREG program. However, as 
outlined by Miles and Huberman (1995), sampling was purposive wherein I asked to interview individuals 
connected to specific functions or parts of program implementation or village governance. This means these 
individuals had the program knowledge, responsibilities and experience to respond to interview questions. 
Interviews were conducted until empirical data saturation was reached (Morse, 2000, pp. 3–5; Mason, 
2010). Shadow data were used to gather secondary data and also reach the next set of interviewees (p. 3). 
Here interviewees talk not only about their own experiences but those of others, as well as differences and 
comparisons between both. Though such data need to be verified, they can provide in-depth perspective 
through fewer interviews.  
 
Informed consent was gained verbally and permission for this was granted by the ethics office at the 
university. Signatures are considered formal admissions in the bureaucratic public sector in India and are 
not entertained lightly. In the villages, where individuals may or may not know how to read or write, 
strangers or outsiders asking for signatures will be association with suspicion as these are traditionally 
associated with fraudulent signing away of money, land and property. So signing a document they don’t 
understand and for a stranger would present potential danger to which they would not expose themselves. 
These issues could have seriously hindered my access and data collection efforts. Verbal consent provided 
an alternate means to communicate information and receive informed consent without physical signatures 
that would have created resistance. 
 
Many formal interviews were followed by informal conversations and discussions in more relaxed settings 
where I was allowed to ask further questions and take written detailed notes. The interviewees did not have 
any issues with such data being used in the research project, but in line with the cultural-political context 
of India, they simply did not want it formally recorded on an audio recorder. Except for these and some 
follow-up phone interviews, all interviews were conducted be in person, were recorded, translated and 
transcribed. My notes and personal observations were typed out after every visit to maintain high level of 
detail. In-person and phone follow-up interviews were done with six interviewees – two at central level and 
four at state and district levels – for clarifications and additional questions.  
 
Data analysis 
Interpretive research has contributed strongly to extending accounting from its objective, instrumental role 
towards a social practice implicated not only in reporting (Morgan, 1988) but also in creating specific 
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visibility (Hopwood, 1987; Tinker, 1985), realities (Hines, 1991; Guthrie, 1998; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 
1988), and the breaking of silences (Lehman, 2013, p. 136; Alawattage & Wickramasinghe, 2009). Though 
calls to expand the boundaries and understandings of the impact of organizational, social and cultural 
context have been extended, studies that engage in an empirically grounded micro-level analysis of the role 
of accounting in accountability are fairly limited. In such a setting, accounting and accountability systems 
have the potential to act as a medium of public accountability, communication, distribution (Neu, 2000) 
and emancipation through visibility, transparency and knowledge that can create shifts in the subfields and 
the distribution of capital. 
 
Accounting theory, like any social belief, is not merely a passive representation of reality, it is an 
agent in changing (or perpetuating) a reality (Tinker, 1985, p. 28). 
 
Qualitative research is connected to making meaningful connections among data, and the role of theory is 
connected to an engagement with the data and also the underlying logic and sociopolitical dynamics of the 
field (Ahrens & Chapman, 2006). Miles & Huberman (1984, p. 6) draw on Wolcott’s (1992) visual 
summary of qualitative research strategies, included poststructuralist field studies where the researcher’s 
role is to form an integrated, cohesive outlook of the field, its context, logic and implicit or explicit rules. 
Such a perspective extended to textual and content analysis has been used extensively in accounting 
research in a variety of settings published in top “alternative” journals such as Accounting, Organizations 
and Society (AOS); Critical Perspectives on Accounting (CPA); and Accounting, Auditing & Accountability 
Journal (AAAJ). Lehman & Tinker (1987), for example, use a sociocultural lens to explore the role of 
accounting discourse through themes of disclosures in intellectual capital, environmental disclosures. 
Unerman (2000) analyzes a hundred years of content to argue that annual reports alone do not present a 
complete picture of an organization’s reporting practices. Himick (2009) uses archival research to explore 
the role of accounting in Chilean pension reforms, while Neu (2000) is a historical study on the role of 
accounting in exchanges between the Canadian army and police forces and First Nations people and in the 
colonization process. 
 
In order to provide an analysis of the intentional and the contextual elements of strategy and change, one 
part of my account involves examining government documents in detail to trace the introduction of new 
elements and their timelines in order to construct an overall account of the Government of Andhra Pradesh’s 
(GoAP’s) visible program decisions and strategy over the course of eight years of program implementation. 
I present an outline of the legacy administrative and accounting issues juxtaposed with change markers 
(Fiol & Lyles, 1985) in the shape of new structures, practices and understandings, in order to provide a 
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canvas against which such changes can be observed over time. In keeping with unfolding of practice I also 
outline some field threats and resistance mounted by meso-micro public officers. This analysis draws on 
interviews with the government officials at the state, district, block and village level, various members of 
the social audit team at the Society for Social Audit, Accountability and Transparency (SSAAT) including 
its joint director, field officers, legal officers and rural beneficiaries, as well as interviews with national-
level monitors (NLMs). I compare themes generated from this exercise to insights generated from other 
interviews, secondary documents, observations, personal lived experience and secondary data to provide 
an underlying context to the change in the distribution of capital and shifts in habitus. In the last section of 
analysis, I combine insights from the field, capitals and state strategy to present an overall synthesis of the 
shift in habitus and the role played by accounting and MCS. 
 
What insights can a sociological theoretical framework provide about accounting processes? Since I provide 
an analysis drawing on Bourdieu’s practice theory and other empirical concepts, I’ve consciously worked 
on the following: 
 
 Accounting processes, artifacts and interactions have been known to make visible, express, create 
and support specific interests and also be a source of creating action (Latour, 1996). Bourdieu’s 
concepts provide a framework that allows me to map and understand the constitution of the field 
of social services delivery, powers in terms of capitals, sociopolitical context in the shape of habitus 
that impacts accounting processes, and the creation of accounting artifacts and interactions to 
implement accountability.  
 
 Bourdieu’s concepts of habitus and human agency allow an exploration of the multiple and 
divergent interests embedded in the same field or subfield through accounting processes, artifacts 
and interactions. This combination of objective structures and subjective choices at the individual 
level connects through the “space of possibles” (Bourdieu, 2007. p.22) and the possibilities of 
reproduction and accumulated change reflected in the drawing upon and use of specific accounting 
artifacts. Multiple interests and habitus in a social welfare program to be explored through 
structurally granted powers in accountability that come from administrative positions and 
individual capitals such as economic, social, cultural and symbolic. Within a single social security 
program I look at identical or similar accounting artifacts and interactions representing multiple 
stakeholder interests and therefore drawn upon differently by different stakeholders for different 
purposes within the same program process. 
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In traditional research settings, texts such as financial reports, analyst reports and accounting standard 
reports are used in capital markets research and corporate governance. This genre of research originates 
from the perspective of a stand-alone objective reality, which is reflected in the organizational decision 
making, strategy and functioning and which can be made known through an analysis of texts such as annual 
reports and analyst reports. Iconic positive theory studies include Watts & Zimmerman (1978), who draw 
on submissions to FASB’s discussion memorandum to look at the drivers of accounting standard setting 
and how stakeholders invest in lobbying to influence the result. As in Bushman & Smith (2001), the purpose 
of an examination of texts is to shed light on information relevant for decision making to various external 
stakeholders. 
 
Bourdieu provides a conceptual link between sociocultural elements and economic structures and decisions 
(Pickle, 2005). In his research on the Kablya tribe, Bourdieu is seen to draw upon language, meaning and 
intention to connect social structure and individual action. This provides an understanding of his relational 
and symbolic construction of notions of power. Though Bourdieu’s conceptions of habitus, capitals and 
field can take a variety of forms, allowing themselves to be drawn upon and interpreted in various setting, 
they are also considered to be strong conceptual tools. To provide a deeper analysis of the large amount of 
data in the form of primary interview transcripts as well as secondary government and other public reports, 
documents and articles on the program, I thought it important to enlist further analytical tools to examine 
the data and connect with the theoretical framework. 
 
Discourse analysis 
Discourse analysis is a tool that allows me to connect verbal and written communication as a social function 
(Jones, 2012, p. 9) interpret the field, relational power/capitals and habitus. There is no specific focus on 
the content analysis in Bourdieu’s framework (Everett, 2001), but I perceive no ideological clash – though 
he does have strong ideas on objectivity and reflexive research in research (Everett, 2002). With the view 
that this discourse and the structures it communicates, constructs and maintains reflect a particular 
subjective reality, the production (and reproduction) of this objective-subjective data and communication 
is embedded with sociopolitical struggles, understandings and meanings, while also being a part of the 
production of such struggles, understandings and meanings (Ruiz, 2009). 
 
Discourse analysis has a wider scope than textual analysis and has been enlisted in a variety of social science 
fields including sociology, anthropology and also accounting. From a sociological perspective such as mine, 
discourse includes a variety of forms including text, both written and spoken. With such a perspective, the 
analysis cannot be limited to an “objective” analysis of text alone. Sociological discourse analysis considers 
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text as a record of a communicative event (Brown & Yule, 1983), and each such discourse is imbued with 
subjective reality, strategic action and shared understandings. My intention is not to take a purist view 
focusing on the linguistic properties of textual analysis. I draw on a blend of what Brown & Yule (1983, 
p. 1) call a “transactional” view that focuses on the content of secondary communication and an 
“interactional” view that focuses on social relationships and understandings communicated in the discourse 
(p. 1). 
 
The term discourse refers precisely to the capacity of meaning-making resources to constitute social 
reality, forms of knowledge and identity within specific social contexts and power relations (Hall 1997: 
220). In claiming that texts are multiply implicated in their social contexts and, thereby, come to shape 
various forms of knowledge and identity, discourse analysis has been instrumental in developing a more 
dynamic and historically sensitive mode of critical inquiry into culture – what is broadly known as post-
structuralism (Chouliaraki, 2008, pp. 674–698). 
 
There are many tools available to discourse analysis and each can be used differently. Hsieh & Shannon 
(2005), for example, focus on textual analysis and outline three qualitative content analysis techniques 
based on coding themes and their origins. The conventional approach derives its codes directly from the 
text data while (p. 1279), the direct approach draws initial or predetermined codes from theory, literature 
or research findings as (pp. 1281–1282). Finally, summative content analysis identifies the frequency with 
which certain words or content are used with the view of understanding the underlying context (p. 1283). 
However, communication can be more than just written text just as analysis has to build beyond coding, to 
connect data to theory towards new insights. Each tool for discourse analysis presents its own set of 
underlying assumptions and perspectives. As Jorgensen & Phillips (2002) eloquently outline: 
 
Each approach to discourse analysis that we present is not just a method for data analysis, but a 
theoretical and methodological whole – a complete package…. In discourse analysis, theory and 
method are intertwined and researchers must accept the basic philosophical premises in order to use 
discourse analysis as their method of empirical study (Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 4). 
 
For my analysis, I draw on the Ruiz (2009) paper on “Sociological discourse analysis: Methods and logic.” 
His analytic tools and perspective offers a number of potential connections with Bourdieu’s practice theory. 
Sociologically, according to Ruiz, discourse as a practice – as with any practice – is imbued with meaning 
through individual interactions and their interpretation of reality. His discourse analysis is subdivided into 
three levels or stages that could be linear in theory but in practice can constitute overlapping stages. He 
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describes the process of analysis as a continuous back-and-forth dialogue amongst the levels (p. 3). These 
levels are textual, contextual and finally sociological (interpretive) analysis. 
 
Textual analysis is the first stage, in which structures of discourse can be considered autonomous and 
external to the subjects that produce them. Here, discourse in an object. Contextual analysis, the second 
stage, makes the connection between social discourse and the social reality in which such discourse is 
produced and where it circulates. It is an effort to place the data in the “local” meaning of the discourse 
(p. 7–8), to understand the space that produces the discourse and gives it meaning. Here discourse is a 
singular event. An important assumption at this stage is the intentionality linked to discursive strategies 
adopted by participants (p. 8). It is for the researcher to investigate for whom and towards what end (p. 7). 
 
The third stage, sociological analysis, draws on the discourse and its localized setting to provide an 
interpretive analysis of its particular social reality by connecting with the theoretical framework. In this 
stage, discourse can be seen as providing information and an interpretation on a certain representation of a 
social reality and a social structure. Discourse as a social product reflects the positions occupied by the 
players in a field, the logics and rules that hold that field together, and lastly the habitus or social 
conditioning of the player(s) producing the discourse (p. 11). 
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Chapter 4: MGNREGS and the Central Government – Macro Level 
 
Another rather different set of imperatives for accounting has originated from those scholars who have seen 
accounting systems as mirrors of the societies or organizations in which they are implicated. At the societal 
level, this has involved seeing accounting as essentially reflective of the organization of social relationships 
(Burchell, et al., 1980, p. 10). 
 
Governance and accountability are concepts linked in a vast array of literature drawing on frameworks such 
as rational choice and interpretive theory to better understand the multiple interests, processes and 
interactions through which governance policies and decision happen (Bevir, 2011, pp. 2–3). Aligned to this 
thinking is the notion that relationship between societal actors is in a state of flux where governance is “a 
process of interaction between different societal and political actors and the growing interdependencies 
between the two as modern societies become ever more complex, dynamic and diverse” (Kooiman, 2003, 
p. 170). Along similar lines, literature on metagovernance or “governing of governance” (Sorenson, 2006) 
investigates governance as a means of social and political communication (Bang, 2003). This 
communication includes the establishing of ethical principles and norms of good governance to “shape and 
steer the governance process” (Death, 2014, p. 105). 
 
Within the governance literature, accounting systems and practices have a pervasive presence in 
organizational functioning. Given the aims of metagovernance – creating a master structure, norms and 
principles (Kooiman & Jentoft, 2009) – accounting has the potential to provide structural “framing” and 
diffusion of practices, as well as a temporal order (Robert & Scapens, 1985, p. 448) towards creating 
specific models of governance. The specific visibility granted by accounting, financial and administrative 
practices can be used to support and encourage certain interests and types of understandings (Neu, 2006, 
p. 391). Accounting practices also encourage the linking of subfields, allowing control and surveillance 
even at a distance (Neu, 2000). The generation and reporting of financial information has been connected 
to accountabilities and the regulation of behaviours. 
 
At the central level in MGNREGS, there is a specific enlistment of accounting in the metagovernance-
based framing of the central program vision and notion of accountability. Accounting is enlisted in an 
enabling and facilitative role in official government communications. Its practices, systems and processes 
provide tools towards outlining, building and diffusing of program expectations and objectives to the state 
governments. My analysis follows the unfolding of MoRD’s public communications to the states – namely, 
program framework structures, practices and processes through specific documents such as the MGNREGS 
67 
 
Operational Guidelines. However, the differences between theory and practice; between policies and 
planning, and operational implementation; and between accountability frameworks and their 
implementation are where the modern state has to contend with the complexities and plurality of 
jurisdictions, interests and stakeholders (Bevir, 2011, p. 2; Bullock, 2006). 
 
The state governments had the power and choices connected to enacting the program in their respective 
states. As the program gained a more defined in-practice shape through state-level guidelines and micro 
implementation, there was very limited success in moving towards the MGNREGS program’s participation 
and accountability objectives. The original distribution of roles and capitals imagined and supported by the 
Centre slowly became contested and Centre gradually took steps towards a more powerful and strategically 
involved but still at-a-distance position. Over the period of eight annual cycles of program implementation, 
the functioning and struggles in the field contribute to a reconfiguration of material arrangements and 
habitus between the central and state governments. Within the distribution of roles and stipulations assigned 
by the NREG Act, there is also a reflected shift in the central habitus as it works to gain more control and 
establish stronger accountability requirements for state governments. 
 
Research questions 
Connecting this enabling and strategic nature (Ahrens & Chapman, 2005; Hopwood, 1983; Neu et al., 
2006) of accounting to discourses of organizational accountability (Ezzamel et. al, 2007), this chapter 
explores the enlistment of accounting practices as an actant in the multi-level architectural framing of 
MGNREGA and the diffusion of the central program vision and its notion of accountability. I pose and 
pursue two central questions in this chapter: 
 Within the stipulation of the NREG Act, how is accounting enlisted and communicated by the 
MoRD towards the framing and diffusion of a national program vision, objectives and specific 
notions of accountability for state governments? 
 What role do accounting practices play in multi-level change processes – in the field, capitals and 
habitus, at the macro-meso level?  
 
My data include primary interviews at the macro and meso governance levels and interview observations; 
program guidelines and progress reports; policy and implementation directives; and non-government 
documents and other public communication between the centre and state governments, over the course of 
eight program-implementation cycles. Besides the public operational guidelines in MGNREGS, the system 
generates massive amounts of official written communication at every position and level. Between the 
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centre and state governments, communication can take the form of instruction letters, meeting minutes, new 
rulings, committee proceedings, legislative amendments, action reports and progress reports, to name but a 
few. But analyzing every piece of document available in the public domain may be both inefficient and also 
not practically possible. So I have limited myself to central communication to the state that relates directly 
to program directives, accounting, accountability and implementing of the NREGA vision.  To present a 
cohesive argument, I draw on Ruiz’ (2009) trifecta of textual, contextual and sociological analysis on the 
data. Ruiz’s tools are explored in more detail in the theoretical framework chapter of this dissertation. 
 
Using social theory as a research lens can provide a specific process of engagement (Morgan, 1983). My 
motivation to learn more about the interrelationship of accounting and accountability between central and 
state governments arose from a particular balance between decentralization, structures of control, and 
accountability (Ezzamel, Robson, Stapleton, & McLean, 2007) in the MGNREGS program. The chief 
means of public communication are the Operational Guidelines issued and updated at the centre by the 
MoRD. The technical nature of guidelines and formal accounting and administrative systems is insufficient 
to understand the strategic vision or the operational implications of how these systems are actually used 
(Burchell et al., 1980) at centre and state levels. In looking at these guidelines, framework, accounting and 
accountability practices, one needs to consider them as a part of a larger picture that just the traditional role 
of creating a hierarchy of relationships and rules (Roberts, 1991). An informed analysis of the motivations, 
enlistment and use of accounting systems provides a more inclusive definition of accountability and its 
relationship with accounting beyond its traditional role of representing of organizational reality. The context 
comes from the passing of this central government effort through the sociopolitical arrangements of this 
subfield (Burchell, Clubb, & Hopwood, 1985, p.385) as an outcome of practical activity (Ahrens & 
Chapman, 2007, p.1) of program planning and the building of its architecture. 
 
The question now is: How can a shift in settled ways of thinking and doing –in habitus – be made visible 
in research settings? At the beginning of the field research, I investigated markers that could represent an 
interpretation of the field and the shifts in habitus at different levels. I looked at the progression of official 
communications, primary interviews and other, secondary data to examine the particular enlistment of 
accounting in planning, implementation, control and accountability functions. The construction of 
accounting artifacts and interactions around them also add to the picture, reflecting the sociopolitical and 
administrative influences through which accounts are demanded or negotiated. There was a process of 
reflective triangulation within my observations as a researcher, the primary interviews, informal 
conversations (manually recorded through handwritten notes), and also an innate understanding of the 
contexts of the country in which I grew up. 
69 
 
 
This chapter is organized as follows: First, I present an overview of the administrative, regulatory and 
organizational contexts that provide an understanding of the existing habitus, capitals, and the central 
government vision for workfare accountability. Second, drawing on interviews and secondary data at the 
central and state level, I present an analysis of the accounting artifacts and interactions enlisted by the centre 
towards the creation of a specific vision of the program and its accountability. In this subsection at the first 
level, I focus on text and discourse as the object of study (Ruiz, 2009, p.3). From the perspective that 
discourse has an intentional dimension and can be a part of a discursive set of strategies enlisted by players 
towards acquiring capital, I analyze the content, language and presentation of some key government 
documents that the centre enlists to communicate with the state level, in addition to primary interviews and 
media articles. I explore specific accounting processes, steps and activities that make up the various 
accountability practices. The intention, decisions and manner in which the centre constructs and diffuses 
the program and enlists accounting towards the creation of an overall national framework of accountability 
provides a window into field-specific logic and its underlying sensibilities and understandings. These flow 
from the nature of the activity of governance in the public sector and are embedded in and reproduced 
through its agents and distribution of capitals.  
 
On a second and concurrent level, I examine the contextual elements within which this framework and its 
accounting and accountability practices are set. I provide an account of the planning, construction of 
practice, and in-practice central implementation towards an understanding of background, field and space 
from which this particular arrangement of planning, budgeting, control, KPI and monitoring processes 
emerges. The last level of interpretive sociological analysis provides an overall interpretation of what this 
central discourse and its related decisions and actions attempt to accomplish, and of the gradual shaping of 
the government habitus and strategy. Let me begin by providing contextual background on the field and the 
program. 
 
MGNREGS – The central level 
The NREG Act laid the groundwork for the program in terms of major aims and distribution of major 
positional roles and powers. One of the centre’s first and continuing jobs was to create a framework that 
could bring such a program into existence. Through the NREG Act and the central government’s ideological 
and strategic vision for the program, the MGNREGS initial framework had envisioned a high level of 
financial and implementation devolution (Awio & Northcott, 2001) focused on the pursuit of accountability. 
These practices link macro intent and strategy to meso-micro implementation and action, providing insights 
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into interactions between stakeholders around accounting and the manner in which accountability is “made 
practical” (Miller & O’Leary, 1990). 
 
In the multi-level setting of MGNREGS, accounting practices are enlisted by the macro level towards the 
creation of an overarching national structure, supporting processes and artifacts that not only communicate 
and diffuse the central strategic vision and objectives for the program, but also provide the mechanisms for 
resource allocation, reporting, performance measurement and accountability. It is the role of the state 
governments to interpret these visions and objectives in constructing and executing state-level 
implementation, control (Chapman, 2005; Otley & Berry, 1980) and accountability towards established 
program goals. The central vision speaks not only to discourses of public accountability but also the habitus 
held by the governing authorities in the struggle for symbolic capital in the face of a vast, complex and 
transaction-heavy system and traditionally inefficient management control systems. This habitus includes 
the established norms and codes for communication, action and interpretation. 
 
In governance practice, norms, principles and values often play a rather obscure role. They underpin 
all decisions since they inspire those who govern how to think and make judgements about how the 
world works and how to act in particular situations. However, they often remain implicit. When 
they are made explicit, they are rarely absolute. They are not always deliberated, and when 
addressed they often lead to nothing concrete and practical. Implicitly or explicitly, governance 
means choosing between them (Kooiman & Jentoft, 2009, p. 818) 
 
Division of roles and responsibilities – The centre and the state 
As with MGNREGA, a multitude of factors in the context of the public sector can contribute to arranging 
a program space and drawing upon accounting and administrative practices perceived to support a notion 
of accountability. Accounting and administrative technologies can be enlisted towards accountability 
practices in a multitude of ways, each of these domains emerging differently. Ahrens (1996) explores 
different styles of accounting implicated in accountability in different national settings. The study finds that 
ideas of what is considered “good management” (p. 140) can be different and can be conceptualized through 
different frameworks. Such understandings of accountability are found to be embedded into normative 
organizational discourses and organizational action. Sinclair (1995) echoes similar sentiments exploring 
the forms accountability can take under different contexts. She outlines the importance of understanding 
that notions of accountability can change, take different forms, and also be experienced in a variety of ways. 
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India’s public system is considered to be heavily administrative and bureaucratic in nature. Though the 
country is quasi-federal and constitutional powers are divided between central and state levels, the centre 
traditionally possesses more and higher powers as the governing authority over its 29 states and 7 union 
territories. The public sector has introduced some public reforms but is still in the phase of trying to enforce 
financial probity, compliance and control (Broadbent & Guthrie, 1992, p. 3). India’s social security system 
is fragmented and traditionally open only to citizens in the organized public or private sector in the form of 
pensions and health insurance. The Employees Provident Fund Organization came into being in 1953 and 
is overseen by the Ministry of Labour & Employment, Government of India. It administers a contributory 
provident fund, a pension scheme and an insurance scheme. However, a large percentage of India workers 
are employed in the unorganized sector and have access to limited or no social security, social services or 
old-age pensions. Social programs have faced particularly significant implementation and accountability 
issues. These are a number of social services programs, delivered by a myriad of departments and agencies, 
and governed by a variety of laws and regulations, but they still do not reach the underprivileged population. 
These conditions increase opportunities for duplicity, complexity and fraud, with decreased control, 
oversight and accountability. 
 
Within this setting, centralized governance has given way to more recent decentralization and a devolved 
format, representing a significant loss of central authority and legitimacy (Bardhan, 2002, p. 185). Modern 
public sector reforms have created shrinking or “hollowed out” (Bevir, 2011, p. 8) roles for central 
governance levels. The spatial and functional (Kooiman, 2003, pp. 4–6) dispersion of power and the 
restructuring of governance responsibilities has not only created an amended facilitator role for central 
government but also raised metagovernance challenges of defining and achieving common governance 
objectives and strategies (Kooiman, 2003, p. 4). “Governance thus poses dilemmas that require new 
governance strategies to span jurisdictions, link people across levels of government and mobilize a variety 
of stakeholders” (Bevir, 2011, p. 2), while “[t]he role that government plays in governance is variable and 
not a constant” (Pierre & Peters, 2000, p. 29) and therefore, “depending on varying paths of change, both 
the prominence and the nature of government’s role in governance will vary” (Denters, 2005, p. 314). 
 
The NREG Act, approved by the Indian Parliament, outlines the non-negotiables for both the central and 
the state government. In MGNREGS, the MoRD, situated in New Delhi, is the central government agency 
in charge of administering the act and ensuring its provisions are followed through its guidelines, process 
maps, and stipulations on governance, control and accountability. The legislative right–responsibility 
relationship between central and state levels is outlined by the constitution of India, outlined under two 
specific categories – legislative and administrative: 
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 Article 256 of the constitution of India: “The executive power of every State shall be so exercised 
as to ensure compliance with the laws made by Parliament and any existing laws which apply in 
that State, and the executive power of the Union shall extend to the giving of such directions to a 
State as may appear to the Government of India to be necessary for that purpose.” 
 Article 257: “The executive power of every State shall be so exercised as not to impede or prejudice 
the exercise of the executive power of the Union, and the executive power of the Union shall extend 
to the giving of such directions to a State as may appear to the Government of India to be necessary 
for that purpose.” 
 Article 258: “The union has the power to confer powers and entrust functions to the state in certain 
cases and a law made by the Parliament which applies in any state may, confer powers and impose 
duties or authorize the conferring of powers and the imposition of duties on the state.” 
 Article 258A: “And similarly, the states have been provided the power to entrust functions to the 
Union, with the consent of the Union Government.” 
 
The National Rural Employment Guarantee Act, 2005 (NREGA) adds to this and provides its own set of 
administrative divisions of powers specific to the program: 
 The power to give directions – 27(1): “the Central government may give such directions as it may 
consider necessary to the State Government for the effective implementation of the provisions of 
this act.” 
 Powers of audit – 24(1): “The Central government may, in consultation with the Comptroller and 
Auditor General of India, prescribe appropriate arrangements for audit of the accounts of the 
scheme at all levels”; 24 (2): “The accounts of the scheme shall be maintained in such form and in 
such manner as may be prescribed by the state government.” 
 Power to make rules – 31(1): the central government has the power to outline the manner in which 
the program funds are utilized as well as conditions, limitations and the funding patterns – “the 
Central Government may, by notification, and subject to the condition of previous publication, 
make rules to carry out the provisions of this act” 
 Power of transparency and accountability:  The District Programme Coordinator and all 
implementing agencies in the District are responsible for the proper utilization and 
management of the funds placed at their disposal for the program. At the state level, the Act 
empowers state governments to prescribe the manner in which books and accounts are 
maintained and reporting is done. 
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In practice, accountability interrelationships between central and state levels emerged as far more nebulous 
and complicated either than what was planned or than what could be seen on paper. Though the program 
design was innovative, it had to function within the same microcosm of administrative players, 
relationships, sociocultural contexts and issues as other social services programs. Within MGNREGS, two 
interconnected factors create significant differences and conditions for challenges in the administrative, 
financial and accountability processes between central and state levels. 
 
The first factor is the specific program structure stipulated by the NREG Act: decentralized, participative 
and localized. Drawing on panchayati raj institutions (PRIs) for decentralized implementation, the power 
to plan, implement and account was dispersed down the line to state governments, both institutionally and 
geographically (World Bank, n.d.). State governments were invested with extensive administrative and 
financial control in the planning and implementation of the program. Collaborative partnerships and public 
accountability, community participation, and a central role for village panchayats (Guidelines, 2006, p. 3) 
were cornerstone elements of the program and continue to have the public support of high-profile 
economists such as Jean Dreze, Dilip Abreau of Princeton and Pranab Bardhan of Berkeley (Bhalla, 2014). 
 
Given the planned extent of the program in 2006, the central government did not have the legislative power 
to oversee state machinery on reporting, performance and accountability, as this would constitute an 
interference and infringement on the rights of the state government and administration.  In short, the centre 
could not be expected to inspect records or penalize state governments for their performance (CAG Audit, 
2007). So, as long as the relevant paperwork and KPIs were presented to the centre, they had to release the 
negotiated program funds. The issue, as outlined by the Director of MGNREGS, is that the centre does not 
have a direct role in implementation or the holding of the state government to account. But the onus of the 
overall vision, funding and accountability to the Parliament, the highest legislative body in India, as well 
as to citizens and beneficiaries falls on the centre. 
 
Power thus largely existed only on paper for the centre, as it had no access or control over what actually 
happened in the field. There were numerous other checks and balances conceptualized by the MoRD into 
the system at every level. But most of these mechanisms were found not to work in practice. There were 
widespread allegations of corruption and genuine concerns regarding inefficient program delivery and 
control ranging from delay in preparation of muster rolls, to ghost muster rolls, to complaints about fake 
companies floated by panchayats to produce fake bills and the uploading of fake, incomplete and incorrect 
records. However, over the course of the program’s unfolding, efforts can be seen to have been made by 
the centre to diagnose and address problem areas. Based on a report submitted by the Dr. Mihir Shah 
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Committee, the MoRD (2013a, b) released its revised 2013 guidelines, while also adding sections such as 
“Critical Issues and Initiative Undertaken to Strengthen Implementation” in its 2013 report to the people 
dedicated to addressing such problem areas. 
 
This peculiar and complicated decentralized relationship, combined with the scale and financial scope of 
MGNREGS, created a federally designed and funded state-centric program that underscores a departure 
from the other funding, accountability and power relationships that exist between central and state 
governments in the delivery of social welfare programs. Similar struggles over control and the (re)defining 
of accountability have been observed in many accounting studies implementing decentralized governance 
and devolved budgeting (Braci, 2009). Ezzamel, Robson, Stapleton, & McLean (2007) provide an example 
of change processes connected to devolved formula funding creating tension between newer efficiency-
based institutional accountability and older, tacit local notions of accountability based on profession. As 
outlined by Ezzamel et al. (2007, p. 156), accountability can be seen to reside in the relations between the 
organizations and their environments. 
 
The second significant program factor is that with the granting of power and a budget without a ceiling 
came the need to regulate those who had control over the spending of public funds. But the centre had 
neither the administrative structure, the manpower, nor the resources to monitor actual implementation on 
the ground. India is the seventh largest nation in the world in terms of land area, and home to over 1.2 
billion people, the vast majority of whom live in rural areas with agriculture as the major form of livelihood. 
Between the villages and the state government, thousands of concurrently ongoing public works have to be 
managed in terms of financial, operational, administration, reporting and control on one side and a fund 
flow system for payments on the other. According to GOI data2, in 2012 the country had approximately 
650 districts or zillas; 6,600 blocks or tehsils; and 64,000 villages, each of which has had a special gram 
sabha to decide its public works and construct its labour budget. The program has pumped unprecedented 
amounts of funds into poor rural villages in the last eight annual cycles. In 2006–07, the program had taken 
up 835,000 public works and completed over 38,700 public works, with more than 44,800 works in 
progress; 905 million person-days of work were provided with an expenditure of Rs. 88.23 billion (MoRD, 
Report to the People 2007, p. 31). By comparison, in 2013–14, the program had produced 1.35 billion 
person-days of work employment, undertaking 11.16 million works (including new and spill-over from 
previous financial years) with an expenditure of Rs. 374.7 billion (MoRD, Report to the People 2013–14, 
pp. 19–34). Between central and state levels, for the program funds to be projected, dispersed and utilized 
                                                          
2 https://data.gov.in/catalog/number-districts-drdas-blocks-villages-country#web_catalog_tabs_block_10 
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optimally would require coordination between the funder (the centre) and the implementer (the state) 
(Ghosh, 2013, p. 13) across a vast geographical space. It needed robust administrative and management 
systems and practices with the capacity to support the decentralized implementation and sharing of power 
and resources but existing administrative and financial system were significantly unevolved to deliver on 
MGNREGA requirements. 
 
Evidence of these challenges can be seen outlined in the public statement below: 
 
Additional Solicitor General Indira Jaising said … that the state governments are reluctant to 
implement the guidelines. “We are facing resistance from the state governments. States are 
supposed to convert guidelines into rules but they are not doing this,” she said (The Hindu, 2010). 
 
Drawing upon Ruiz’ three layers of analysis – textual, contextual and sociological – the first layer of my 
account is based on textual and discourse analysis based on primary interviews and secondary data from 
government and non-government documents, websites and public information. These are key to 
understanding elements such as the government’s vision, objectives, strategy and habitus. I have explored 
various accounting practices (MCS, MIS), artifacts and interactions enlisted by the centre to provide a 
processual picture of the material arrangements of the field and the distribution of capitals. These processes 
are so connected and interwoven that it may be difficult to present a silo-based discussion of each, so Ruiz’ 
framework of analysis is in keeping with the merging of the subjective-objective divide that Bourdieu finds 
so limiting. 
Textual and contextual analysis 
The central government’s MoRD was the national designer and funder of the rural social services program 
frameworks. Its symbolic (political/economic) capital and power traditionally flows from its inherent 
position of oversight, and its control from the institutional and administrative structure of the field as well 
as an accumulated sense of its place and role in the larger hierarchy. In line with Bourdieu, the centre’s 
capitals are relational in nature. Also important is the nature of the centre’s use of this power and that of 
other players in the past and present. All these factors contribute to determining the amount of power the 
MoRD effectively wields (Emirbayer & Johnson, 2008, p. 3). The program as it is today can be seen through 
three major intertwined processes between the central and the state governments, which hold the program 
up. Accounting artifacts and interactions form an integral part of each set of processes: 
i. Operational Guidelines: Policy documents such as successive directives and public reports that 
focus on the national framework. 
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ii. The central government MCS: Includes MIS, labour budget approval, performance measurement 
and audits. 
iii. Financial funding and disbursal processes: These include upward funding requests from state 
governments and downward disbursal of program funding. 
 
i. Operational Guidelines and supporting communications 
The NREG Act is clear in its overarching vision of employment, participation and transparency. It presents 
“objective” laws and rules for the program nationwide. The MoRD draws upon the Act and its stipulation 
to release a document called the “Operational Guidelines” for the state governments. The second edition of 
the operational guidelines (2006) is the first one to be publicly available and presents a first look at the 
comprehensive program structure, supporting accounting and accountability process and reporting 
documents outlined by the MoRD. Successive versions of the MGNREGS Guidelines released in the years 
2008 and 2013 are supported by ancillary operational guidelines for areas such as capacity building and 
MIS. Included in the communication of instructions and suggestions to the states are copious amounts of 
official letters, circulars, detailed rulings, and clarifications. The operational guidelines have come to be 
one of the most important public vision documents and play several important functions in the program: 
 
Diffusion of the program vision – As outlined earlier, the mandate of the Operational Guidelines is to 
follow the objectives of the Act and provide a baseline from which state-level program structures can be 
initiated. The initial distribution of major capitals came from the Act but it was the MoRD that fleshed out 
the state-specific rulings and options to launch phase one of the program. The initial guideline and 
supporting communication were therefore aimed to design, construct and communicate a uniform program 
architecture that articulated the government vision for the first phase of 200 rural districts in India. It was 
for state governments to develop, fairly independently, the capacity to plan and implement the central vision 
while integrating state-specific needs. The Guidelines were therefore critical is providing the first layer of 
conversion to abstract notions like of “transparency” mentioned in the NREG Act. They do so by outlining 
a particular assemblage of resources, personnel and positions and an initial structure of accountability. This 
delineation of implementation, conceptualization of accounting and administrative practices travels from 
the centre to state offices, creating specific visibilities linked to organizational objectives where they were 
then to be converted to state-specific rules to launch the program at the micro level (Director, NREGS). 
 
The process outcomes include strengthening grass root processes of democracy and infusing 
transparency and accountability in governance (MoRD, Report to the People, 2006–10, p. 4). 
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The content section of the 2006 edition provides the initial division of the program into specific 
subprocesses and the detail assigned to each. A quick glance shows an initial process-flow mapping for the 
program: management; planning; employment; and work execution are followed by payment of wages; 
funding; recording; and finally elements of accountability. A fair level of detail is provided, including steps 
on how to plan and construct the labour budget; implementation of public works in terms of labour and 
materials, funding and payments parameters; and the role of the state in terms of transparency and 
accountability. Included in the appendices are formats of all important management accounting artifacts at 
each level – the job card registers, asset registers and employment registers at the village level; a list of 
documents to be displayed on the state-level website; and formats for monthly progress reports, formats for 
claiming central funds, and proof showing how central funding was utilized. 
 
The manner of construction of an initial central management control system (MCS), the distribution of the 
micro bottom-up budgeting process, MIS, artifacts and reporting processes are all a part of the MoRD’s 
initial program framework strategy, and they reflect the centre’s understandings, habitus and decisions in 
terms of its vision. The content and style presents a certain picture of the centre’s interpretation of process 
maps, process roles, reporting structure and initial outcomes for each process. Prominent among the 2006 
edition are also at least four subsections predominantly devoted to “accountability” in MGNREGS. These 
include monitoring and evaluation of outcomes, management and maintenance of records, transparency and 
accountability (role of the state), and finally transparency and accountability (public vigilance and social 
audit). 
 
Field visits, inspections and sample checks (internally and externally) must be undertaken on a 
regular basis to ensure comprehensive and continuous assessment of the Scheme. State-level and 
district-level officers should inspect at least 2% and 10% of works respectively. Block-level 
officers will inspect 100% of works. These inspections must be closely monitored by State 
Governments (MoRD, 2013). 
 
State governments have the role of interpreting these instructions but the document formats for job card 
registers, asset registers and so on seem non-negotiable. Through the state, these accounting artifacts filter 
down to the district, block and gram panchayat levels, taking with them the central vision, but they are also 
becoming a part of each state-specific strategic vision of the program, linking the subfields to the centre.  
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The 2006 MoRD guidelines started off quite tentatively in their language and approach. The detailed 
instructions are “suggestions” to states towards building regional programs even as they outline a detailed 
list of possible issues that may be encountered by the state in planning, implementation, control and 
transparency. Accounting and administrative formats attached as appendices to the second edition 
guidelines used titles such as “Possible framework for a gram rozgar sevak” or “Suggested pro forma for a 
muster roll.” In line with the logic field and its experience with other social services programs, the centre 
tries to prepare state governments for possible areas of weaknesses but does not attempt to enforce such 
suggestions. The 2006 guidelines, for example, spend considerable effort in outlining vulnerabilities in each 
step of the micro implementation process starting from registration of beneficiary families at the village 
level (p. 48) and payment of wages (p. 53) up to the evaluation of completed works through social audit 
(p. 54). Potential solutions are again presented as recommendations to the state – for example, the guidelines 
recommend holding of an “open meeting” with program workers before the start of a public works project 
to give them information about the project, including running costs, materials, and labour and fund 
utilization, as well as the amount of work and wages to be generated. 
 
Over the course of the next eight process cycles, successive versions of the guidelines and formal 
communication can be seen as substantially changed (MoRD, 2006–07). The newer versions of guidelines 
do not present a changing central vision but definitely offer an amended communication strategy based on 
the unfolding of the program implementation. Accompanied by amendments to the original Act, detailed 
extensions can be found added to existing process as well as increased requirements and revisions in rules 
and processes and a very visible and forceful change in the tone of language. The planning section in the 
second edition, for example, consisted of only three pages addressing the labour budget, the district and the 
annual plan. In contrast, the fourth edition of the 2013 guidelines dedicated six pages to a completely 
revamped process structure, one that that outlines not only more detailed preparation steps such as technical 
approval, approval of plans by the gram sabha, submission of budget to the centre, and technical and 
administrative sanction of works, but also required baseline surveys to assess quantity and timing of demand 
for work and consequences for not entering work details in the online MIS. In contrast to previous styles of 
communications, the newer guidelines outline consequences for not adhering to the process or timelines 
(contents page). 
 
Outlining positional roles, responsibilities and capitals – In line with devolved governance models seen 
in countries such as the United Kingdom, Australia and the United States, MGNREGS requires extensive 
role assignment due to its high level of organizational and geographical dispersion. Aside from the key 
positions associated with MGNREGS, assigning of supporting roles and capitals is an important central 
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activity. For the guidelines to strengthen the covenants of the Act, it has to solidify responsibilities, outline 
reporting structure and even specify hiring processes for the state levels. The central guidelines and 
supporting communications extend the stipulations of the Act to suggest jurisdictional responsibilities over 
program planning, resources and implementation, building a nuanced expectation of main and supporting 
players. These covenants provide definition to state ancillary powers to make rules and decisions connected 
with state responsibilities awarded by the Act. The state governments do have an extensive role in further 
defining of duties and closing of loopholes. More on this can be found on in the appendices of the next 
chapter (especially Appendix K). 
 
Though such communication is imbued with formality and the text comes across as matter-of-fact, objective 
and neutral, it plays a specific role in making explicit how the field is structured in terms of positional power 
of access to funds and powers of account. The second edition of the Guidelines provides a more detailed 
list of all major stakeholders and positional responsibilities. Though the states have significant power in 
forming interpretations, the suggestions of the central government are meant to contribute to the 
normalization of power to specific positions in the field. The centre sets expectations of reporting and 
performance, providing the means to set up control and oversight mechanisms for the state government’s 
role in implementation, as the centre does not have a direct line of reporting to most of these positions. 
Implementation agencies involved in delivering the program report to the state government, which in turn 
reports to the centre. 
 
These Guidelines have been formulated to facilitate the design and implementation of Rural 
Employment Guarantee Schemes. They should be interpreted as a broad operational framework, 
around which further provisions may be built, taking into account the State’s economic, social 
and institutional context (MoRD, 2006, p. 1). 
 
Creating structures and due processes – The performative aspect of this exercise combines norms, 
activities and timelines, creating patterns of performances (Rouse, 2007) that have the potential to become 
a practice (Feldman & Pentland, 2003, p.94). Such an exercise also establishes the environment and the 
requirement from such performances. This outlining of the normative structures is what the MoRD 
accomplishes through its Guidelines, framework, MCS and MIS. Organizational processes and the gradual 
formation and clarification of process routines in multi-level organizations such as those involved in 
MGNREGS convert work into formal process maps that provide internal meaning and understanding of 
how each unit of the process links to the others, as well as what the timelines of completion of each set of 
activities and processes are. Higher-level process maps create a process structure that include outlining of 
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work expectations, process steps, positions of power held and measures of performance. As an example, 
the employment process cycle at the village level is broken down to smaller steps that consist of the 
eligibility criteria, application for registration, job card format, and use of job cards for application for work, 
leading up to the provision of work and record of such employment provided. We see an assignment by the 
MoRD of the activity and responsibility at each level, with expectations of performance. In combination 
with the works that were declared permissible in a state, sanctioning of work and material-labour costs, 
documents created and reporting demanded, it presents complete subprocesses within larger processes. 
Over time, the understanding of such a practice fades into background knowledge. 
 
To see another example of how rules, norms and vocabularies become grounded in practice (Rouse, 2007), 
we look at another example of macro process mapping by the centre. The fund granting process is a 
representative one. The 2006 guidelines devote four pages to providing a basic process outline consisting 
of pattern of financing (tranches of funds), performance evaluation and documents to be submitted. The 
2008 section on program financing is substantially extended, detailing the factors on which the labour 
budget will be assessed, MIS, monthly progress reports, projection of monthly labour demand and 
technical-financial estimates for public works (MoRD, Operational Guidelines, 2008, pp. 42–44). In 
comparison, the 2013 guidelines display an extensively developed framework that requires not only online 
submission of proposals, but also a list of compiled financial and non-financial documents such as cash 
utilization certificates. To assist in their understanding and assimilation, the MoRD includes separately 
coloured boxes to outline process fund flows. Supported by detailed elements of evaluation, discussion, 
approval and release, this process exercise is happening on an annual basis and is becoming integrated into 
states level practice as due process for accessing MGNREGA funds. 
 
Field visits, inspections and sample checks (internally and externally) must be undertaken on a 
regular basis to ensure comprehensive and continuous assessment of the Scheme. State level and 
District level officers should inspect at least 2% and 10% of works respectively. Block level officers 
will inspect 100% works. These inspection must be closely monitored by State Governments and 
followed up (MoRD, 2006, p. 36). 
 
This sequence of activities making up a process is repeated every time a public work is initiated, or twice a 
year when each state requests MGNREGS funds from the MoRD. Thus, practices can become implanted 
through the creation of rules, norms, and a routine that in time becomes accepted and internalized. This 
comes from the understanding that activities that make up a practice are not mindless, but reflect a certain 
flow that integrates with larger social logic, drawing into these activities the actor’s interpretation and 
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understanding of his position, role and actions. Studies such as Burns & Scapens (2000) and Ahrens & 
Chapman (2004) look at the role of management accounting systems in creating stable organizational 
routines that are flexible enough to contribute to organizational change. These established sets of activities 
and processes also allow the central government the means to bind (Scapens, 1994) state and local 
performance to the structure of the field, as well as establishing its position and capital through its power 
to create and amend such practices. In this manner a specific organization of work processes and systems 
can define traditional bureaucracies and create and recreate contextual cultures and acceptable norms of 
formal accountability (Feldman & Pentland, 2003, pp. 94–95). 
 
As the program implementation progresses, we see another public communication arena where the MoRD 
communicates a more involved and powerful role for the central government. Follow-up progress reports 
are public documents released by the government to speak to public accountability and the roles of citizens 
and non-government and community-based organizations. These reports essentially discuss progress and 
improvement made by the centre towards the program and efficient usage of public funds. The first 
cumulative progress report was for the period 2006–10. Going forward, a report will be released almost 
annually, presenting and conveying a positive picture of program impact. The focus is on providing to the 
public detailed steps for planning, staffing, public works implementation, workers’ well-being, fund 
disbursal, financial technologies such as electronic fund management systems, opening of post office bank 
accounts for program beneficiaries, and much more. These changes signal and signify the centre stepping 
away from its initial basic role of designer and overseer, and taking a deeper authoritative role in outlining 
the program rules, regulations and processes to the public. 
 
ii. The management control system: Planning, reporting and control 
With a growing body of literature linking MCS to organizational capacities, organizational performance 
and strategy (Ahrens & Chapman, 2006; Henri, 2006), the design of the MGNREGS MCS and its 
components is an important link to the centre’s vision and objectives in light of the spatial distances and 
decentralized framework of the program. With the pursuit of transparency strongly enshrined in the Act, 
the decisions that shape its MCS can also be connected to the logic and context of the field. In an 
institutional field such as social services delivery, flows of information at the macro, meso and micro level 
are made visible through accounting and administrative technologies (Neu, Ocampo-Gomez, Ponce de 
Leon, & Zepeda, 2002). These information flows also provide the ability to connect the players (Neu, 2006, 
p. 395) and enable two key functions of an MCS – planning and control. 
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Scapens & Roberts (1993) provide a particularly relevant account through their study of the introduction of 
an accounting system in a large multidivisional company. Their paper finds decentralization, resistance and 
a communication gap between production and accounting, leading to the non-acceptance of a new 
management accounting system.  Resource dependence theory would perhaps look at the ecology of 
connected and interdependent organizations that fight for power originating from control over resources 
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978, p. 1). On the surface, this would help in interpreting the conscious context, but 
it would not take into account the latent leanings and understandings absorbed by organizations, as reflected 
in the blueprints, judgments and perceptions of accountability expressed in future programs such as 
MGNREGS. Changes in budgetary control and process adjustments to MCS can be observed in studies 
such as Lapsley (1994) but central-level changes go beyond the contingency theory based on scope of 
adjustment to resources available. This process would require a matching of organizational structure and 
circumstances to the specific kinds of accounting systems (Otley, 1980) which the central and state 
government did partially accomplish in recent years. And as data and extant literature demonstrate, 
structural characteristics and notions of western accountability can differ vastly from what exists in fast-
developing nations such as India (Dar, 2014).  
 
The central vision was to create an information-driven planning and implementation of an organizational 
strategy and to achieve evaluation-envisioned objectives through transmission, visibility, measurement and 
mobilization of key stakeholders. Within this, state governments play a strong role in the creation of state 
level MCS and accounting practices including financial management, budgeting, performance 
measurement and controls. The information provided by an MCS is also the base of a pervasive process 
through which an organization can view its performance, progress, future needs, and effectiveness in using 
resources. The connectedness of players through an MCS provides the means to structure and, for the 
MoRD, to oversee the management of financial, operational, technological and human resources in a 
network. Towards this, I explore central efforts to design and provide state governments with components 
towards establishing and diffusing program objectives and a framework for accountability. In line with the 
experiences of implementation and struggles with state governments, the MoRD can be seen to be taking 
steps towards increasing its prescriptive presence and strengthening its oversight and control mechanisms 
over the state governments. 
 
Planning function: The labour budget – The labour budget is designed to be a central activity for the 
MGNREGA planning function, collated at block, district and state levels and culminating in a consolidated 
national labour budget for the program at the centre. The formats, accompanying rules and reporting 
processes are detailed in the Guidelines, and in post-2006 editions the centre is quite insistent that they be 
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followed if program funding is to be released. Although step-by-step process details are provided for district 
and lower levels towards the making of the annual plan or labour budget in the 2006 Operational Guidelines, 
these give the impression of being a basic outline. 
 
In comparison, the 2008 Guidelines display a significant extension in process detail outlining the link 
between short-term decision and long-term strategy for state, district and village levels (p. 18). It details, 
for example, the components of the developmental plan which include assessment of labour demand, 
identification of works that meet the estimated labour demand, estimated cost of works and wages, and 
benefits expected in terms of employment generated and physical improvements to the village (p. 14). The 
issuance of separate operational guidelines for prospective planning is also mentioned. The language for 
this section is fairly instructional and prescriptive, while still allowing for state level perspectives and 
decisions; for example, “The District Programme Coordinator will scrutinize the plan proposals”; “The 
Programme Officer will not reject a proposal received from the Gram Panchayat”; “The State Government 
should prescribe the time frame for each level to propose, scrutinize and approve the works” (MoRD 
Guidelines, 2006, pp. 11–13; my emphasis). 
 
In the planning section in the 2013 edition of the Guidelines, we see the greatest level of changes in overall 
program detail, including setting out of steps and timelines. There are additional steps towards process 
scrutiny of the labour budget and consequences if the process or timelines are not adhered to. There seems 
to be a strong sense of change effected in the perspective and the language used towards the states, in the 
manner in which mechanisms for enforcement are utilized, and also in a higher level of central involvement. 
The representative tone seen in “Suggested Content for the Training of Gram Rozgar Sahayaks, Mates and 
Community Resource Persons” (p. 44) is tempered by the outlining of specific actions the state 
governments are expected to take (pp. 45–46): “All States should develop an IEC Plan on MGNREGA with 
focus on reaching out to the registered workers as well as other groups which could benefit from 
MGNREGA.” 
 
The control function  
 Accounting artifacts – Though the MoRD is not new to social security and rural development 
programs, the document and registers for MGNREGS are specifically designed for the objectives of 
this program. At the micro level, much of the information was recorded through management 
accounting artifacts, including cash, vouchers, work and asset registers as well as cash book and 
ledgers. The format for these artifacts was provided by the centre to the states. Along with the associated 
processes, they linked the macro to the micro through the diffusion of information formats required, 
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connected to central notions of accountability. They called to relief a specific visibility of data and 
information. These artifacts and processes also connected the micro to macro via transmission of data 
through them, each connecting to the program’s multi-layered legacy MCS. 
 
The artifacts were used by different stakeholders in multiple ways. A physical copy of work, 
employment and financial records has to be constructed and maintained at the village panchayat level 
open to public scrutiny, social audit and the Right to Information (RTI) Act. At the micro level, a muster 
roll can be accessed by a concerned villager to check on her work and payments right. It can be used 
by the social audit team to compile its social audit scrutiny report. The same muster roll can be used at 
the block level to create MIS records for reporting that are then compiled into reports for oversight at 
the macro level as well as reporting to the Parliament of India on the progress of the program. Each of 
these processes also creates interactions among stakeholders at macro level, meso and micro levels 
around the accounting artifacts. These interactions around the accounting artifacts contributes to 
visibility, knowledge and awareness and the social distribution of capitals. Their construction and the 
interactions around them at the village, block, district and state levels shape the social space, 
distribution of capitals and empowerment at the micro level. 
 
Starting with poor program control in the first few years, the central government has since increased 
focus on resource allocation, control and monitoring. One can see the objectives of metagovernance at 
work here with the MGNREGS funding allocated over at least two different tranches each year, each 
triggering a process of evaluation of state performance. Though state financial allocations supported by 
proof-of-demand cannot be denied, the centre has both increased and intensified central financial 
control and performance measurement (efficiency) measures to enforce improved budgetary discipline 
(Cheung, 2011) at the state level. 
 
 Monitoring and information system (MIS) – The 2006 operational guidelines discuss the MoRD 
building a central MIS that states can use for planning, execution and monitoring of the program. In 
order to focus on public accountability, information about program planning, implementation and 
records had first to be created and then made available in the public domain. Since every public work 
undertaken at the village level creates a separate record, which is then uploaded to the MIS at the block 
level, the MIS was critical to monitoring and transparency processes. This included several types of 
information, such as workers’ entitlement data; documents including registration, job cards, muster 
rolls; work selection and execution data; employment demanded and provided; and financial indicators 
such as funds available and used and the disaggregated structure of fund utilization in terms of expenses 
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on wages, materials and administrative expenses (MoRD, 2007, p. 8). To make this possible, the centre 
outlined key information on control and oversight processes all the way up to the micro village level.  
For example, outlined triggers for supervision in the online MIS system include matching of demand 
and supply, payment of work done at each level, availability of technical and non-technical staff at each 
level and minimization of recording advance payments (p. 79). The evolving of key performance 
indicators for the monitoring process (p. 36) is something that was yet to be accomplished in the 2006 
edition. 
 
The initial central MIS was to draw on existing infrastructure but allow states to create extended 
additions and program-dedicated resources, should they decide to do so. The quality of decisions taken 
by management at both central and state levels depended on the quality of state, district, block and 
village level information collated and made available. In 2006, the MoRD hired the National 
Informatics Centre (NIC) to begin the process of constructing a central monitoring and information 
system (MIS) for the management of information (MoRD Operational Guidelines, 2006, p. 77). 
Interviews with senior officials at the MoRD indicate that from its administrative perspective and way 
of thinking, a decentralized program spread across a vast geographical space should have an MIS that 
is secure, flexible and scalable. Such a system would serve as a backbone for program reporting and 
public transparency, with the states shouldering their share of responsibility. The states were to use the 
system in the manner outlined by the Guidelines, providing operational data, data entry, authorization 
of works and expenditure, issue of muster rolls, monitoring, and transparency to program beneficiaries 
and other stakeholders (CAG, 2013). Communication, verification and data entry would happen at the 
basic level of activity and at the outset, in 2006, the MIS looked to be designed as an offline system. In 
coordination with the state-level State Employment Guarantee Council (SEGC), it would provide the 
capacity to aggregate nationwide program data and generate the reports required by the centre. 
 
A web-enabled MIS www.nrega.nic.in has been developed. The village level household data base 
has internal checks for ensuring consistency and conformity to normative processes. All critical 
parameters get monitored in public domain: a) workers’ entitlement data and documents such as 
registration, job cards, muster rolls, (b) shelf of approved and sanctioned works, works under 
execution, measurement (c) employment provided (d) financial indicators including wage 
payment (MoRD, Report to the people, 2006–2010, p. 10). 
 
But in practice there were substantial issues with the MIS and other connected systems, not limited to 
any level, rendering the system largely ineffective and inefficient for the purpose of reporting, control 
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and transparency. The initial system inherited by the program was a collection of disjointed, 
technologically inefficient pre-existing systems between central and state levels that could not handle 
the program’s scale and volume. A large amount of information from micro level, even though available 
to the state government, was not uploaded online. Such information as was available online could not 
be verified to be recent, correct or complete. There were substantial claims from stakeholders that the 
legacy system and the newer MIS did not address the systematic and technological loopholes that 
enabled large-scale corruption. A Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG, 2013) audit of the use of 
NREGAsoft highlights the many issues faced by states such as Uttar Pradesh that have been less 
successful than Andhra Pradesh in instituting stronger structures for control and accountability. The 
issues outlined for Uttar Pradesh include: 
o lack of adequate validation controls; 
o blank or ambiguous users entering or authoring data; 
o distance fields without adequate validation; 
o lack of IT personnel with the training to use the platform as required; 
o discrepancies in data between the MIS and/or physical records and/or annual records; and 
o excessive administrative expenses. 
 
The report states: 
 
Due to software-related issues, NREGAsoft did not function as comprehensive operational 
information, monitoring and accurate tool for all the stakeholders and functionaries of the scheme. 
The software not only accepted invalid and incomplete information but also failed to generate alerts 
on the occurrence of errors in order to facilitate rectification. Besides, the data entry operators were 
also not proficient and as such unaware of the relevance and impact of their work. Finally, the 
validity of data on the MIS is suspect as there were various data sets for the same activity… (CAG, 
2013, p. 58). 
 
In contrast to earlier program promises, large amounts of communication between the state and the 
centre were unavailable online where they could be publicly accessed. Reporting, especially between 
block, district and state levels, was accomplished partially through paper-based records in a number of 
states. An interview with the Assistant secretary of the MoRD outlines the number of committee 
meetings that happen regularly between various state and centre officials, in which program 
performance information, formal requests, progress reports and presentations are delivered. This is in 
line with the offline and online reporting channels and processes that have traditionally existed in 
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centre–state relationships from before the NREGA program came into being. The MGNREGA 
Sameeksha report (2012) admits that in the face of the MIS system, in many states monthly progress 
reports (MPRs) can still be paper-based hard copies of reports passed from the gram panchayats to the 
block and then onto the district to be entered online. 
 
However, some progress in the software platform side of the program started to be reflected in public 
communications in 2011 when the idea of e-governance was introduced by the MoRD through the re-
engineered central MIS NREGAsoft. Based on the centre’s vision for an IT-based solution that supports 
public accountability by providing publicly accessible information to citizens, the new avatar, 
NREGAsoft version 6.0, became available in September 2011 (http://nrega.nic.in/releases.htm) and had 
the capacity for micro-level integration (MoRD, 2011), offering a potential solution to the planning, 
monitoring and content managing needs of the program. Official, signed letters from central to state 
level (MoRD, 2011) shows the level of detail suggested by the centre to the states and the sharing of 
best practices to take MIS systems towards a transaction-based system that could produce reports from 
live data. The new system is said to provide a workflow system with a customized interface, and offline 
and online records and information from each level of governance. 
 
The new version is also better equipped to work with the newer MIS system initiated by states such as 
Andhra Pradesh. The improved central platform now has the capacity for online payment of wages 
directly into the bank or post office accounts of workers and also be compatible with newer technologies 
such as a mobile monitoring system (MMS) and an electronic fund management system (e-FMS) 
enlisted by states such as Andhra Pradesh. The MMS draws on cellphone networks to connect to 
NREGAsoft and provide online, real-time data, updating capacity to gram panchayats and other 
implementation agencies and increasing capacity for empowerment. The MGNREGS e-FMS manual 
became available online in May, 2012. 
 
There are two ways of looking at this – before e-FMS and after e-FMS. With e-FMS, funds flow 
directly from the state government to the gram panchayat or the beneficiaries. There is no role for 
the block and district in this case. In the non-e-FMS case scenario, for example, we release money 
from the central government to the state government, [specifically] the State Employment 
Guarantee Fund (SEGF), which is the state. They’ll release to the district and again based on the 
demand of the block, the district will release to the block. Block will then release to the gram 
panchayat. That is a lengthy process (Assistant Commissioner, MoRD). 
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Each of these new endeavours faced its own set of political and local resistance (Economic & Political 
weekly, 2014) at the state and micro levels: 
 
Post office, bank account, commercial account. But the basic condition is that the states should 
have a core banking system (CBS). And various states are in the process of converting from non-
CBS to CBS. So that is a basic condition. There we can reduce a day – earlier it was taking around 
ten days to transfer funds [direct to the beneficiary]; now we can reduce it to five days or something 
like that. There is a huge difference (Assistant Commissioner, MoRD). 
 
The state of Andhra Pradesh proactively invested funds and made efforts to hire a well-known private 
sector information technology company, Tata Consultancy Services (TCS), to design an end-to-end 
MIS solution that facilitated the uploading of local data, creation of real-time records and micro-level 
transparency and accountability creation of local records for the state (TCS, 2011). But Andhra 
Pradesh’s state-level strategy and investment in its MCS was an exception rather than the norm among 
states. 
 
Performance is very much visible. We and anyone else can see it in the Management Information 
System (MIS). MIS is the basic information because we have made it mandatory that MIS should 
be 100%. Earlier we asked for performance numbers in writing from states and then we required 
additional proof. Since we made MIS mandatory, we get the base data to decide the performance 
of each state from there (Assistant Commissioner, MoRD). 
 
To summarize, in light of the substantial amount of fund transfers made by the central government, the 
revamped and reengineered initial MIS was said to have the capacity to provide improved information 
on fund flow to the MoRD. It was to enable visibility of financial and non-financial information as 
envisioned by the centre and also better tracking of funds to ensure they were released through the State 
Fund, followed all financial norms, and reached the workers at the village level (MoRD, Report to the 
People, 2006–10, p. 18). In reality the system was far from perfect. There are still significant issues 
with data collection and data management, which MGNREGS continues to face at the central level. 
But even given these limitations, some states made more headway connecting to central systems. By 
2008–09, 60 million job cards and 12 million muster rolls had been placed on the MIS. 
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iii. Resource allocation: funding and disbursal processes 
Approval of funding and KPIs – The fund approval process is the second step after the labour budget had 
been collated up to the central government. It consisted of the state government’s formally submitting 
applications requesting for MGNREGA funds based on their state level labour budget. This initiates a 
process of engagement, assessment and also negotiation between the centre and the state based on an 
assessment of past performance, funds utilization and key performance indicators (KPIs). 
 
At the secretary level, the Principal Secretary from the state government [and the] secretary from 
the department … have a meeting called the “empowered committee.” The head of the committee 
is the Secretary for Rural Development, so there will be negotiation. It is a discussion or a review 
of the performance of the last year. Even though it is demand driven, there has to be a limit for 
which we set the target. They can come to us anytime but initially to fix the release, how much 
money we need to release to a particular state, some basis has to be established. The basis for us is 
the performance of the last year (Assistant Commissioner, MoRD). 
 
Several accounting and administrative artifacts documents are crucial to this process. Artifacts such as MIS 
financial reports and public works–related management accounting and administrative information based 
on implementation data are submitted by the state government, as well as MoRD-designed key performance 
indicators (KPI’s). An interview with the Director of the organization provides some insights into how such 
KPIs may be designed and actively interpreted. He presented it as a straightforward, simplistic process of 
conversion from the Act. For example, an indicator of optimum fund utilization could be amount spent on 
wages as well as amount utilized as a percentage of total funding granted, and so on. My efforts to discuss 
this process further were met with some impatience at having to explain something very obvious to his 
understanding. This discussion presents an example of a central habitus – entrenched understandings 
derived over time from similar processes and experience of delivering social services program or similar 
processes for other programs. 
 
Aside from reports and KPIs the fund approval process in the 2013 edition also requires oversight 
documents for the Empowered Committee meeting. Each year the Empowered Committee, chaired by the 
Secretary of the MoRD, meets (MoRD Operational Guidelines, 2013, p. 99) to assess state performances 
on the program with the view to negotiating and approving state-specific submitted labour budgets. These 
include an action taken to report on complaints to the state, “no misutilization and unrelated expenditure 
and misappropriation of funds noticed during the year” (MoRD Operational Guidelines, 2013, pp. 100–
101; emphasis added) and documentary proof providing evidence that the Ministry’s clarifications, 
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suggestions, advice and observations issued for MGNREGA at the state, district, block, and village levels 
had been satisfactorily followed. There are also artifacts designed specifically to be produced at the state 
level for the funding process. A key accounting document in the fund release part process is the Utilization 
Certificate, a comprehensive document through which the states account for grants received, physical 
output, pending liabilities, unspent balances, and work in progress.3 The format of the consolidated labour 
budget submitted to the MoRD, formats for claiming central funds under NREGA can be found in the 
appendices of the 2006 edition.  
 
There is also follow-up action and we will review that as well. Based on the minutes what are the 
follow-up actions the state government has taken? And we will review that as well along with the 
performance of this year (Assistant Commissioner, MoRD). 
 
In comparison, the 2008 edition amends the original version by creating two separate artifacts – the Monthly 
Allotment and Utilization Certificate Watch Register and the Utilization Certificate for Cash Component. 
Both artifacts are a part of the budget evaluation process at the centre. These documents are objects around 
which main actors such as the centre and states interact towards program funding. The 2008 guidelines 
outline assessment factors such as projection of employment and average person-days generated; cost per 
person-day; and physical and actual performance MIS progress reports. Interestingly, the 2013 guidelines 
substantially extend information and documents required, implying a change in previously held 
understandings, attitudes, perspectives and habitus at the central level towards the state level. The changing 
narrative of these communications with the state are also reflected in the note and requirements of 
statements such as these: 
 
Estimate of labour should be realistic and close to actual achievement trends of the previous year 
in terms of households demand, days of employment demanded and expenditure. If a sharp rise in 
the employment demand is estimated, a proper justification for this should be clearly presented by 
the district in a narrative form along with the labour budget (MoRD Operational Guidelines, 
2008, p. 40). 
 
The 2013 operational guidelines have express outlines of expenditures “not allowed” under the 
administrative costs (MoRD, 2013, p. 106). The KPIs become connected to performance measurement and 
resource allocation more securely – both important elements of the program’s overall MCS. For the first 
                                                          
3 http://nrega.nic.in/Netnrega/WriteReaddata/Circulars/Provisional_Utilization_Certificate_2013_14.pdf 
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few cycles of program implementation, the MoRD does not hold the states to account strictly. But 
somewhere around the release of the second and third versions of Operational Guidelines, the frequency 
and accuracy of state reporting are adhered to more closely, while committee and other meetings as well as 
financial audits happen more regularly and frequently. These changes provide evidence of a key departure 
from earlier relationships between the centre and the state, and also allude to MoRD’s changing stance to 
the state’s previous misuse of central funds for MGNREGS, intentionally or unintentionally. The centre 
can be seen to be taking back some of the control in this program process.  
 
Performance review and other accountability mechanisms 
The centrally introduced social audit is a key public accountability practice for the program architecture 
and vision, though each state that decides to use the social audit as a control and accountability mechanism 
in MGNREGS has the right to design its implementation. It is called an IEC (information, education and 
communication) tool and includes public scrutiny of financial, works and administrative documents for 
each public work implemented. The centre set the guidelines in terms of what percentage of works had to 
be physically verified: 100% at the village level, 10% at the block level and 1% at the state level. However, 
how social audit was employed towards accountability was the decision of each state. 
 
The MCS and MIS were supported by physical verification of works, and the MoRD enlisted National 
Level Monitors (NLMs) to conduct physical audits. There are also periodic review meetings with the states 
connected to the release of federal funding (Quarterly Performance Review Committee meeting).The Act 
also built in statutory institutional mechanisms such as on-request investigation by the CAG.  
 
The Ministry of Rural Development has taken several key steps to strengthen the implementation 
of the Scheme and address challenges this year. The Ministry of Rural Development has brought 
out the new Operation Guidelines for MGNREGA and a reform agenda, namely MGNREGA 2.0 
(Report to the People, 2013, p. 17). 
 
The centre instituted review meetings at various levels to increase indirect oversight and spread awareness 
and best practices. The performance review committee is one such meeting that requires attendance from 
all states and happens at the central level at New Delhi. The zonal review meeting and the follow-up action 
review meeting introduced additional parameters for individual states and zones: 
 
In the Performance Review committee, we basically review performance in terms of financial 
matters … parameters like financial, physical and other miscellaneous general and administrative 
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matters. In the physical we will examine basic parameters. See, in NREGA, the basic purpose is 
generation of employment, other objectives are secondary. We’ll not focus as much on money spent 
than percentage employment generated which is the basic objective. From there everything else is 
related. So, we go by percentage generated (Assistant Commissioner, MoRD; my emphasis). 
 
…to focus on each particular zone, we have started the concept of regional (zonal) review meetings. 
We go to a particular zone.… For example the west zone, Maharashtra, has done tremendous work 
in [one] particular area and a state, Gujarat, in another, then we’ll ask them to follow the Best 
Practices.… So as we visit sites, officials of other states get a feel of what is happening in other 
states. And they try to replicate that. So zonal meeting is one mechanism. Since size will be 
minimal, it is more effective, which is why we hold these regional review meetings (Assistant 
Commissioner, MoRD; my emphasis). 
 
The process of changes in each of these segments between central and state levels not only reflects the 
gradual change in the role and perspective of central government, but also some acceptance by state 
governments to changing demands from the centre. Within these changes, financial, operational and 
accountability performances still vary substantially from state to state. Some states are in line with central 
improvements and have made efforts to implement them. Other still lack the political and administrative 
support and resources to make this possible. 
Sociological analysis 
 
This section provides the third layer of analysis based on Ruiz’s (2009) framework. 
i. Material arrangements: Capitals and habitus 
The last analysis section provides a substantial amount of detail between central and state levels in terms 
of setting of process and the context of drawing upon accounting practices, artifacts and interactions 
towards accountability. Set within these wider organizational contexts and field-level logics, accounting 
and accountability practices shape and are shaped in turn both through the unfolding of the field, capitals, 
and habitus, as well as through “structures of intentionality” (Chapman & Ahrens, 2004, p. 1) made visible 
through their enactment. 
 
This program, with its newer format and unprecedented budget, provides a backdrop for a struggle over 
and renegotiation of stakeholder relational roles and capitals at the macro level. Important to understanding 
the program design is Bourdieu’s “habitus” at the centre, as mentioned in the paragraphs before. Similarly 
to definitions of culture and socialization and discussions on contextual environments, a collective habitus 
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includes the all-internalized experiential understandings, underlying logics, systems, knowledge, 
orientation, beliefs, values and tastes accumulated over a period of time, and passed on to new members 
who become a part of that social system. A habitus contributes to how an individual, a social unit or an 
organization visualizes its own identity, role and place within the larger whole. In keeping with this, public 
organizations are known to have certain established bureaucratic ways of seeing and doing, and a strong 
perception of their own station and power. These characteristic ways of thinking, conceiving and acting are 
embedded in and can be perpetuated through its framework, its administrative processes and the logic of its 
daily activities. 
 
The MoRD has multiple governance and funding relationships (Secretary, Rajasthan: interview) with the 
states and so certain understandings of the contextual field can be understood to have been gained by the 
centre and the MoRD over the period of these decades of association. The program started off with an 
innovative design mode, giving major legislative, planning and implementation power to the states, so they 
could design and implement a program that suited their own specific needs. The centre had the traditional 
political and economic capital as the facilitator and funder but the states had far more control of the funds 
and implementation, so the balance of political and economic capital was in the favour of the state 
governments. In keeping with this, the initial program guidelines that supported accounting practices, 
systems and artifacts come across as broad and generalized, granting state governments flexibility to 
populate them based on local requirements. 
 
In the larger picture, central and state administrative systems can have similar underlying understandings 
based on their habitus, social position and capitals, and so visualize and practice accountability differently. 
Thus an established public-sector habitus can be observed behind the purposive activity of governance. 
Interviews, both in content and behavior, also display some of the embedded understandings of “how things 
are done,” entrenched activities where the underlying logic is no longer questioned. This is the non-
purposive habitus of the government, wherein tacit aspects of human activity in terms of actions, 
understandings and language are specific to the logic of that practice. It has to do with taken-for-granted 
knowledge that seems trivial but directs the government and the MoRD as a unit to see itself and act in a 
certain way. This habitus is also carried within individual members. Created by a particular type of 
environment, it harmonizes the social experiences of individuals in a group (Bourdieu, 1997, p. 80), which 
means that the group shares that habitus at a macro level. Displayed in central interviews is a common and 
similar sense of awareness on certain elements of the program, a Bourdieusian reflexivity wherein public 
officials seem to step back to communicate how they think certain program processes should work based 
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on their particular position, role and understanding and explain also the logic of the strategies they have 
enlisted or will enlist towards their goal. 
 
However, after the first few cycles of implementation significant causes for concern emerged publicly 
through CAG reports and widespread public investigations into fraudulent misuse of funds. Highly placed 
officials at the centre, as well as National Level Monitors, have pointed to severe issues with voluminous 
information, lack of infrastructure and corruption at the micro level that included fudging of muster rolls, 
spurious transactions, and partial wage payments, duplication of works and improper record keeping, all of 
which was traced to a lack of transparency. These challenges create an environment where practices interact 
with the existing habitus and also shape it, and this is publicly acknowledged by the MoRD: 
 
A radical Act like the Mahatma Gandhi NREGA is bound to face several challenges as it seeks to 
empower poor rural communities and transform traditional hierarchies through its demand-driven 
and rights based processes. The Ministry has taken various initiatives to address these issues, such 
as accurate capturing of demand, planning of works, closing of muster rolls on time to check 
delayed payment, timely measurement of works and improved tracking of expenditure (MoRD, 
2013, p. 23). 
 
ii. Struggles for control 
The field and its habitus in the context of the centre evolve through struggles with meso-micro 
implementation, transparency and accountability through multiple implementation cycles. The challenge of 
accountability here is also a challenge for accounting. Regardless of objectives and structure, the context 
and putting accounting and accountability practices to actual work can reveal its own set of hurdles. The 
program can also be seen as the domain of struggle and action for accumulation of capitals and power, and 
practices such as accounting can amplify its spatial and temporal reach (Graham, 2007, p. 310; Miller & 
O’Leary, 1987). In this instance, it is through the implementation of the program framework and 
accountability practices that the field can be seen to be in intense flux. Studies like Wildavsky (1976) and 
Covaleski & Aiken (1986) provide some insights into the sociopolitical context accounting systems and the 
struggles for power and control. 
 
Accountability is on both levels, one is official and the other is the public level; it's different for 
both… (District Programme Co-ordinator, Mathura). 
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The centre’s macro actions and decisions define the program’s backbone structure, communicating its 
vision through framing and shaping the field relationships and structural distribution of capitals and 
resources (Everett, 2002). In theory, the MCS, MIS, and numerous checks and balances built into the 
framework were to provide possibilities of control, transparency and surveillance from a distance, but in 
practice the central administrative system and the framework were woefully unprepared for the magnitude 
of MGNREGS as well as for legacy issues. 
 
Due to the bureaucratic nature of the workings of the central and state governments, the occurrence of 
meetings and the creation of paperwork and reviews do not guarantee that program goals are met in spirit. 
There is significant scope for improvement in terms of visibility, connectivity and system inefficiencies. 
Keeping in mind the geographical and financial scope of MGNREGS, along with traditionally weak 
structures of reporting and transparency, as well as corruption and political interference, the program 
presented significant challenges to central and state administrations in both implementation and 
accountability. In a newspaper article, Additional Solicitor General Indira Jaising (The Hindu, 2010) 
recommends a formal investigation of one such state because it seems reluctant to implement the central 
guidelines through state-level rulings, producing issues of control, oversight and fund mismanagement. A 
government draft report also sites “inertia and resistance to change” (Shah Committee, 2012, p. 38) as a 
key issue for the program at the state level. As a result, billions in public funds were reported lost, not 
reaching intended program beneficiaries: 
 
“It’s not that the government is not spending money. Both state governments and centre 
government are spending a lot of money on social security.… Today we do not have any 
mechanism to find out how much the state government or the Central government is spending on 
social security schemes,” Additional Central Provident Fund Commissioner V Vijayakumar said at 
a programme organized by the Indian Chamber of Commerce (Economic Times, 2015). 
 
There is another facet to this struggle. Accountability struggles are not straightforward and limited to the 
state government’s lack of intent or effort. Progress presentations in Andhra Pradesh reflect the 
implementation and accountability obstacles faced by state governments at the district, block and village 
level. State-level infrastructure for reporting, oversight and recourse on the ground has traditionally been 
underdeveloped, creating conditions for meso- and micro-level bureaucracy and corruption. Local 
sociocultural structures of power at the village level are very entrenched and did not seem to respond to the 
initial program implementation. Therefore issues in recording and transmission of financial and 
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administrative information not only led to increases in administrative costs but also hindered decision 
making, better process management, and internal and external transparency. 
 
iii. Change and the role of accounting 
This chapter has provided the first level of investigation of MGNREGS at the macro level. Here we have 
witnessed the processes through which the program framework was designed and diffused by the MoRD at 
the central government level. I also investigated the challenges faced by the program between central and 
state levels. 
 
The period of 2006–10 is marked by an intense public political and media debate over implementation gaps. 
Interviews and news coverage point to struggle and resistance at the centre, which is accountable for the 
funds released to the states, the states themselves, which have the implementing authority, and finally the 
media. In response to some of these struggles and challenges faced in the course of the program’s 
implementation, the MoRD has attempted to make changes towards firmer action and has modified initial 
accounting and accounting practices and interactions. Over the course of eight cycles of program 
implementation we see more detailed and prescriptive instruction on accounting practices and their use. 
There is an increase in high-level performance evaluation, and tighter enforcement of funding parameters 
and access to financial and operational data. These speak to some amendments in the central role and 
strategy towards its program vision and objectives.  
 
In addition to sending out public message on transparency and access to data, the centre seems to have 
affected an adjustment in its overall strategy and role in the program, allowing glimpses into what habitus 
can represent. I am not suggesting that this is the only habitus, but rather that this is a dominant habitus, 
reflected in the communications I examined. With the implementation of multiple program cycles, it 
became clear that harmonization of the centre’s program vision could create conditions for the program to 
do better. This success of this shift in central strategy varied across states. Those such as Rajasthan and 
Andhra Pradesh, which had committed more towards better program delivery, responded more efficiently 
to central demands. 
 
Part of this shift seems to have emerged from the extension of the program scope, and part from the 
performance of the states and the central view that practices, processes and understandings needed to be 
overhauled over the longer term (habitus) if transparency and accountability were to be achievable goals. 
This is not a novel phenomenon. Organizational and government systems receive data from their 
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administrative and management information systems and are known to act and interact with the 
sociopolitical environment to learn and negotiate (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978, p. xii). 
 
In manipulating policies, the Federal Government can be seen as an operator of control systems. 
The “levers” available to it are within the keyboard of policies derived from acts of Congress and 
agency practices. These are constantly changing, as Congress passes new laws, amends old, 
allocates funds, and as officials of the executive branch construct, carry out and modify policies 
governing administrative practice” (Wenger, 1998, p. 8) 
 
Each of these changes reflects new possibilities of control, surveillance and accountability. Significant 
changes can also be observed in the perspective, language and actions undertaken by state governments 
after the centre gradually introduced its changes. The rendering of the accountability vision at the central 
level or its implementation at the state level does not emerge in terms of the multiple or competing set of 
logics for accountability explored in studies such as Ezzamel et al. (2007) or culture-specific accountability 
styles in Bracci (2009). Instead the interviews reflect a divergence in terms of interests and goals in the 
particular socioeconomic-political setting of the country. Gradually the central government became more 
and more involved in operational rules and regulation that governed implementation right down to the 
village level, bringing about a change in the distributions of capitals between central and state levels. 
Notions of accountability are accumulated in the habitus over the longer term and changes in the operational 
and structural side of the program both come from and also feed a shift in in habitus and understandings at 
central and state levels. In keeping with the legislative boundaries and rights of the states, specific decisions 
were still up to them, and this is why Andhra Pradesh did exceedingly well in terms of implementation – it 
made political and administrative decisions to invest in transfer of data online, public access to program 
information, and mechanisms of control, oversight and transparency. 
 
The 2006 guidelines set out fairly flexible and straightforward directives on recording, monitoring, 
evaluation and accountability, largely focused on the state level. We observe a new type of public discourse 
emerging post-2008 with a re-setting of central efforts. There is more than modest expansion in the scope 
of the 2008 Guidelines, with a focus on specific accountability processes such as capacity building, works 
implementation process, and monitoring and evaluation. The centre set out clearer rules and performance 
indicators and used its financial purse strings to direct states more forcefully. By the third edition the 
Guidelines reflected the amendments in the Act or vice versa and were significantly more detailed and 
extended. By 2011, the centre had reinvested and relaunched its flagging MIS, now called “NREGAsoft.” 
This system is more technologically advanced, has the ability to connect more reliably to state-level 
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systems, provides better report generation capabilities, and also makes available to the states connected 
technologies such as an electronic fund management system, real-time MIS’s and mobile monitoring 
systems. Requirements for getting funds approved from the centre have been significantly extended. More 
detailed work process rules, stronger compliance requirements, introduction of corrective and punitive 
actions, and increased levels of reporting, control and monitoring built into newer accounting and 
accountability practices systems also reflect a gradual but clear shift in control and power towards the centre 
and the MoRD. A study of the document (Review of MGNREGS, 2014) provides information on state-
wise projects to streamline work, administrative and financial processes. Action plans have been introduced 
and changes made to personnel at the micro level. For example, junior engineers and technical assistants 
are among the few declared to be in the core staff at the field level by the centre, and requirements are put 
out (such as one junior engineer for every block, or one technical assistant for every 2,500 active job cards). 
In financial management, introduction of measures such as electronic transfer of funds on an FTO basis, no 
parking of funds with implementing agencies, and no use of cheques are just a few of the measures 
introduced (Review of MGNREGS, 2014). 
 
The analysis also reflects a gradual shaping of the program’s multi-level structure, guidelines and 
supporting central directives infrastructure based on the centre getting a more practice-based sense of its 
powers and role in this program. The involvement of the centre in day-to-day rules, instructions, processes, 
training, MIS and documentation increases exponentially. Rules and directives to back up the guidelines 
were dispersed more regularly by the centre, with meticulously detailed steps for state-level activities. 
Amendments to the Act were accomplished (Report to the People, 2006–10), detailing processes, roles and 
responsibilities, and designing financial and non-financial reporting, artifacts and flows of information. 
Over time, we witness a gradual change in public discourse, program administration and overall outlook 
and approach to the program. The changes filter into accounting processes not in terms of what practices 
and artifacts are enlisted but rather “how” they are enlisted, drawn upon and supported. There is also a 
change in the manner and role in which the MoRD sees itself in the program. I argue here that these 
representative markers point to shifts in nature, mode and content of central communication with the state, 
changes in manner and use of accountability mechanisms, and the type and level of enforcement. These 
markers can be interpreted as pointing to a “systematic learning” (MoRD Report to the People, 2014) and 
a change in perspective from previously entrenched systems of thinking and action in the centre–state 
relationship in the field of social services. 
 
The changes described above are reinforced and supported in concrete terms through instructions and 
memos, detailed requirements and process steps. But one of the biggest overall changes we observe is the 
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increased central focus on financial visibility. Uploading or downloading of muster roll data onto the MIS 
in states like Andhra Pradesh is not only real-time but also given the option to be supported by technology 
such as e-Musters, availability of computers and internet connectivity, and cell phone data uploading. 
 
Process re-engineering in government is never easy, there is enormous resistance both from 
within and outside the system. The most radical initiatives related to MGNREGA for instance, 
including mandatory payment of wages through bank and post-office accounts, and 
universalization of the Management Information System (MIS), were originally greeted with 
great skepticism, but eventually recognized as path-breaking reforms (Mann, Pande, & 
Ramesh, 2012). 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have provided an analysis of the MoRD’s enlisting of accounting in shaping a framework 
for MGNREGS and its accountability practices. I have argued that the implanting of accounting practices 
such as micro budgeting, social audit, MIS, MCS and oversight mechanisms in multiple levels of 
governance by the centre creates a specific visibility and organizes the field around a set of concrete 
practices (Neu et al., 2006), artifacts and flows of information. Drawing on the habitus held individually 
and collectively, the design of a national program architecture, and the combination and arrangement of 
resources, work processes and flows of information, the introduction of accounting practices also influences 
the distribution of powers and capitals. The centre’s initial vision and objectives are reflected in and through 
these initial and subsequent discourses, framings and accounting practices. But the program structure 
accomplishes much more than that. It articulates a centralized program design for the country and constructs 
a structure, positioning certain groupings of accounting practices and artifacts to frame a specific notion of 
transparency and accountability at various levels of the program. The centre does not have a direct role in 
program implementation but as the operational guidelines filter down the state line, they diffuse the central 
vision and objectives at meso and micro levels. These practices also establish a temporal order for the 
program at a distance, through the cyclical nature of program activities such as planning, budgeting, 
implementing, reporting and transmission of financial and non-financial information (Roberts & Scapens, 
1985, p. 448). 
 
Conducting a multi-level investigation draws on data to provide an analysis of MGNREGS, its players, 
influences and conditions at the macro level. Accounting is also seen to have a role in change processes in 
the centre–state relationship at this level. Drawing on Bourdieu’s notion of relationality in which power, 
position and capital are in relation to each other and to the field, the central and state governments are key 
100 
 
actors attempting to arrange and “organize” the field, the program and its distribution of capitals. 
Organizations can have long-lasting structural and institutional memories and a number of concurrent social 
services programs being delivered alongside MGNREGS would have contributed to an initial distribution 
of capitals different from the one assigned by the NREG Act. In MGNREGA, the ideas behind the 
frameworks introduced were innovative but program systems, practices and processes (delivery, MCS, 
MIS) leaned on existing bureaucratic understandings of the field and how things had been done for decades. 
Agency at central, state and local levels plays an important role, as do inherited innate qualities of this field 
and its habitus, a merging of the subjective and objective, habitus and strategy. 
 
The analysis presented in this chapter reflects the first level of the program introduction. Accounting is 
presented as an enabler that facilitates the creation and shifting in the type of financial shaping, visibility 
(Graham, 2010) and temporal order (Roberts & Scapens, 1985, p. 448) as the centre attempts to move away 
from its original role and oversight. The central role of accounting becomes especially evident through the 
newer provision of symbolic classifications for the program. More than the notion of comparative change 
or scale, in this chapter I have noted the direction of a sustained shift that has the potential to settle deeper 
that just conscious strategy. It highlights sustained transformations, over a period of time, in understandings 
associated with accountability and the functioning of accounting at central, state and village levels. The 
production and consumption of new patterns of accounting practices towards planning, reporting, 
implementation, and control modules have created a different pattern of awareness, cognizance and 
boundaries associated with notions of accountability diffused to the state and micro levels. This impacts 
how accountability and accounting are perceived and consumed in the field of social services. 
 
Through management accounting mechanisms such as key performance indicators, MIS and MCS, the 
MoRD provides individual states (MoRD, 2008) with state-level markers in keeping with central 
accountability objectives, and also creates possibilities for oversight (Hoskin & MacVe, 1986). On multiple 
levels of governance in the program, the MCS and MIS play the role of informing technologies, allowing 
the centre the potential for indirect, at-a-distance government. As top-down official communication, the 
guidelines and recommendations also assist in establishing legitimacy and symbolic capital for the MoRD 
(Ahrens & Chapman, 2002) in the particular positional distribution of this program. 
 
In the longer term, through the process of implementation, struggle and adaptation, the central habitus 
accumulates a fresher systematic understanding of contextual accountability, reflected in a newer system 
of doing things. These understandings and new ways of doing things slowly become integrated into practice 
and the activities that make up this practice (Papacharissi & Easton, 2013). However this can in no way be 
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considered a straightforward or one-sided journey, as program implementation lies in the hand of the state 
governments. States like Andhra Pradesh have not only accepted the newer provisions and requirements of 
the central government, but in line with state-level objectives of the program have also provided sustained 
support to the centre’s vision of accountability. Combined with the changes initiated by the centre, these 
aided in a change in the field at the macro level, as the distribution of capitals shifted favourably towards 
the MoRD. 
 
The next chapter provides an analysis of MGNREGS and moves from the central design phase to hit the 
next layer of program design and implementation. Here, this dissertation’s multi-level perspective is 
extended by focusing on a meso-level analysis between the state government and its offices at the district 
and block levels.  
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Chapter 5: MGNREGS and the States – Meso Level 
 
The operation of work technologies in organizations is not a purely technical-rational affair. Rather, 
it is embedded in a cultural system of ideas (beliefs, knowledge) and sentiments (values), in which 
actions and artifacts are vested with symbolic qualities of meaning. The appreciation of 
organizational dynamics requires sensitivity to local frames of significance and interpretation 
(Dent, 1991, p. 706). 
 
Introduction 
Building on the macro level analysis of the last chapter, this chapter focuses on the dynamics, complexities 
and interpretation of the central vision and framework, moving to the next phase of the program – the 
second layer of its multi-level implementation. Here the analysis presents the distinct state-level vision of 
the state-level Government of Andhra Pradesh (GoAP), whose strategy and decisions construct a specific 
rendition of accountability at the meso-micro level. In this context, a practice-based multi-level perspective 
allows me to follow the process from the macro level and investigate the strategic and operational use of 
accounting (Ahrens & Chapman, 2002) towards accountability at the meso level. The construction process 
includes the GoAP enlisting certain strategic management accounting practices towards its own state 
objectives and implementation goals for the program, creating a core practice-based role for accounting in 
the state’s MGNREGS change processes. The research site for this chapter comprises the meso state-level 
government offices in charge of the MGNREGS program. I trace the program progression over eight annual 
program cycles, focusing on the state of Andhra Pradesh while also drawing on themes and insights from 
other meso-level research sites. 
 
Neoliberal reforms of the 1980s have created new delivery patterns, practices and mechanisms connected 
to the multi-sector delivery of governance and social services. The problem of managing and reforming 
hybrid patterns of rule (Bevir, 2011, p. 3) that highlight the changing relationship among the state, society 
and citizens – including decentralization, collaborative governance, citizen participation and civil society – 
is a key challenge of modern governance (Bingham, 2010; McLaverty, 2009). Newer theories and research 
in public governance are less connected with traditional models of hierarchy. They include a larger number 
of societal actors in an attempt to lay open the inner working of the modern state (Bevir, 2011, p. 1): the 
different stakeholders, interests and interactions that influence policies, practices and the impact of 
governing. In this setting accounting, organizations and the social are not only linked but interdependent 
(Hopwood, 1978; Chapman, Cooper & Miller, 2009, p. 2). 
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Within these reforms, developments in information technology and management accounting are putting 
management control systems (MCS) at the center of operational strategies (Langfield-Smith, 2005, p. 73). 
Studies like Dillard & Burris open new research avenues as they explore the impact of new technologies 
on MCS, change and organizational structures (Dillard & Burris, 1993). Though interest in understanding 
this intersection is increasing (Henri, 2006; Dent, 1990), it is considered still nascent and fragmented 
(Ansari, 1977; Langfield-Smith, 1997; Langfield-Smith, 2006, p. 753), especially the role played by 
strategic accounting practices in organizational change processes and accountability at meso and micro 
levels (Burns & Vaivio, 2001, pp. 389–390).  
 
The challenge is that these new accountabilities are at once obstructive and enabling of good 
practice. Through accountability the financial and the moral meet the twinned percepts of economic 
efficiency and ethical practice (Strathern, 2000, p. i). 
 
The mainstream problematic of outcome-based research pursuing a somewhat unidirectional and passive 
relationship among MCS, organizational strategy and managerial decisions (Chapman, 1997, pp. 189–190; 
Langfield-Smith, 1997, p.225) is now being challenged. Many piecemeal studies focus on one specific 
element of MCS and its connection to strategy (Malmi & Brown, 2008) while studies such as Hope & 
Fraser (2003) argue that practices such as budgeting and balanced score cards (BSC) are no longer relevant 
in the current business environment. Chapman (2005, p. 1) provides an alternate view of MCS as an enabler 
of innovative strategic responses in uncertain business environments and agrees that connecting specific 
management accounting practices to strategy has proved difficult, urging attention towards the potential of 
MCS as systems of strategic control (p. 3). Dillard (2008) argues to move beyond a purely technical view 
of accounting information systems (AIS). He explores AIS through the lens of social theory to present a 
more inclusive design that “incorporates a greater range of values, interests, and objectives” (p. 21).  Chua 
(2007, p. 488) reinforces such perspectives with a call for research on the role of management accounting 
systems in “actively build[ing] and sustain[ing] valuable strategic roles” (Chapman, 2005). So it is not 
surprising to see a relative lack of literature on strategically designed MCS that also shape organizational 
objectives and their contextual environment. 
 
Connecting meso-micro practicalities of accounting and strategy (Whittington, 2003) means investigating 
the meso and micro processes through which organizational plans and strategies are put to work, as well as 
the players that take part in such processes. Though strategic decisions happen at various levels in 
organizations (Johnson, 1987, pp. 4–5), not all state decisions in MGNREGS can be judged strategic or 
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deliberate, in light of various sociopolitical, financial and infrastructure factors. In contrast to studies such 
as Granlund & Lukka (1998), who argue for a global convergence of management accounting practice, the 
government of Andhra Pradesh (GoAP) deals with formal and informal powers, coalitions, and powerful 
political, administrative and local stakeholders, so elements like habitus, distribution of formal and informal 
authority (Abernethy & Vagnoni, 2004) and power can be important influences in field-level strategic 
decisions (Pettigrew, 1973; Pettigrew, 1977). It is also worth keeping in mind, within this subsection, that 
not all strategic and non-strategic implementations play out in the intended or even the same manner 
(planned versus realized strategies). In contrast to macro explorations, the Andhra Pradesh state strategy 
and management processes permeate down to the local governance and individual citizen level, so it is 
important that they be viewed through a micro-based perspective. 
 
A key element of MCS is the important role it can play during within uncertain environments. In this 
chapter, set within the state-level subfield’s structure, capitals and habitus, I attempt to reach two theoretical 
goals through a process-oriented approach (Chua, 2007, p. 488): 
 First, to connect the vision and strategy of the state machinery to an active bidirectional MCS that 
is both shaped by and shapes its organizational and social contexts and habitus. 
 Second, to enhance a practice-based understanding of the role of the MCS in implementation of 
decentralized accountability and reform processes. I argue that over time the implementation of 
such accounting and administrative/accountability practices contribute to a gradual shift in the 
habitus, notions of accountability and distribution of capitals at the meso-micro state level. 
 
Research questions 
 What is the role of strategic accounting practices in the construction of accountability and reform 
at the meso governance level? 
 How does this construction process influence the distribution of capitals and habitus at the meso 
and micro level? 
 
The MGNREGS in Andhra Pradesh 
Andhra Pradesh was (until its 2014 division) the eighth largest of India’s 29 current states, its state capital 
being the city of Hyderabad, with a geographical area of approximately 275,000 square kilometers, divided 
into 23 districts. According to the 2011 census, Andhra Pradesh had a population of 84.6 million, an 
increase from 76.2 million recorded in the 2001 census, with approximately 67% of this population living 
in rural areas, with a healthy, approximately 50%, distribution between males and females. With two major 
rivers running through the state, the topography is varied, bountiful and strongly steeped in agriculture and 
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livestock farming. Andhra Pradesh is considered economically robust due to its manufacturing, minerals 
and export sectors. Demographically, it has one of the highest rates of literacy in the country with male 
literacy standing at almost 75% and female literacy approximately 59% (Census, India, 2001). However, 
its political and public systems have not been immune to numerous issues of corruption in state programs 
such as irrigation and public housing (India Today, 2014). Political power, caste system, ruling class 
divisions, education, religion and gender are all relevant factors of importance and stratification in the 
social. In 2014, the state of Andhra Pradesh was split into two, creating India’s 29th state, Telangana. 
 
The field: Structure and capitals 
Inherent in understanding the construction of a practice is the possibility of a practice-based creation of 
rules and norms either not being followed (Rouse, pp. 501–502) or else being amended to fit actual 
requirements of practice. The decentralized and devolved MGNREGS model pumped immense amounts of 
central funds into the meso and micro level from the centre, and increasing public debate on its inefficiency 
and ineffectiveness put a growing focus on existing stress lines. In the context of MGNREGS at state levels, 
the canvas on which public control and accountability struggles are set is formed by the struggle to 
accumulate and/or retain (local government employees/state) or counter (state/local governance) an 
established public sector habitus and access to public power and funds through accumulated positional and 
symbolic capitals. Thus, having an understanding of relationships of power and possession of valued 
capitals is essential to understanding control and notions of accountability (Oakes, Townley, & Cooper, 
1998). Going beyond the economic (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 242), I draw on Bourdieu understanding that control 
and power function both overtly and invisibly in nested subfields. This section focuses on the distribution 
of capitals and strategic role of accounting and MCS in the strategy and program implementation through 
new structures, practices and artifacts. 
 
The Andhra Pradesh state machinery, comprising the administrative division and the ruling government, 
has drawn on the central vision to interpret and define its own state-level vision for the program. As a key 
field agent at the meso level, the state is seen to have the economic and political capital to make key strategic 
decisions regarding program priorities, resource allocation, structures and practices for MGNREGS. 
Between the meso and micro layers are many important public and non-public players, who interact around 
these state structures, practices and artifacts and impact the program implementation. These include three 
tiers of government employees (district, block and village), contracted technical support staff, members and 
employees of various non-governmental organizations (NGOs), self-help groups (SHGs), local elected 
political representatives, and rural citizens. Aside from formal sociopolitical elements, local and informal 
characteristics define the interests of many social actors (Langfield-Smith, 1997, p. 208) while also being 
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the source of the strategies and objective potentialities of change and transformation (Bourdieu, 1990). A 
study of accounts at these levels provides an indication of how multiple stakeholders with divergent 
interests engage with this process. 
 
The habitus and struggles for symbolic capital by players in a field can impact the nature and order of a 
field. In India, aside from the traditional strength of economic and political capital, the social, cultural and 
the religious also possess strong powers of differentiation at the meso and micro levels (Bourdieu, 1989, 
p. 19). The formal process of attempting to redistribute public powers in MGNREGA away from the centre 
and state and towards the local has created what Rose (2001) calls a “process of detraditionalization” (p. 2). 
Here, capitals and distribution of material resources are not only processual in nature but are also impacted 
upon by field relationships whose structure is “socially shared and historically produced” (Everett, 2002, 
p. 58). This is to say that, aside from formal positional capital in MGNREGS where the state has the 
“legitimate right to name,” the nature and specific mix of informal capitals and “interest” (Bourdieu & 
Wacquant, 1992, pp. 26, 117) at meso-micro levels can also influence the shape, understandings, habitus 
and implementation of program practices. It is through the structuring and (re)distribution of these non-
economic capitals that one can see the constraints and probability of transformation (Bourdieu, 1986, 
p. 242). 
 
At the state level and all levels below, the pervasive presence is that of positional administrative capital, 
most closely associated with Bourdieu’s political capital (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 48). Taking a look at the 
formal distribution of administration, there is a clear state-level structure of authority and reporting in 
Andhra Pradesh. Public policy decisions and rulings come from a combination of administrative and 
political logic (Jonsson, 2008, p. 542, as quoted in Tengblad, 2012). The nested subfields are also 
characterized by the primacy of “positional” or codified formal capital. Powers and capacity come from the 
office and designation occupied in the hierarchy and not from the individual herself. At the highest state 
level the director of the MGNREGS program and ruling political ministers have highest 
political/administrative powers. The state-level MGNREGA office is a fully functional office made up of 
many sectional heads (CFO-NREGS, AP-Interview). 
 
Based in the capital city of Hyderabad, the state office is still at a physical distance from village 
implementations. Interviews and visits to the state offices show the strong operational powers of the chief 
financial officer (CFO). The placement of his office with the larger area also reflects the various 
departments reporting to him. He has a strong hand in meso-program introduction and implementation, 
coordination of new administrative and management control systems, assignment and distribution of 
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financial and personnel resources, and program oversight over public officers at the meso and micro levels. 
The CFO’s position also holds cultural capital in terms of having significant prior administrative and 
financial experience, technical education, and the ability to communicate both verbally and in writing in 
the language of administration, control and accountability. In Andhra Pradesh, he is also the public face of 
the program to outsiders and researchers such as myself. Based on his approval and assistance, I was able 
to access the district, block and village levels. At each level, I had to give proof of this support to be allowed 
to access local offices and officials and even to speak to rural citizens. The line of control downwards 
provided many instances of respect for the CFO’s prowess and accomplishments in the program. All these 
pointers contribute to establishing a strategic focus on the role of finance and management control practices 
in the program and the program power held by the CFO’s office. This is not always so – state-level office 
in states that do not have such political, administrative, financial and strategic support do not enjoy similar 
levels of power at the meso and micro governance levels. Strong positional capitals are also enjoyed by 
support-functionary wings of the program such as technology, personnel and vigilance. 
 
The vigilance wing in Andhra Pradesh, whose team members I met at both state and district levels, was 
created as a key public department at the state level, and was granted considerable powers and support to 
carry out its functional duties. Its job is to conduct regular vigilance audits and to work with the Society for 
Social Audit, Accountability and Transparency (SSAAT) to investigate reports of corruption and misuse of 
power and public finances. Included in the vigilance wing are legal officers who file and pursue corruption 
and misuse of public resources cases in the local judicial courts. The wing also takes action on 
investigations. It assesses damages, fines errant employees found guilty of charges, and recovers such funds 
or fines. The capital held by vigilance directors and many of their key officers can understandably be seen 
as significant, and can be classified as both positional and political at both meso and micro levels. Though 
this capital again stems from positional power, it is both positional and symbolic in nature. This power to 
hold other public officers and local political leaders to account has created a strong place for vigilance 
officers in the meso and micro program power hierarchy, though their numbers are limited in comparison 
to SSAAT. The more efficient and effective this account taking, the higher the vigilance wing’s capital in 
that block or district; this is one area where performance could be improved.  
 
While the distribution of capital gives us an indication of the structure of this field, shared understandings 
associated with the habitus are historically produced and accumulate over a period of time (Bourdieu, 1986, 
pp. 46–58). The structure and functioning of this subfield is also impacted upon by individuals and positions 
that can demand an account-through mechanism that includes monthly financial reporting, MIS reports, or 
audits by national- and state-level monitors or by audit and vigilance departments. Though reporting is 
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institutionalized, audits represent a strong mechanism for transparency and vigilance which can be a strong 
deterrent to financial fraud. 
 
However, interviews with SSAAT officers brought up a potential bottleneck and some frustration in terms 
of cases reported by SSAAT, but not yet processed or penalized by the vigilance wing. Reasons for this 
could include a lack of personnel bandwidth and resources, lack of administrative support, or systemic long-
due processes for resolution of complaints. One must also take into account both the strength of 
documentation provided by the SSAAT personnel as well as the efficiency of the vigilance wing’s 
departmental functioning. 
 
The non-governmental, not-for-profit, and community-based organizations that are a part of social audit 
have risen to be important players and an important part of public and citizen oversight and accountability 
in many states. In Andhra Pradesh, social audit is entrusted to SSAAT, a non-governmental organization 
funded by the state government that functions for MGNREGS like a process department responsible for 
conducting the MGNREGS social audit, similar to the process responsibilities of the vigilance wing. 
However, unlike state governance, the structure of SSAAT is narrow at the top with the bulk of its 
employees working at the micro level. It has its own organizational hierarchy consisting of managers 
handling subdepartments of administration, accounts, IT, capacity building and field activities. The Director 
and Joint Director of this agency have substantial amounts of positional capital, due largely to support from 
the ruling governance as well to the significant public success of the social audit practice in Andhra Pradesh. 
The other levels are populated by program managers, state team monitors, program coordinators, and 
assistant program officers, as well as state resource persons (SRPs), district resource persons (DRPs) and 
village social auditors (VSAs) at state, district and village levels, respectively. The VSAs usually vary 
between 40 and 60 in number in each block. They are local rural youth trained to conduct social audits. 
 
Over the last eight years of its implementation, SSAAT has gradually built up the structure and capacity to 
involve local citizens in holding public and private implementers at district, block and village levels to 
account. It has developed an extensive network of social connections to various networks at a local, state 
and national level as well as the trust of rural citizens. The agency possesses experiential knowledge of 
contextual cultural and local reporting practices through its audits as well as administrative and political 
support. Based on this, SSAAT appears to have constructed an increasingly efficient mechanism of audit, 
accountability and garnered a great deal of social, political and cultural capital over the past years. The 
media has shown intense interest in its workings and its Co-Director, Ms. Sowmya Kidambi, has emerged 
as a charismatic trailblazer and leader who is a well-known public figure, not only in the state of Andhra 
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Pradesh but also at a national level, for her contribution to developing and establishing the practice of social 
audit in MGNREGS. 
 
Aside from these larger players with significant state-level presence, the next set of social agents connected 
to this network is placed between the levels of micro and meso governance. District-, block- and village-
level public officers and contractual employees hold various degrees of positional capital on the program 
implementation ladder. Hierarchically, micro-level public officers hold much less positional capital than 
meso-level officers, who in turn hold lower capital than a state-level officer further up the ladder.  
 
Legacy challenges 
Amidst such measures and support from the administrative and political wings, the state first had to assess 
and address inherited systemic weakness before figuring out its goals, objectives and strategy for the 
program.  
 
The distributed accountability model of the program and the inability of state governments to track such a 
large-scale program due to lack of infrastructure and oversight mechanisms created additional problems. 
Several government agencies operated concurrently, running a number of social welfare programs not under 
the purview lower social capital in ground- or micro-level public offices. Rather than positional powers at 
government level, this relates to social status held by women and types of power respected in a field. Being 
a secretary appointed as a representative of the government did not make this woman socially equal to the 
men holding the same position. 
 
In terms of capital in the program, SSAAT’s interests have congruence in terms of the formal and the 
informal. A majority of SSAAT’s core employees and audit teams recruited from the village are active at 
the block and village level. There are no conflicts that I could perceive, given that creating social capital 
for themselves by countering informal local capital is their primary function towards accountability. 
Interviews at agency level provide clear and stridently communicated goals. SSAAT employees do the 
audit and hand over the results to the GoAP and the vigilance wing, which then has the task of enforcing 
program rules and regulations. Though the special vigilance wing was formed at the state level, it has it 
offices and representative officers at the district and block level as well. Given the nature of their work, the 
interests communicated to me were connected to the GoAP and SSAAT. They expressed their own roles 
largely in terms of the following of due processes and artifacts laid out by the government. There seemed 
to be a stable system of performance measurement, as records generated regularly for reports outlined the 
number of complaints received, the processes followed and the outcomes generated. 
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At the village level, not all interests are articulated. Power can be organized and consumed both formally 
and informally, so it’s important to remember that not all informal power can be classified as illegal. 
Distinct groups articulate different interests in a field but not all interests are represented in the micro capital 
distribution in MGNREGA. The local subfield values, power that comes from access to land, financial, 
political and physical resources of which the villagers traditionally possess very little, and accumulated 
localized (social/political) capital seem to be deemed stronger and informally legitimate. The panchayat 
Secretary is a powerful figure, possessing strong positional power as the local representative of the state. 
His localized symbolic capital from this position is very strong as he is one of the key local links between 
the village and the block (state). He holds considerable sway in the social order at the village level. He 
oversees program implementation, most important village decisions require his presence, important 
documents require his signatures, and he is also involved in record maintenance and audits. Though the 
positional capital of a BDO or district coordinator is far greater than the village secretary’s, the secretary 
may possess stronger symbolic capital at the field level. He is the state representative and the first line of 
oversight at the micro village level, holding power over the rural citizen to potentially block access to 
obtaining work and receiving fair wages, or to be a champion for the interests of the village and its 
inhabitants. 
 
The Illegal – Illegal interests, the elephant(s) in the room, namely large-scale misappropriation of funds 
(Aiyar & Samji, 2009, p. 10) and traditionally weak administrative and inefficient accountability structures 
(Mukhopadhyay, Muralidharan, Niehaus & Sukhtankar, 2013, p. 5), are rarely voiced directly in public 
interviews. But they significantly impact the program implementation and strongly influence the accounting 
and administrative systems and practices introduced by the GoAP. At a localized level in the block and 
village, positional powers that include resource control, record creation and signatory powers act as 
informal levers to create symbolic capital deemed as powerful and accepted as the formal program position 
these individuals hold. In the earlier years of the program, local banking and financial systems were non-
existent and the state government did not have the infrastructure or personnel to monitor or track work or 
fund disbursal. Wages were disbursed through a transfer to a local official, possibly the panchayat President, 
to be delivered in turn to individual workers. At the village level, the distribution of capitals is traditionally 
extremely skewed towards a few individuals in power.  
 
At the village level, pockets of power are held by micro public workers such as the engineer and assistant 
who have to approve technical plans, the “mate” overseeing and signing off on the daily work, and 
contractors and other technical workers holding technical, operational and financial sign-off powers over 
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granting of work, work processes, fund disbursal processes or recording processes. In the absence of control 
and accountability, this type of power feeds symbolic capital that allows these players the informal capacity 
and legitimacy to dictate to others in the field with lower capital and powers. This could include a village 
Secretary colluding with the local village President in a variety of illegal activities including putting ghost 
workers on rolls; fudging muster rolls and expenditure and work registers; non-payment or underpayment 
of wages; and so on. It could also include an engineer or assistant engineer refusing to sign off on work 
plans before being paid some money to do so; a President through his social and political power obstructing 
the creation of a job card for a rural citizen requesting MGNREGS work; or a mate refusing to let an 
individual work and so on.  
 
The romantic story of the panchayat that will be small but an ultra-powerful structure is, I think, a 
brilliant concept but if you probe deeper you find that a lot of the sarpanches [village Presidents] 
who get elected today belong to the powerful elite because they are only ones who can really contest 
(Joint Director, SSAAT). 
 
The rural villagers were at the bottom of this hierarchy, lacking any real power. Some of these local interests 
and capitals can still be observed in the positional and physical deference observed in interviews at the 
village level. This varies from state to state, but I did have some insight into this relationship during 
interviews conducted in the state of Uttar Pradesh, one of the states thought not to be doing as well in 
MGNREGS implementation as Andhra Pradesh. I witnessed poor villagers come in to talk to the program 
officer at the block with great hesitancy, absolute docility and obeisance. They did not even look the officer 
in the eye while communicating. These villagers could not and did not speak out about these activities; in 
essence, they also contributed to them, and thus to their own low levels of capital. 
 
It is important to keep in mind how systemic and accepted these informal and illegal capitals seem to be. 
The legitimacy comes from a lack of contestation and from collusion by players including Secretaries, 
Presidents, program beneficiaries and other stakeholders who over time have come to accept these demands 
as regular and normal in the course of an MGNREGS work cycle. The roles and symbolic capitals possessed 
by such locally powerful players have the capacity to be converted into personal economic gain at the 
expense of the state and of rural citizens. The biggest and most powerful players – the state and central 
government level, with all their legislative and administrative powers under MGNREGA – are unable to 
stem and counter the micro-level leakages and corruption. The lack of state oversight, visibility and control 
creates ample opportunity for individuals to misappropriate public funds without consequences, in part due 
to the state not having implementational access, management systems and other resources adequate to 
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monitor the workings of the program during its earlier history. This is what Ahrens & Chapman (2007) 
refer to as the “situated functionality” of capitals wherein agents such as micro government officers (and 
rural citizens) interpret state introduced accounting and accountability practices towards a specific 
distribution of capitals at the village level. 
 
Some meso-level public officers address this capital imbalance issue in interviews indirectly through the 
voicing of legitimate interests: for example, the need for more financial oversight through discussions on 
strengthening the PRI system at the village, block and district level; for establishing more resources for 
audit; or for computers for uploading of program information. A handful of public officers at the meso level 
discuss this issue more directly in informal conversation after recorded interviews have ended. Where this 
reflects most clearly are interviews with local villagers, national-level monitors (NLMs), and NGOs, CBOs 
and SHGs connected to various levels of the social audit process. The struggles to create the internal and 
external understandings, climate and deep-seated attitudes (habitus) to address the informal networks of 
power, capitals and corruption are addressed most openly by SSAAT in this field. This is because their 
formal mandate, interest and capitals are directly linked to the creation of access, capacity and social 
mobility at the micro level and oppositely aligned with those representing illegal field interests. These 
officers offer various arguments of management control process versus local socio-capital structure and 
habitus. 
 
Contested capital and resistance 
The construction, maintenance and change of a certain social order, shared knowledge and understanding 
is strongly connected to power and capital (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 165). Bourdieu’s conceptual framework 
links the social (the organization) and the mental (habitus) towards the production of differentiations 
between those with power and those without. These classifications are the site of struggles, resistance and 
strategies to increase, decrease or maintain symbolic capital. It is through such processes that a field can 
produce opportunities for change and transformation through the transformation of its representations and 
perceptions. As Everett (2002) explains: 
 
Systems of classification are sites of struggle between individuals and groups. Social taxonomies 
(e.g., “occupation,” “race”) are the result of and at stake in social power relations. It becomes 
important therefore to consider how language and, more broadly, “symbolic goods” contribute to 
the reproduction and transformation of structures of domination (Everett, 2002, p. 58). 
 
113 
 
The danger of presenting an empirical analysis that looks back over an eight-year period is the perception 
that these events unfolded one after the other in a straightforward, well-defined form. In MGNREGS, my 
field data point to two major sources of significant contestation and resistance towards implementation at 
the micro level. The first one, which I will discuss in this section, can be considered internal as is comes 
from within the meso-micro levels of the state organization. The second major source consists of external, 
non-public players such as panchayat Presidents, local landowners and moneylenders, contractors, and so 
on whose interests becomes threatened and contested under the evolving program system. 
 
If this subfield were to continue to reproduce itself socially as it did in the years before, meso-micro level 
public sector agents would continue to draw upon accumulated social capital and positional powers that 
allow them significant formal, informal and illegal economic and social advantages. Such advantages are 
considered to be part and parcel of being in such a position, are common knowledge and have been socially 
accepted for a long time. As outlined in a detailed account by Arvind Kejriwal (Kejriwal, 2011), now the 
chief minister of the state of Delhi, corruption is not only widespread but an accepted social practice, no 
longer questioned. 
 
The public sector layers between the district and the village present a special challenge. At the village level, 
such officers have become habituated to enjoying high symbolic capital over decades in public service and 
years in the MGNREGS program. It allows them to continue to work without significant accountability for 
productivity, efficiency or government resources, knowing that the bureaucracy allows them impunity from 
responsibility and/or liability. Economic benefits some of them receive are an understood part of reality 
connected to getting works projects approved, having a job card issued or gaining access to one’s earned 
wages. In many cases, more than one public officer is involved and others are cognizant of that fact. For 
example, one of the block-level employees of SSAAT, the social audit wing, pointed out that everyone at 
the village and micro public level knew that if a certain positional individual (a technical field officer, for 
example) was not offered a certain sum of money, that person could not be expected to approve of a certain 
works project. In fact, according to the director of SSAAT, an honest public servant or village representative 
cannot hope to survive in such an environment and has to bend to the will of the social. There is minimum 
awareness of rights, while whistleblowers are few and faced with insurmountable odds. To add to this, 
previous cycles of MGNREGA had brought billions of dollars each year into the micro system under the 
existing distribution of roles and capitals. This raised the economic stakes considerably and created more 
opportunities for individuals with any positional or social capital, resulting in the amassing of public funds 
into countless private fortunes. 
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For these reasons, misappropriation was a taboo topic and as expected, it was not possible to expect public 
officers even at the state level to speak about it in publicly recorded conversations such as interviews. When 
Andhra Pradesh gradually introduced changes in systems and practices, there was as expected substantial 
resistance from within the organization, what has been called “systemic defiance” at various levels. While 
the changes introduced by the government could not be formally and publicly denied, they could be and 
were impeded in significant ways at different levels of governance. 
 
The micro-level public officers could see the new technologies and practices reduce the formal process 
control they held locally as signing-off authorities and the makers and keepers of accounts. These new 
practices and systems called for more effort, coordination, learning and knowledge, and did away with 
manual entries connected to implementation data, fund flow, materials management and disbursal of wages. 
The e-governance systems necessitated timely creation of data at the village-block level and increased state 
capacity for oversight, control and tracking of implementation and performance. The increased 
accountability through financial and operational visibility could also potentially change the distribution of 
powers and perhaps opportunities at district, block and village levels. 
 
The performance of practices is connected to people. As Barnes (2001, p. 28) puts it, to engage in a practice 
is to exercise a power. Thus, these changes constituted a significant threat to individual capacities and 
informal powers exercised by public officials at the micro level. This especially applies to the refining of 
powers and action guidelines for field-level agents of the government, as this is where a significant amount 
of misappropriation of public funds was said to take place. Enactment of new systems would displace their 
role in the shared social hierarchy. These challenges have been outlined succinctly by Mukhopadhyay, 
Muralidharan, Niehaus, & Sukhtankar (2013) on their policy report on the introduction of smart cards in 
Andhra Pradesh: 
 
The roll-out has, at times, been impeded by the inadequate involvement of local officials. One 
explanation is that they have resisted because a perceived loss of power and/or rents stemming from 
the transition to bio-metric payments. Alternatively, officials may have few incentives to deliver 
high-quality implementation due to weak oversight and difficulty in holding them responsible in a 
setting with distributed accountability and responsibility for the program’s success at the local level 
across various stakeholders with their own interests (p. 6). 
 
The government of Andhra Pradesh itself, in a 2011 circular, also admits to strong resistance from local 
public governance to new technologies and practices.  
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Though the policy guidelines are given by this office and necessary support is extended by the 
district administration, due to inadequate coordination by the mandal (block) level, GP level 
functionaries, the project implementation and the time lines fixed are suffering (Appendix K, 
GoAP, 2011, Circular No. 2665/RD-SHG/EBT/2011). 
 
Issues of “systemic defiance” are also outlined in the implementation of other MGNREGS processes such 
as social audit: 
 
There has been violent resistance from the vested interests threatened with exposure and state 
support has been uncertain at best.… By contrast, in Andhra Pradesh, instead of mutual 
ambivalence or hostility, the Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan (MKSS) and the government are 
supporting each other to overcome the threshold of systemic defiance to such a radical initiative 
for transparency and accountability (Shah & Ambasta, 2008). 
 
There is also a critical lack of coordination between multiple tiers of governance both vertically and 
horizontally in the MGNREGS program that can be considered common to public-sector working and 
habitus. The central and state governments recognize the agency conflicts and internal struggles for power 
that exist under these conditions between positions such as district program coordinators (DPC) and 
program officers (POs): 
 
The program suffered not only from lack of social mobilization of agricultural labourers and work 
site management issues but also from the usual bureaucratic turf wars and coordination conflicts 
between Chief Executive Officers of Zilla Parishad and Collectors. (CEGC, 2010, p. 3). 
 
Program strategy: Management systems, practices and artifacts 
Fiol and Lyles (1985) enlist a range of outcomes to reflect organizational change and shifts that include 
new insights and knowledge, new structures, new systems, new actions or a combination of these options. 
To provide evidence of change in the organization’s structure and systems, or the social space as Bourdieu 
would refer to it, the following discussion first provides an extensive examination of the new structures, 
systems and practices that gradually get put in place by the GoAP to create a defined program format. I 
then provide an analysis of how these changes connect to second-order changes in the habitus. 
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The GoAP’s conscious intent has been a key factor that has been translated into visions, strategic plans and 
objectives connecting state decisions to the shaping of MGNREGS delivery structure and context. 
Following the program’s progress (Appendix K), we see the Andhra Pradesh government gradually 
developing a much more clarified vision for the MGNREGS program, taking stronger decisions to solidify 
the direction and strength of its progress. It evolved by investing an unprecedented level of commitment 
towards strengthening its MGNREGS state-level delivery system, creating stronger control and 
accountability practices as well as encouraging rural communities towards self-governance and public 
accountability. Towards this intent, we see the state work towards changing the structure of the field and 
certain positional powers over the last eight years. We see the amended, removed, and new practices, 
systems and artifacts supported through steadily introduced policies (Appendix K), rules, and practices in 
what can be considered a relatively short period of time. Towards public accountability processes, the state 
is seen increasingly to provide public political, administrative and resource-based support to enforcement 
of transparency and accountability through its MIS and vigilance wing as well as through non-governmental 
agencies such as SSAAT and APNA working at the micro village level. 
 
These efforts point to the GoAP’s learning and realization that meso state governance and accountability 
goals have to be aligned with sociopolitical context at the local, if a reframing of the social has to be 
accomplished. Such shifts can no longer be considered solely external and constraining, but also individual 
and internal (Rose, 2001, p. 1). In addition, this setting also provides an appreciation of the non-rationalistic 
processes through which strategic practices play out in real life. This perspective can be linked to 
Bourdieu’s practice theory in several ways, including the notions that smaller decisions and activities make 
a larger process (Practice theory); that decisions are a sense-making activity in a complex environment 
(game, capitals and strategy); that strategy does not emerge fully formed and completely logical but is 
situated within the contextual environment (habitus); and finally that there is a spatial-temporal dimension 
to this activity. Of specific interest to this are studies drawing on alternative frameworks to connect MCS 
and strategic change (Simons, 1990; Chapman, 2005; Henri, 2006; Davila 2005). 
 
To outline these connections in more detail: 
 
 First, the government communications provide a measure of the conscious will of the state – the 
due process, effort, time and resources it took for the GoAP to accomplish program goals. 
Management accounting practices and management control systems enlisted by the state in these 
conditions can also be seen to be a gradual process extending over a period of time and requiring 
significant state vision and effort. Given the habitus of the public sector, each aspect of the 
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establishment of new processes, systems and artifacts can be seen to be supported by the issue of 
the detailed and extensive government guidelines, rules, supporting orders and instructions, 
sometimes spread over multiple years (Appendix A). These systems and practices are included in 
the “structures of intentionality” (Ahrens & Chapman, 2007) that shape underlying notions of 
habitus and accountability and are also shaped back in turn. 
 
 Second, keeping the above outlined elements of structure, controls, culture and resources in mind 
I also argue that Andhra Pradesh’s MGNREGS strategy did not start out as a rationalistic, pre-
mapped, controlled and straight-line process (Lindblom, 1958; Quinn, 1980, p. 145). The system 
as it appears today did not appear fully formed. Its initial series of smaller decisions addressed 
specific areas of issues. As these decisions interacted with the external contextual environment, 
common objectives become more established, in time evolving and crystallizing into a larger and 
more stable formal state strategy. Andhra Pradesh took significant steps to address implementation 
issues, and these steps were drawn upon by many other states in MGNREGS implementation. 
These include limiting the role of the elected panchayat President and the organization of rural 
beneficiaries into labour groups (shrama shakti sanghalu) and creating an alliance with local NGOs 
(the Andhra Pradesh NGO Alliance or APNA) towards the training (social audit), process education 
and awareness of beneficiaries.4  
 
 Third, formal MCS theoretically consists of the structures and processes that are uniform across an 
organization. In practice, however, administrative and management control processes can 
implement quite differently, depending on the way they are drawn upon (Anthony & Govindrajan, 
2001, p. 347) by players. Even within an organization, multiple players at various government tiers 
make different use of the same accounting systems and practices. Thus, implementing a control 
system in such a large organization as the GoAP can be seen to be far more complicated in practice 
than in theory (Flamholtz, 1983). Studying such a meso account contributes to our knowledge of 
the subjective experience of these objective structures. Indeed, as such accounting activity unfolds 
in MGNREGS, we observe the specific arrangements of people and resources that come to be 
ordered around it (Ahrens & Chapman, 2006, pp. 99–100) as well as the impact of various 
socioeconomic and political and interests. 
 
Management control: Systems and practices 
                                                          
4 http://www.civilsocietyonline.com/pages/Details.aspx?606 
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This section draws heavily on the GoAP’s released state orders, guidelines, memos, rulings and circulars 
(Appendix K) mined from copious amounts of government communication made available in the public 
domain. In combination with the interviews and secondary data, these provide a picture of the nature of the 
program implementation and slow reconstruction and reveals some important insights connected to the 
program progression. Accounting technologies are increasingly been seen to be a direct and essential part 
of public change and reform processes (Rahaman, Everett, & Neu, 2007; Preston et al., 1992, 1997). The 
use of financial and accounting numbers to construct accounts and govern at a distance (Miller & Rose, 
1990) features prominently in modern democratic governance. In MGNREGS, the MCS connects 
governance and control in a temporal space where micro information, entering the system locally, 
contextually and through multiple points across a vast geographical area is required to achieve both macro 
and meso structural objectives (Ashmos & Huber, 1987). So, technologies and practices that allow the 
bridging of such distances and contexts gain even more importance. 
 
Accounting and MCS have been known to play various strategic roles in non-private settings (Preston, 
Coopers, & Coombs, 1992), (Covaleski & Dirsmith, 1983), (Langfield-Smith, 1997). Graham (2010) 
provides one example of strategic policy decisions taken by governments, considered to be in the best 
interests of stakeholders, implemented through accounting practices. Langfield-Smith (1997) attests to a 
lack of our understanding of accounting in strategy. Lastly, Chapman (2005) argues for an increasingly 
significant role for MCS in “building and sustaining valuable strategic goals” for organizations in 
contemporary uncertain conditions (Chapman, 2005, pp. 1–2; Ahrens & Chapman, 2005). Through this 
lens, one can certainly understand the interest in exploring the role of accounting in formulating and 
implementing strategy (Chenhall, 2005, p. 10), its connection to organizational strategy and the design of 
MCS. 
 
Andhra Pradesh has gone one step ahead in MGNREGS, creating and testing innovative solutions and 
making efforts to have program data more available and accessible towards public accountability. In the 
context of India’s public sector environment, this is by no means a small feat. The centre is encouraging 
various states to share program best practices and learn from each other’s successes but that is the limit of 
their influence and facilitation. The centre cannot command states to do so. 
 
Rural Development Minister Jairam Ramesh has asked states to adopt two initiatives taken by Andhra 
Pradesh “to help secure entitlements for MGNREGA wage seekers.” These comprise a system to 
accurately register demand for work, and pin responsibility and compensate workers for delays in 
paying wages (Economic Times, 2013). 
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Other states that, like Andhra Pradesh, are also doing relatively better in program implementation have this 
in common: making state and context-specific resource and implemental changes to program delivery. 
Andhra Pradesh has invested deeply in e-governance (MCS/MIS) and social audit. The state of Rajasthan, 
in contrast, does not have a strong social audit practice, as its local population and culture are remarkably 
different from Andhra Pradesh in terms of education and local structures of power. Instead it has invested 
in building a sizeable, effective and prolific internal audit department that conducts its own financial and 
physical audits. This department has proved to be very successful in increasing the level of vigilance, 
oversight and control over funds disbursal at the micro village level.  
 
Management information system – With a program format such that part of the planning and a major part 
of implementation, inventory management and fund disbursal happen at the village and block level, it 
became essential to develop the capacity to capture local data online. Thus, one of the major decisions made 
early on in program delivery by the GoAP was to move towards building an MIS that could facilitate e-
governance. Andhra Pradesh envisioned its information technology (IT) infrastructure and MIS as key 
strategic investment points for the program MCS to bridge the geographical and organizational gaps 
between the centre, state, district, blocks and villages. 
 
The period between the years 2006 and 2010 reflects initial interest and investment in processes that would 
improve IT and the MIS. The GoAP’s own state-level MIS system was inadequate to support the program, 
so it began program investment by going beyond public departments to hire a top private-sector IT 
company, Tata Consultancy Services (TCS). TCS was tasked to design and maintain a real-time MIS in 
which the records could be created through an end-to-end IT/MIS system. The MIS was to be a distributed 
architecture, wherein transactional data could be uploaded into the system through multiple channels at the 
block and village level. While the process of building and testing this platform began, Andhra Pradesh also 
initiated efforts towards the training of district and block officials and hiring IT staff to work on the existing 
EGS system (Appendix K). On a small scale, IT infrastructure investment included hiring computer 
operators for the block level and making dedicated computers and internet connectivity available to 
MGNREGS (Appendix K, Circ. No. 477, 2011) at the block level for timely data uploading. At this point 
in time, the administrative budget of MGNREGA was still at an inadequate 4% of program funds allotted 
to each state. In Andhra Pradesh, the political wing of the state approved the provision of additional funds 
towards administrative expenses. 
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The MIS was constructed and slowly rolled out in phases all over the state. It gradually transformed into 
an end-to-end live system connected to multiple line departments at the state level. Its real-time information 
uploading was verifiable, tamper-proof, and could also be tracked in real time. Its automated system had 
the capacity to generate standardized reports, automatic works and wage lists from e-muster rolls and to 
manage inventory. It created significant differences in the quality and timing of financial and program 
reporting from the village level up. The secure system did not allow changes post–project completion, 
which had formerly been a major weakness, and it could flag delays in the payment cycles. It provided a 
significant tool for performance analysis at an organizational level and for assigning of accountability at 
the micro level. This system transformed the state of Andhra Pradesh into a networked organization from 
the village level to the state across huge geographical distances, facilitating substantial increases in 
visibility, accuracy, timeliness, transparency and internal and public accountability (The Hindu, 2011). 
 
The government, in partnership with TCS, has established complex management information 
systems to track and publish (via a public website) information on enrolment of beneficiaries, 
conversion to Smartcard‐enabled payments, and other operational metrics. (Mukhopadhyay, 
Muralidharan, Niehaus, & Sukhtankar, 2013, p. 5). 
 
The state also began to invest in capacity building practices by recruiting and training personnel to dedicated 
program capacity at each micro sublevel. In 2010, it initiated more detailed processes and checklists for 
transparency and accountability processes such as physical verification of muster rolls, payment orders, 
material payments at the village level by the Vigilance Wing, visits by quality control, setting up of “Flying 
Squads” (Appendix K, 04.10.2010) and an IT connected grievance call centre. It set up the Andhra Pradesh 
NGO alliance (APNA) with 253 NGO agencies across 428 blocks with the mandate of ensuring 
transparency and a grievance redressal system where NGOs could play a strong role in protecting citizen 
interests. GoAP also instituted a whistleblowing practice to report identity fraud (Appendix K, Cir. 
No. 1453, 19 October 2010) 
 
Fund and cash management systems and technologies – In 2009, the GoAP took the initial steps towards 
streamlining its fund and cash management systems. Andhra Pradesh decided to be the first state in India 
to test an electronic fund management system for the program that was first developed and used in Andhra 
Pradesh as a part of the GoAP to move towards e-Governance. It introduced the first version of its new a 
central electronic fund management system. The planning and setting of financial objectives for the 
program require information on fund availability and utilization. However as the CFO at the GoAP points 
out, with the legacy system funds would get transferred from centre to district and block coffers only to sit 
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there. Also the multiple levels of transfers starting from the central coffers down to the village level faces 
multiple issues of transfer costs, time lag as well as problem in tracking pilferages and misappropriations. 
It was adopted in a phased manner over 2013 and 2014 for the express purpose of fund management. It 
meant that funds would not sit unutilized at the district and block bank accounts. 
 
Yeah, we have a very fine idea – a system, eFMS, electronic fund management system. We keep 
entire funds received from the government of Andhra Pradesh in a saving account at a bank called 
SBH, and all program-implementing offices at district [and] block level access those funds online 
through CBS system, central banking services. All transfers are electronic through CBS. The block 
level generates a fund request with details of the wage seeker, work done, amount entitled to and 
bank account it has to go [to] and its bank code (CFO, MGNREGS, Andhra Pradesh, interview) 
 
It began the process of negotiating with banks to use their payment gateways and local infrastructure for 
the wages to reach the bank and post office accounts of the rural beneficiaries directly. This meant that 
funds would not have to be transferred manually to each level of office before making their way to the 
village level and the beneficiary. The implementing officers at the block level send one single fund transfer 
request containing information about work done, wages earned and code of the bank account to which the 
funds have to be transferred. Several checks are built into the system. For example, for wages, not more 
than 100 days of wages can be drawn; more than the approved wage rate cannot be withdrawn; wages 
cannot be drawn for works other than those identified and approved by the Act; and finally, funds cannot 
be drawn for anything else besides wages. Separately from the e-FMS system, funds are withdrawn for 
wages, material and administrative costs. This also reconciles the various categories of funds with the block 
level. 
 
We can now look at average wage rates across different types of works, and apply the knowledge 
to improve wage rates in pockets where it's not healthy (Director, NREGS-AP, n.d.).  
 
Over the past few months the system has enabled AP to improve wage rates in Telangana districts from 
around Rs. 30–40 per hour to around Rs. 80 per hour by identifying relevant projects and assigning them 
accordingly. 
 
Linked to this were systems aimed towards such a cash management system which is connected to the 
electronic or biometric payments systems at the micro village level. This required an operational model that 
allowed wages to reach the bank accounts of beneficiaries without allowing intermediaries access. This 
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system leveraged available payment gateways such as the Aadhaar payment bridge (APB) and core banking 
solutions provided by public-sector banks. But since villages in rural India would typically not have access 
to banks, biometric systems were introduced to support the last stretch of the funds reaching beneficiaries. 
In 2012, it initiated the smart card system so that wages could be delivered in cash to beneficiaries. 
Processes were launched to hire customer service providers (CSP) who were to connect the bank to the 
villages. CSPs used point-of-service (POS) for authentication at the villages they visited and wages could 
be withdrawn through these portable machines, thus setting up a micro local banking infrastructure. The 
government communications shows the number of steps required to build the CSP force. Circulars and 
memos reflect not only the hiring process but also subsequent rules that prevent the appointment of family 
members of key players as local CSP to avert nexus formation. 
 
The changes brought about in shortening the process lifecycle can be seen to be reflected in the following 
statements: 
 
A major complaint from all over India is of delays and corruption in payment of fair wages under 
NREGA. By contrast, labour payments in Andhra Pradesh are increasingly being made within a 
week of completion of the previous week’s work. How does this happen? By the last (sixth) day in 
a week’s work, the measurement sheets and muster rolls of the entire week are closed and reach 
the mandal (block) computer centre. The next day, the muster data are fed into the computer. On 
day eight, the pay order is generated by the computer and the cheques are prepared. By day ten, 
these cheques are deposited into the post office accounts of workers. The next day, cash is conveyed 
to the post office, so that on days 12 and 13, workers are able to access their wages from their 
accounts. All payments to labour are made only through these accounts; there are no payments in 
cash (The Hindu, 2008). 
 
Andhra Pradesh linked these systems to other supporting technologies. In 2010, it initiated the first step 
towards an “own your mobile” e-MMS scheme (Appendix K, Cir. No. 555, 21 December 2010). It started 
to invest into availability of mobile phones and mobile technology as an alternative means for data 
uploading at the village and block level (Appendix K, Cir. No. 555, 30 August 2011). By 2010–11, the 
GoAP initiated the implementation of biometric and GPS-based e-MMS (Appendix K, Cir. No. 556, 21 
September 2011). It then linked the e-MMS to the pay order generation (Appendix K, Cir.555, dated 
16.07.2011). In 2015, the GoAP initiated an electronic muster verification system (e-MVS) that verified 
musters daily and made information available online to the GoAP. In 2014, the GoAP ruled that mandatory 
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uploading of muster attendance is required and is to be linked to pay-order generation (Appendix K, Cir. 
No. 555, 09 July 2014). 
 
Extensive computerization of the entire scheme has been done to facilitate availability and 
accessibility of information up to the individual wage seeker level merely by the click of the mouse. 
All stages of NREGA work, from registration of workers to issue of job cards, preparation of work 
estimates, muster rolls and payments to workers have been computerized. The bitter experiences 
of Andhra Pradesh in [its] Food-for-Work Program prompted the government to take 
comprehensive measures in digitalizing all the records ranging from vouchers, bills to pay orders 
which are available for scrutiny (Reddy, NIRD, 2013, pp. 107–109). 
 
Resources and capacity building – Of the three funding categories that come from the centre – finance, 
operational and administrative – the state governments were initially allowed to put only 4% towards 
administration of the program. This had to cover expenses towards training, technical field experts, block-
level data entry operators, accountant and monitoring and evaluation officers, social audit, vehicles, 
cellphones and grievance centres, to name just a few items. As the CFO of Andhra Pradesh mentions, 4% 
was not nearly enough to support efficient implementation.  Effective training, control, oversight and 
accountability measures were to be put in place. The ruling party of Andhra Pradesh supported this and 
made some key decisions. First, it sanctioned additional funds from state coffers towards the administrative 
expenses of MGNREGS. No other social services program in Andhra Pradesh or any other state had this 
support. Second, in the meantime, the political and administrative wings lobbied the central government to 
increase the allowable administrative expenses limit from 4% to 6%. Eventually, the central government 
increased the administrative expense limit to 6% towards “[s]trengthening professional support for 
transparency and accountability in the NREG Act” (MoRD, 2007). 
 
The state started off in 2007 by focusing on capital expenditure and investments into rural connectivity and 
the building of all-weather roads to rural areas (Appendix A). It gradually invested in increasing number of 
vehicles available for inspections (Appendix A, Cir. No. 1740, 2 February 2008). In the state of Uttar 
Pradesh, lack of vehicles had been cited as a key issue impacting a block development officer’s (BDO) 
micro-level vigilance and control. Other areas of capital expenditures included block-level office buildings 
(Appendix K, Cir. No. 39, 20 October 2011), rural connectivity (Appendix K, GO. No. 271, 08 September 
2009), computers and cellphones. At each block mandal, a cluster of 25 or so villages, there was a mandal 
computer centre (MCC) manned by two computer operators. At the district level, there is a departmental 
computer centre (DCC) for each cluster of blocks. With the extra allocation of funding towards 
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administrative expenses, the administrative wing made investments into the hiring of additional dedicated 
program, service and technical staff to reduce data uploading bottlenecks. This increase was also passed 
onto SSAAT towards expanding its social audit practice. 
 
MGNREGS’s capacity building can be seen through two specific sides, namely organizational and 
individual: 
 
… for organizations, it relates to the whole gamut of governance, administration (including human 
resources, financial management, and legal matters), business processes, program development, 
evaluation, and policy changes for innovation. For individuals, capacity building refers to 
excellence in individual performance, leadership development, socializing managerial values, 
technical skills, training opportunities, organizing abilities, and other areas of personal and 
professional development that includes sensitivity to values of equity, participation and inclusion. 
Thus, individual empowerment eventually needs to result in the “communitization of capacities,” 
especially marginalized and socially excluded groups in the society (MoRD, n.d.). 
 
Andhra Pradesh is one of the few states that established a concurrent personnel force dedicated to this 
program. As can be seen in Appendix K that provides a relative short list of GoAP circulars, orders, 
guidelines and rules, this is tremendous accomplishment that required intensive effort, coordination and 
resources and went a long way towards the effectiveness of the program implementation. Though the centre 
has formal training guidelines, rules and checklists for all states, the GoAP encouraged the implementation 
of large-scale training and sensitizing of employees at multiple tiers, including: 
 block development officers and village Secretaries; 
 engineers at the block and district level; 
 IT personnel at the block and district level; 
 accounts personnel at the block and district level; 
 training of trainers (TOT); 
 mates and field assistants at the block and village levels; and 
 grievance redressal coordinators at the district level. 
 
The GoAP released its own state guidelines focusing on capacity building activity, and created an 
administrative section devoted to capacity building not only within the organization but also for rural 
citizens. It invested in advertising, wall painting, village criers, village plays, and CBOs as well as SSAAT 
to increase levels of access, knowledge and awareness. SSAAT and the APNA alliance of NGOs were also 
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a part of training of public officers at the local level. SSAAT’s larger focus was on the recruiting and 
training of local youth who were a part of the social audit process and are sent to villages other than their 
own to conduct a due diligence of the process and produce a final report. SSAAT also trains its micro-level 
staff that conducts these training and connected processes. These staff also send their own reports to the 
agency head office. 
 
Andhra Pradesh is also one of the only states to introduce a significant structural change in program roles, 
limiting the role of the elected panchayat President in MGNREGS. This has traditionally been associated 
with strong economic, political and social capital and issues of agency and illegal nexus at the micro level. 
Instead it innovated to distribute such traditional social power through the creation of labour groups called 
“shrama shakti sanghalu” or SSS that worked and shared as a team. It invested in recruiting experienced 
professional to set up SSAAT, initially on a very small scale and then with more funds and extensive 
political freedom to work and innovate in the field. For the state MCS, these changes collate into a set of 
program systems and practices that create favourable conditions towards achieving its program objectives. 
 
Reporting and transparency 
Enforcement is a key weapon of change at the meso and micro levels. The mere presence of codified formal 
systems does not translate into achieving organizational objectives without effective implementation of 
these systems and practices into the internal workings. Aucoin & Heintzman (2000, p. 244) outline three 
purposes of public sector accountability – control of abuse and misuse of public authority, the effective use 
of public resources in line with public sector values, and finally encouragement and promotion of 
continuous learning in public governance and management. The GoAP’s solution for achieving this is a 
combination of rules, oversight, structure, and leadership. An important element of management control 
practice is that managers of an organization influence its other members towards reaching organizational 
goals and objectives through planning, strategizing, implementing, communicating, evaluating and 
influencing (Anthony & Vijay, 2007, p. 7). 
 
Though the MIS is gradually providing increased capacity to record, collate, compare, analyze and track, 
the role of oversight and vigilance cannot be overemphasized, given the agency problems at block and 
village levels. It may be difficult to track all elements of reporting, control and transparency efforts of this 
vast program in this subsection but at the state level, it includes transparency and access to timely and 
accurate information towards efficient planning, budgeting, inventory management, implementation, 
performance evaluation and control. For the district, block and village public system it translates into higher 
levels of financial, operational and positional accountability. At the village level, it includes an extensive 
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system of checks and balances that create much needed oversight, public accountability and knowledge 
creation. 
 
As government communication reflects (Appendix K, Cir. No. 3479, 24 June 2013), a constant stream of 
government-issued instructions includes measures such as the initiation of disciplinary action against those 
mates involved in embezzlement of funds and deviation of the program provisions, guidelines for the 
performance of the senior mate, a publicly contracted overseer at the village works level (Appendix K, Cir. 
No.  4779, 21 April 2014) and the duty to produce and submit relevant records to the quality control team 
during verification (Appendix K, Cir. No. 188, 5 February 2014). The initial 2008 guidelines were 
supplemented by a second, more detailed set of social audit rules in 2009. 
 
The village secretary and assistant block officer, block officers, technical assistant, engineers and other 
such public representatives submit program progress documents and reports on which they personally have 
to sign off and for which they are responsible. At the block level, there are monthly submissions of financial 
progress reports (Appendices C, D, E) that keep track of funds transferred to each block, expenditure on 
works, materials, publicity and awareness, and social audit, culminating in funds available for that month 
for that block. This is then collated across all 13,097 villages, 661 blocks and 13 districts (Appendices C, 
D, E, F). Each block keeps an account of the villages under it, each district oversees the block offices under 
it and the GoAP State controls these tiers through information that comes from each level, the reports 
generated by the MIS and the information produced by various audit and organizations and public oversight 
practices. There are performance evaluation reports based on block and districts and the state conducts 
regular meetings with the district program coordinators (DPCs). 
 
There is also a monthly reconciliation of funds. The MIS has modules for material management and 
program budget, which can be used to obtain current information. Towards transparency and accountability, 
there are also a series of processes at the ground level for physical verification of muster rolls, measurements 
of works done by engineers and assistant engineers, wage pay orders, use of state resources such as vehicles, 
grievances and action taken records through district checks, state-level monitors (SLM), audit teams, flying 
squad audit teams, and social audit teams (Appendix K, Proc. 452, 2 October 2010). 
 
Bureaucrats and government officials involved with the project say the software solution has 
helped them nail the issues of corruption and lack of transparency very effectively. Moreover, an 
intelligent software platform also helps the officials work towards improving the average wage 
rates. Since Andhra Pradesh is able to track the progress of work through an automated system, 
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the workers are paid based on amount of work they complete, independent of the number of hours 
they put in (Director, NREGS-AP, Economic Times, 2009). 
 
Aside from regular audit practices, the state has also put together teams of experts called flying squads. 
These teams conduct surprise audit as well as regular financial and audit teams along with state-level 
monitors who visit and physically verify implementation details. The block and district level hold open 
complaint days, to which villagers come from far and wide to report corrupt practices and complaints, 
bypassing traditional dominating structures at the village level. The setting up of an anonymous online 
telephone line for complaints and the work of the vigilance wing have contributed to the relative success of 
the GoAP in the enforcement of program guidelines and rules in Andhra Pradesh. A combination of these 
practices creates transparency and accountability in the process. There is a clearer assigning of 
responsibility and those found to misuse their positional power are found and held to account. 
 
Social audit – The state of Andhra Pradesh has garnered considerable acclaim and national prominence for 
the success of its social audit practice: 
 
The credit for this must, of course, go to the state government that has set up a separate unit exclusively 
for social audit, which enjoys great freedom of action. The work of this remarkable unit of dedicated 
people has culminated in the truly historic rules recently passed by the Andhra Pradesh cabinet that will 
go a long way in institutionalizing social audit. These rules draw upon experience in the state over the 
last two years (The Hindu, 2008). 
 
The aim has been to create a citizen-based, bottom-up works and accountability system that in time transfers 
power to the poor, uneducated and powerless. Interviews with the Joint Director and other members of the 
group at a micro level describe not only a slow journey to present conditions but also a number of problems 
in terms of powerful local agents as well as issues of resources and training and of resistance and safety. 
The bulk of the work has been towards building structure and activities that constitute the audit, increasing 
its rural reach, and gathering the trust of citizens through performance and results. In terms of developing 
transparency and public accountability, the system involves rural youth in order to create long-term changes 
– sustainable changes – to the local distribution of power. The audit begins with the filing of applicants for 
MGNREGS records by the district resources personnel (DRP) at least a fortnight before social audit begins. 
The DRP recruit the village social auditors (VSAs), educated local youth from villages. These individuals 
are trained to verify all important information including financial and operational data, expenditure and 
materials registers, muster rolls and wages disbursed.  
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The audit process requires a physical verification of work sites and works accomplished and a door-to-door 
check to verify validity of job cards, registers, wages and all other relevant documents, as well as noting 
issues and complaints. The social audit process culminates in a massive public meeting.  The social audit 
village-level gram sabha is attended by rural citizens, elected representatives, block and district 
representatives, senior government officials, and the media. The social audit report compiled by the VSAs 
is read out. Various concerns are outlined with the testimony of affected beneficiaries and officials have to 
respond to such complaints and questions. The meeting also takes disciplinary actions or sets out what 
needs to be done. The resultant Action Taken report has to be submitted to the program officer and the gram 
sabha within one month and issues are asked and answered (The Hindu, 2008).  
 
Once these social audits are concluded, these individuals take the resultant experience, knowledge and 
awareness back to their own village. They act as advocates of public oversight, helping to override 
traditional social hierarchical relationships of domination at the village level. They are looked up to by 
peers, elders and families, and they encourage their fellow villagers to speak up in gram sabhas, ask 
questions and register complaints about irregularities in both the wages they receive and the work done 
around the village. Other states have attempted to transplant some part of this social audit model but did so 
only piecemeal. Some did not get political support and many others did not see fit to invest as much time, 
effort and funds in involving rural citizens in their audit; therein lies a major error, say experts (Director, 
SSAAT, interview). 
 
Mechanisms of strategic control and accountability 
i. Control and accountability through organizational routines 
The literature on organizations has attached significance to the process of coordinating people and 
organizational activities. Organizational routines form an important part of this process (Cyert & March, 
1963). Feldman & Rafaeli (2002) argue that organizational routines provide the means to make connections 
and construct shared understandings that speak to which operational actions are considered acceptable in 
certain instances. When such understandings are maintained and transmitted so that they may endure, they 
create the organizational ability to coordinate and adapt; Bourdieu’s writings on habitus and its perpetuation 
is not very far from these arguments, although he focuses on the social and the individual. 
 
The combination of stringent requirements and stronger oversight, the sets of activities connected to each 
step of the program implementation were slowly instituted into the organizational and social routines. A 
real-time MIS and performance management connected to such routines also helped to further establish 
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newer understandings connected to operational goals and a decrease in positional and social power earlier 
held by public officials and elected representatives. Hearings, departmental investigations and other 
methods of recourse helped to establish knowledge, strength and legitimacy of newer processes routines 
connected to MGNREGS. 
 
ii. Control and accountability through scrutiny of inputs: Program artifacts 
The construction of accounting and administrative artifacts brought change in the set of activities that made 
up processes. The newer cycles of work estimation and construction of labour budget, works 
implementation, fund disbursal, reporting and control mechanisms and social audit have slowly become a 
regular feature. These newer practices and artifacts have populated the MGNREGS program space in 
Andhra Pradesh and become a part of the patterns of changes initiated by the GoAP and newer perceptions 
absorbed by the actors. 
 
As a part of the changes initiated, many accounting and program artifacts were amended. At the block level, 
some forms were made redundant, while more paperwork was added elsewhere to create tools for better 
recording, reporting and visibility. Social audit reports, job cards, village-level registers and wall paintings 
of project financials all added to visibility and control on the organizational side and acted as a means to 
better understanding, learning, discussions and citizen-based accountability at the village level. These 
artifacts play a key role in systematizing the organizational hierarchy and synthesizing new notions of 
accountability in MGNREGS. They have slowly become integrated and embedded into standard procedures 
and the program’s objective structures (Langfield-Smith, 1997, p. 208). 
 
The system, which is web enabled, allows users … to sift through entire data including number of 
job cards issued across 22 districts and almost 21,857 village mandals, and identify the loopholes 
for addressing inefficiencies – just like a sophisticated enterprise resource planning (ERP) 
software used by many corporates (Director, NREGS-AP, Economic Times, 2009). 
 
Interviews with block officers present an increased awareness of the value of process-based training and 
knowledge. With these officers, the public articulation of such interests has become deeply inculcated at all 
level of employees such that words and phrases found to be used in interviews by public employees by 
state, district, block and village officials were many times almost identical. At the micro level specifically, 
employees seem to have aligned their perception, concerns and interest to the successful production of 
demanded artifacts and practices without a strong voicing of their effectiveness. The level of technical and 
financial information displayed by each player in the field is quite high. The employees reflect a certain 
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sense of institutionalization and syncing of habitus as far as the public face of the program vision, objectives 
and rules are concerned. In fact, it came as a surprise to hear village-level government employees talking 
the same language as the GoAP’s NREGS CFO. There is little confusion in the diffusion of the state vision 
and all players seem more than willing to publicly play the MCS and increased transparency. 
 
iii. Control and accountability through scrutiny of outputs: Managerial culture, responsibility 
and performance management 
Different types of accountabilities are known to produce different types of self and others (Roberts, 1991). 
To follow the MGNREGS change process, the meso governance in a decentralized governance system has 
the capacity to make allocation and control decision most suited to its specific conditions. In turn, decisions 
about resource allocation, governance, recording and accountability at the village level rest on the shoulders 
of a democratically elected council who are considered most efficient and effective in translating local 
needs and demands (Denters, 2011, p. 317). 
 
In MGNREGA an increasingly codified and formal nature of the management controls and accountability 
practices is visible in the increased precision of systems, processes and artifacts. The dominant state 
government relies on its employees to communicate and diffuse not only its vision but also the status of its 
program and its MCS, representing a unified public interest in the success of the program. The knowing 
and articulation of such interest is valued by the major player, the state government, and is evident in most 
conversations with employees at the micro level. 
 
A single version of truth is what makes the difference, and that’s where we have benefited 
immensely from this software solution (Director, NREGS-AP, Economic Times, 2009) 
 
From the state side, the MIS and the overall administrative elements of MCS were slowly rebuilt towards 
assessing the objectives of the social service program. Andhra Pradesh’s newer public rhetoric and internal 
expectations reflects its strong position on both inefficiency and resistance. As the state perspective and 
thinking on the MGNREGS program has changed, it has enlisted various management control mechanisms 
to enforce and diffuse its vision of accountability down the hierarchical line. As described above, the GoAP 
has taken significant steps towards transparency and identifying of local responsibility and introducing an 
improved MCS that employs a robust MIS with modules devoted to fund and cash management, materials 
management, labour budget, social audit and performance evaluation. The government circulars, 
memorandums and orders introducing these new elements also give us strong indication of the change in 
the distribution of capitals contributed to by the GoAP (Appendix K). 
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In essence it built a system in which performance became more visible at the micro level. This visibility 
created the potential of performance measurement and management could now be conducted at the state 
level. The state settled clear timelines for the block and program officers on a weekly basis, creating new 
modes of answerability, associating transparency and responsibility with accountability (Lindkvist & 
Llewellyn, 2003). More than the hierarchical power specific to public governance, the new systems and 
practices demand positional and individual accountability that created performance measurement 
indicators. 
 
The Andhra Pradesh government has made clear that officials responsible for delays will be 
penalized. The guilty official has to bear the cost of compensating the affected workers. The online 
software … makes it possible to pinpoint the exact stage where the delay takes place and the official 
responsible for it.… To discourage holdups, the compensation due to the worker is deducted from 
the official’s salary. The state has put out clear timelines for each function and official (Goswami, 
2013). 
 
As external structures connected to practices change, so did the internal perceptions and expression of 
accountability (Bourdieu, 1989, p. 19). On a deeper organizational level, we also see a substantial change 
in the habitus associated with accountability and accounting at meso and micro levels. In his discussion on 
the creation of structures, practices and habitus, Bourdieu outlines that the “inculcation” and 
institutionalization of structures (and habitus) include elements of express and explicit communication 
(including written and oral communication, rites, and practices) that take a set of daily activities and logics 
and convert them into principles and underlying understandings over time (Bourdieu, 1977, pp. 19–20). 
This agrees with “collective rhythm” (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 163), strongly reinforced by and within the group 
not only in terms of “symbolic order,” temporal form, or spatial structures for external representation, but 
also because this is how the group and individuals within it see themselves. 
 
At the organizational level, these accounting and accountability system qualities allow changes in process 
and understandings to accumulate, building what can also be called “organizational memory” (CFO, 
NREGS-AP, interview). This is the data and knowledge accumulated from experiential working and 
conscious active learning, passed on to newer employees through activities such as socialization, training 
and construction of accounting and administrative artifacts. As Bourdieu notes, strategy is not one-way or 
deterministic and he cautions against a purely intentional view of the field (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, 
pp. 9, 25) holding the social to be “a mere aggregate of individual strategies and acts of classifications” 
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(p. 9). Organization memory is in line with the conscious and unconscious learning processes also 
associated with building or shifting of a habitus. 
 
A field’s struggles and adjustments in habitus over time are connected to changes in an established order 
(Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 13) and attached “categories of perception” (pp. 12–14). In line with this, 
as the implementation cycles continued, public employees between meso and micro levels came to realize 
that the state government was serious about the new framework, that older practices and ways of doing 
were no longer acceptable, and that transgression bore the risk of being penalized. A slow transformation 
of traditional socio-organizational hierarchical relationships, at least in the context of MGNREGS, can be 
observed. 
 
A key enabling factor has been the commitment of top‐ranking government officials to develop, 
monitor, and improve the Smartcard program on an ongoing basis. Indeed, the degree of high‐level 
support in AP has proven essential in generating strong program outcomes. In addition, GoAP has 
shown unparalleled commitment to creating a transparent and accountable roll‐out process 
(Mukhopadhyay, Muralidharan, Niehaus, & Sukhtankar, 2013, p. 5). 
 
As representatives of one of the states performing well in this program, Andhra Pradesh’s officers at most 
levels exhibit great personal pride in how the program has morphed and developed over the past decade, as 
well as in their role in these accomplishments. Changes in structure, processes and practices in Andhra 
Pradesh are also brought up frequently in interviews by the CFO and other state-level officers. The centre’s 
and the state’s interests in the program are also frequently and repeatedly presented in interviews through 
the use of phrases such as “social security,” “participation” and “transparency” in interviews as well as in 
reports. These interests are supported by strategic focus terms, new structures, systems and practices, voiced 
through elements such as “reporting,” “accuracy” and “timeliness” of program information and “capacity.” 
The public sector employees who form the multiple layers between meso and micro levels also voice the 
same state interests, verbatim, at every level between the state and the village. Personal views or specific 
personal interests did not find any expression in the interviews. One might infer that such interests represent 
employees’ public position and what is valued by the most powerful player, the state administration. One 
might also infer that voicing personal interest in this program may not be seen as acceptable or legitimate 
given their official positions. 
 
The presence of the primary state discourse at each governance level interviews not only points to a strong 
diffusion of the state vision and strategy down the line to the micro level, but is also a measure of the state’s 
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current capital built up at the meso and micro levels. In many respects this can be considered progress in a 
sociopolitical setting where public officers at the meso and micro level typically play lip service to the state 
vision, objectives and policy, knowing that in practice there are no provisions to hold them accountable. 
Additionally, public officers occupy public office for a term and may then be transferred. This speaks not 
only to maintaining a constant public face in terms of program vision and communication in progress but 
also to the CFO of NREGS’s insistent focus on organizational memory, wherein practices, processes and, 
through them, visions, objectives and communication are maintained even though officers might be 
transferred out at completion of term. 
 
iv. Control and vigilance: Citizen-driven accountability 
A key element of MGNREGS is the involvement of rural citizens in the local governance and accountability 
process. The practice of social audit is the pivotal focal point for citizen-based accountability. Engaging an 
information and communication technologies (ICT) strategy, GoAP invested in supporting micro program 
implementation and accountability through practices such as wall-writing and advertising, education and 
learning, building of local work groups and a strong public grievance redressal system. Formal recording 
and tracking of complaints and their investigations took place at the district and state levels, and 
mechanisms such as online reporting of weekly work requests and weekly complaint days occurred at the 
district level, to override entrenched local power structures at the village and block levels. These would 
otherwise have ensured that a rural citizen with no capital and power could not raise his voice to ask for an 
account from other stakeholders. The public employees assessed as guilty were dealt with in a firm and 
consistent manner and they learned that their actions had organizational and public visibility and oversight. 
 
NGOs, CBOs and other community-based organizations were important actors in this change process as 
they worked towards familiarizing villagers with processes such as demand of work, wages earned and 
managing of one’s bank account. Limits to the role of the village panchayat President as well as increased 
individual and group awareness and learning associated with both financial and process aspects contributed 
to the changes in contextual conditions at the village level. Information sharing, observing the results of 
certain processes, and added newer realizations to the habitus of rural citizens can be observed. Local 
governance officials are now facing accountability from citizens as well. And this is significant not only 
because it represents a significant shift in village capitals but also because of the proximity of these citizens 
to the work done by micro players. This point supports Bourdieu’s thought that the social is more than an 
aggregate of individual or group strategies and that traditions do not emerge fully formed but are shared 
and reproduced understandings. More on this level of analysis is included in the next chapter. 
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Routines and density of artifacts 
The doing of practices can itself be self-organizing (Schatzki, Knorr-Cetina, & Von Savigny, 2001), with 
accountability becoming a continuous process. On the level of individual employees, the production of such 
artifacts affects the nature of the organizational social space and cognitive and mental structures of 
individual players. Artifacts such as financial reports, performance measurement reports and bank 
reconciliation statements impact not only other artifacts but also the capitals of those who construct them 
and the ordering of the field (Neu, 2006). The nature of power held by a village Secretary, for example in 
her role of demand estimation, changes dramatically with stricter oversight towards performance 
measurement under threat of penalties. This process, as a part of a larger practice of accountability, 
produced newer patterns of perceptions connected to interactions and localized notions of accountability 
(Goddard, 2004). It plays an important part in the perpetuating of patterns that gradually become a part not 
only of individual but also of organizational habitus. 
 
On an organizational level, interconnected activities and the artifacts specific to a practice become 
integrated into the system of the organizational framework and routine (Cyert & March, 1963). They 
represent and store shared experiences, solidifying positional powers of construction, account, signing and 
record maintenance. To give an example, at the block office, the Program Officer is responsible for 
consolidation of village budgets and works with the computer operator, the village secretary and the 
Intermediate Panchayat to deliver the consolidated labour budget to the district level by a certain date. Each 
of these players in turn have their own performance measurements tied to the timely production of such 
information, which is available online to the state government at any time. This construction instills and 
diffuses new elements of the organizational habitus in terms of what is considered valued, acceptable and 
normal. 
 
Engagement in social contexts involves a dual process of meaning making. On the one hand, we 
engage directly in activities, conversations, reflections, and other forms of personal participation in 
social life. On the other hand, we produce physical and conceptual artefacts – words, tools, 
concepts, methods, stories, documents, links to resources, and other forms of reification – that 
reflect our shared experience and around which we organise our participation (Wenger, 2010, 
p. 180). 
 
The practices, some of which are outlined below, can be broken down into a series of smaller activities 
interspersed by the generation and consumption of extensive accounting, financial and administrative 
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artifacts. The reliance on formalized codification and calculations is an entrenched element of the existing 
dominant public sector habitus wherein every policy, plan, guideline, action and decision is put on paper or 
e-mail and authorized through signatures. The value of documentary codification is physically evident in 
the sheer quantity of documents and reports seen in public offices and referenced in interviews. At the state 
and district offices, documents can be seen piled not only on the work desks of most officers but also in 
cupboards, on bookshelves and even on the floors. Conversations with public officers points to the 
understanding that any “meaningful” public activity must be supported by physical proof in the form of 
documents, letters and e-mails. However, the importance of the power associated with signing off on 
program documents is strongly embedded in the field. Its specific distribution presents a picture of the 
program’s reporting structure, reporting requirements and valued capitals. 
 
One would expect such physical documents and artifacts to be representative of the interests of state and 
local offices. However, in traditional MGNREGS public settings, where formal state interest and informal 
local interests do not match, accounting artifacts such as financial reporting, budgeting and works records 
largely present nominal data and accountability and represent dominant local interests. Originating from a 
block or district office, these documents meander their way to the state office without fear of reprisal. Value 
seems to be associated only with the meeting of the codification standards and not the quality or timeliness 
of information. If one were to take part in a conversation with a micro-level officer, one would see the 
systematic denial that current systems were inefficient or that information submitted may not have been 
timely, complete, or useful to the state government and MGNREGS. In their opinion, they were delivering 
everything for which they were asked as public officers. 
 
The state strategy is not specifically towards increased codification, but rather towards stricter financial and 
operational calculations and oversights that uncover and make visible the underlying web of powers and 
connections. During the first few years, the GoAP seemed to attempt to improve reporting and oversight 
by increasing document intensiveness. However, at some point in this process the state changed its direction 
and began to invest more strongly in its IT and MIS for the block and district level. It created an increased 
need for calculation and visibility in the format, quality and quantity of documentary information and data 
at the village, block and district levels. At the village office level, where accounting and administrative 
artifacts are an essential part of the MGNREGS process, there has been no significant change in the registers 
maintained (job card register, muster roll register, work granted register, materials and cash), but quality of 
control and oversight over them has increased to ensure accuracy of data entered. As before, these stayed 
at the village level with copies at the block office. The larger measure of documentary shift can be seen in 
village-to-block and block-to-district reporting. Discussion with government officers at the block and 
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district levels brings up two interesting themes, pointing to the idea that density of accounting artifacts 
produced cannot be linked directly to the quality of accountability. 
 
First, at the block level, it was expressed that the new MIS/IT system had both simplified input in terms of 
transfer of reporting information and also significantly reduced output time and effort spent in assimilation 
of paper-based information for manual reporting, record keeping and approval processes at the district level. 
In many instances the state offices could generate real-time reports from the system once micro information 
had been uploaded at the block level, relieving the block and district levels of this activity. At this point the 
impact of this transformation on decrease of corruption and personal interest of public players at the block 
or village level was not brought up at all. 
 
Second, interestingly, at the village operational level, interviews with development officers and village 
Secretaries produced accounts of increased workload and paperwork as increasingly detailed reporting was 
added to their roster of responsibilities with the increased functionality of e-governance measures. In 
comparison, other states that did not have a MGNREGS-dedicated workforce seemed to have fared far 
worse. Interviews with the Secretaries in the state of Rajasthan produced multiple accounts of duplicate 
information being produced for reporting requirements of other such social services programs for which 
they were also responsible. One such officer actually pointed to a package she held in her hands at that 
moment and said that this was in response to a Right to Information (RTI) request and that it took a 
substantial amount of time to collate such information, as such requests had lately been arising in numbers. 
The rise in documentation detail seems to be perceived as connected to reduced efficiency by Secretaries, 
but the increased use of MIS and other mechanisms of transparency and accountability did not enter this 
conversation. Given that accountability has improved at both the micro village as well as the block and 
district levels in Andhra Pradesh, this is an interesting connection between the density of accounting 
artifacts and micro level accountability. 
 
The habitus as a process 
I draw on the accumulation of habitus as a process (Pickle, 2005) to understand the shift as a socializing 
and learning process that emerges within concrete systems – family, village, and government – and is also 
generated by this system. Accountability can be seen here as an understanding, a part of the habitus, and it 
intersects with concrete practices to result in a particular construction and enactment of accountability. To 
get a deeper understanding of this perception, the reader has to look at practice theory as a dichotomy of 
structures and human agency where notions of capital and habitus can provide us with a way to analyze the 
manner in which accounting practices (artifacts and interaction) frame, construct and enact accountability. 
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As the field goes through resistance and struggles for more economic and symbolic capitals, Bourdieu’s 
relationality is not only reflected in the original distribution but also impacted by strategic actions taken by 
players as they renegotiate their position and power in the program. At the field level, the manner in which 
players, like state governments, consume and mobilize or leverage various forms of capitals (and habitus) 
to function in the program defines the practice-based use of accounting and accountability at the subfield 
level (Baxter & Chua, 2008, p. 215). In the short term, the practices visualized and framed by the centre 
strongly affect the capitals and interactions between participants, organizing social and accountability 
relationships in a specific manner (Bourdieu, 1990b; Chapman & Ahrens, 2004). 
 
Organizations unlike individuals develop and maintain learning systems that not only influence 
their immediate members but then are transmitted to others by way of organizational histories and 
norms (Fiol & Lyles, 1985, p. 804). 
 
If habitus is accumulated history, witnessed as a process, then changes in the particular equilibrium in 
MGNREGS can be seen to emerge slowly and accumulate incrementally over each cycle of program 
implementation. The adaptation to practice and acquisition of learning, understandings and knowledge 
cannot be attributed solely either to deliberate steps of strategy or to automotive repetition of activities. 
Rather, this adaptation comes through the act of putting objective structures and the subjective experience 
of objective structures through everyday activities. At an individual level this is an “inherited experiential 
concept” of the field (Hillier & Rooksby, 2005, p. 6) and is reproduced through employee interactions, 
behaviour and actions as well as employees’ understanding of their role and position in the new order. For 
decades, the public sector officers connected with such social programs at the meso-micro level have 
functioned through a known and accepted public-sector logic and habitus. This habitus is ultimately derived 
from an accumulation of how things have been done in past decades, as transmitted and understood through 
experience, acceptable behaviours and actions passed on from employees, structures and understandings 
associated with the workings of an organization. Within it, strategic actions available to each agent is 
defined by the triad of “socially constructed cognitive and motivating structures” (a part of the internalized 
habitus), the objective organizational structures and the socially defined interests of agents (Bourdieu, 1977, 
pp. 76–77). They contributed to the micro distribution of capitals, powers and shared meanings at the 
village, block and district level. 
 
Four elements of Andhra Pradesh’s strategy have proven exceptionally successful and have garnered public 
approval. First, the GoAP’s MGNREGS MIS software platform was found to fulfill the requirements of 
data collection, analysis and report generation (CAG, 2013, p. xi). The Comptroller and Auditor General 
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(CAG) actually recommends its use by other states. Second, its centralized e-FMS links to a transaction-
based MIS. At the state level it allows better fund management and reduces instanced of unutilized fund 
sitting in public bank accounts. At the village level, it is connected to the opening of millions of post office 
bank accounts into which wages are directly deposited. This is a significant step in terms of cutting out 
layers of middlemen through which funds passed and were misappropriated. Third, social audit guidelines 
and innovative practice established by SSAAT for the state have been praised for the effectiveness of their 
audit framework. Finally, the formation of the SSS, responsible for execution of public works at the village 
level, has been critical; instead of the gram panchayat, panchayat President or program, mates create 
changes in the established nexus and improve the functioning of the program at the micro level (CAG, 
2013, p. xi). 
 
We see that the workings and understandings associated with the newer elements of the GoAP’s MCS have 
not only shaped the distribution of capital and habitus, but have also changed the symbolic capital at the 
micro level. Positional capitals with access to operational and financial powers have been harnessed by the 
MIS system, decreasing their potency and value in the subfield. Locally powerful public players, as well as 
other players in the field, have gradually seen a change in of their role and position in the new order. This 
leads to the acquiring of a new set of understandings, sensibilities and mental structures that are now 
essential to be a functioning part of a newer system associated with reporting, transparency and control. So 
the relationship with organization and context of the MGNREGS MCS in Andhra Pradesh is not singular 
but bidirectional. In essence, the MCS has influenced the shaping of its own context. 
 
Conclusion: Multi-level practices  
Drawing on the multi-level perspective, this chapter has followed MGNREGS from its design stage at the 
centre to its populating stage at state government offices. This perspective has allowed me to provide an 
interlinking story that can better reflect an analysis of the factors, connections and dynamics that shape the 
program from one level and another. Each level adds to the overall analysis, providing a larger and more 
nuanced canvas of MGNREGS processes and their unfolding over a period of eight years, each layer of 
stakeholders moulding and shaping the program and passing it to the next level. We also get a more 
expanded sense of strategies and decisions playing out, shaping the program’s wider accounting and 
accountability practices. 
 
At the second layer of the program, this chapter focused on the program progression and dynamics at the 
state level. I investigated the state government and ways and manner in which accounting became enlisted 
in a strategic role at the meso level to give shape and form to a state-level vision of control, visibility and 
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accountability. This analysis provides insights into the role of accounting in mechanisms of control, 
exercise of power, and accountability in public sector settings. In MGNREGS, what has been referred to as 
“social services values” had become overridden by a public sector habitus accepting bribery, misuse of 
public authority and public resources (Aucoin & Heintzman, 2000). In contrast to the macro level, the 
struggles at the meso level are not a reflection of multiple and distinct program interests but a clash of 
formal, informal and illegal interests steeped in the associated habitus. Through its accounting practices, 
processes and artifacts, the GoAP has attempted to address systemic challenges. So the change processes 
we see at work in this chapter are efforts of the Andhra Pradesh government towards public reform with its 
MGNREGA delivery system. Specific elements of the MCS and the MCS as a whole can be seen to have 
the potential to affect strategic change through choices in control and oversight (Langfield-Smith, 1997). 
Indeed, away from literature that suggests MCS inhibits innovation and change, these systems can and have 
been constructed to be flexible and evolving with the potential to affect strategic change through choices in 
control and oversight (Langfield-Smith, 1997).  
 
Practice is generated through the thought, strategies and actions of stakeholders, and several stakeholders 
other than the public sector have played an important role in this change process. Multiple cycles of the 
new systems, practices and artifacts have introduced newer and updated perceptions, understandings, 
representations, and knowledge. At an individual employee level, through their own experience or that of 
others around them, a shared understanding gradually emerged of which capitals and powers could be 
exercise and which could not. This learning is sense-making, gained through the field’s struggle for and 
resistance to valued capital, and is reflected in the actions of the public employees. Over time, this 
perception has increasingly embedded itself in the mental schemata and workings of meso- and micro-level 
public stakeholders. The decrease in the power of local officials has increased the capitals of both the GoAP 
and rural citizens. In fact, it has created a substantial redistribution and reclaiming of capitals and 
empowerment at meso and micro levels. The redistribution of capitals at micro levels brought a shift in the 
individual and group habitus at the village level, and the resulting actions developed into a scenario that 
combined to overcome numerous governance challenges to create a long-term difference in meso-micro 
public employees about notions of accountability and common sense associated with the habitus. 
 
Reflecting back on this chapter, one gets a stronger sense of how each level can be a mini-universe with its 
own set of logics, stakeholders, interests, strategies and outcomes, shaping the design and implementation 
of the program. It is important to be aware of the fact that none of the levels are isolated or air-tight. Each 
works with the strategies and outcomes presented from the actions of the previous level, at the same time 
also adding their own mark.  
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As these last two analyses demonstrate, the central and state governments are not the only players shaping 
the program. Stakeholders such as the micro level of governance, rural citizens, NGOs, self-help groups 
(SHGs), citizen activists and the media all play key roles in shaping program implementation. Next, our 
analysis follows the program beyond the public-sector settings of the last two chapters to its final 
destination. At this stage, the program has been designed and diffused by the central government, and 
received and populated with state-level visions, resources, strategies and policies. It now shifts to the stage 
of on-the-ground implementation, where it is ready to roll out and reach rural citizens through the meso-
micro governance levels of district, block and village. Here I follow and extend analysis of the program 
from the macro-meso to the meso-micro level, where it presents its own set of processes, systems, logics 
and progression, providing us another link to understanding the role of accounting in accountability as well 
as various change processes as they are transcribed and conveyed from one set of stakeholders to another. 
As a continuation of the exploration of external systems, processes and artifacts in earlier sections, I connect 
to social and mental sense-making processes and structures to argue that dominant capitals and relationships 
of power in a field can witness shifts that become internalized and produce actions that gradually become 
normalized. 
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Chapter 6: MGNREGS and the Village – Micro Level 
 
Systems of classification are sites of struggle between individuals and groups. Social taxonomies 
(e.g., “occupation,” “race”) are the result of and at stake in social power relations. It becomes 
important therefore to consider how language and, more broadly, “symbolic goods” contribute to 
the reproduction and transformation of structures of domination (Everett, 2002, p. 58). 
 
The previous two chapters have explored the connection between strategic accounting systems, 
accountability and change processes at an organizational level in MGNREGS. Missing from these accounts 
are many voices, including various non-public stakeholders that constitute a significantly divergent set of 
interests. This last analysis chapter follows the progression of the program from the macro and meso to the 
micro level, exploring the larger role of accounting and accountability and change processes at the village 
level. It widens the window of perspective and analysis to address potential questions connected to 
representational bias through its focus on the largest non-public stakeholder in MGNREGA, the rural 
beneficiaries. These beneficiaries are the fulcrum around which this immense program’s vision, strategy 
and activity is arranged. However, I do not present this analysis as a comprehensive or exhaustive 
representation of perspectives on accounting practices and mechanisms of accountability in MGNREGA. 
 
Given the considerable debate around defining the form, function and dimensions of accountability 
(Ezzamel, Robson, et al., 2007; Goddard, 2005), the relationship between accounting and accountability at 
the micro level is particularly underexplored. In MGNREGS, both rural program beneficiates and citizens 
are envisioned as a key part of MGNREGS accounting and accountability practices and its rights-based 
structure. Not only do the rural citizens present a different type of interest than previous chapters, but also 
it is at the micro level that corruption has the strongest negative effect. Given India’s specific economic and 
sociopolitical settings, the narratives in this chapter provide a better understanding of how larger public 
practices intersect with village-level interests and the potential of accounting processes as a learning and 
distributive agent towards micro-level rural-social accountability and emancipation.  
 
Research questions 
I examine two connected research questions at the micro level: 
 
1. At a theoretical level, the village is a space where public and non-public sectors, interests and 
accountabilities, representing various levels of material, political, social and symbolic capitals, 
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intersect. Against the backdrop of MGNREGS’s larger centre/state MCS strategy, how are 
accounting processes implicated in accountability at the village level?  
 
2. What is the role played by accounting in routines, learning and emancipation at the micro level? 
 
In the first part of this chapter, I briefly revisit some of the literatures of budgeting and social audit, then 
explore the practices of labour budget construction and social audit at the village level in Andhra Pradesh. 
I also draw on interviews conducted in three other states, from which additional themes were generated for 
both analysis and comparison. Some of these themes include the formal (public-sector) elements of limiting 
the informal (local) powers of key local stakeholders; changes in relationships of accountability between 
village-level stakeholders; and public data on program performance. These provide additional markers of 
the slow but steady change witnessed through and due to the MGNREGS process over a period of eight 
years.  
 
I draw on Bourdieu’s theory of practice to provide an analysis of the role of accounting and accountability 
practices in the social structure of everyday life and culturally constructed aspects of interests (Everett, 
p. 235). I further connect to literatures on routines and learning to examine the manner in which these 
practices contribute to a reorganization of distribution of powers and a change in the stakeholders holding 
such powers/capitals in the context of the micro-level habitus. Pentland & Feldman (2005) offer one 
perspective on the questions outlined above. They look at routines as consisting of “abstract understandings 
and specific performances” and artifacts (p. 794). The paper outlines three ways of exploring organizational 
routines as a unit of analysis. The first way is to study an entire routine as a whole, treating it like a black 
box. The second way is to focus on specific parts of a practice, while the last way is to study the relationships 
between various elements of a routine or practice and the processes of change that occur. The study goes 
on to discuss the importance of exploring internal dynamics and internal structure of routines to understand 
change. I will use elements of the third way of exploring program practices through the lens of the 
program’s structure and dynamics to unpack the practices at the micro village level and connect to change 
and learning. This perspective also speaks beautifully to Bourdieu’s views on practice theory, field 
dynamics and struggles contributing to changes in the field and habitus.  
 
The analysis explores the mobilization and integration of accounting and accountability practices into the 
everyday life of the social, contributing to conversations on the role of accounting and accountability 
practices in the fight against corruption. I argue that strategic unfolding of such accounting and accounting 
practices gradually leads to a cumulative increase in individual and group-level learning and knowledge. 
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Through this, changes in the distribution of capitals affect the power structure at the village level. This also 
contributes to an underlying shift in the individual and collective parameters of sense making at the village 
level (Labianca, Gray & Brass, 2000, pp. 235–237). The underlying element marked by such overt change 
in capitals is the addressing of the power and information asymmetries at the village level, where accounting 
and accountability practices play a central role. Accompanying such shifts are changes in distribution of 
capitals (Bourdieu, 1977, 1990), underlying understandings (habitus) and the sociopolitical structure at the 
micro village level. Village panchayat President’s and village Secretary’s long-held positions of power and 
place are being challenged. There remains tremendous scope for improvement, but these changes point to 
the beginnings of a new order.  
 
Challenges at the micro level  
 
In this sense, we need to understand how interpretive processes, subsequent learning, and transfer 
of lessons learned combine to enable strategic learning. Such understanding is critical to optimize 
allocation of organizational resources in a strategic and innovative learning environment (Thomas, 
Sussman & Henderson, 2001, p. 332; see also Teece et al., 1997; Kuwanda 1998). 
 
The state government faces significant challenges connected to sociocultural governance and accountability 
at the micro level, especially in rural villages. 
 
Socioeconomic fundamentals of rural India – Methodology and measures of measuring poverty can 
differ from study to study. However we can form a general impression. The GOI’s socioeconomic census 
indicates that 75% of citizens earn less than USD $78 a month, 35% are illiterate, and 28% do not own a 
phone. But strong changes are also being reflected. A 2014 government report estimates that India’s poverty 
ratio fell from 38.2% to 29.5% between the 2009–10 and 2011–12 cycles, lifting 91.6 million individuals 
out of poverty (as defined by the World Bank; see Planning Commission, 2014). However, what cannot be 
ignored in rural India, relying as it does largely on agriculture, is that unequal distribution of productive 
resources and deep-rooted social relations of dependency exist that have changed little in the decades since 
India’s independence (Aubron, Lehoux, & Lucas, 2015; Deaton & Dreze, 2002). Landless farmers, rural 
sharecroppers or farmers with a small portion of land have a relationship of dependency upon the landowner 
class called zamindars and upon money lenders, both of which groups are powerful political and social 
players. Moreover, these rights to resources or lack thereof are passed on from one generation to another 
with little recourse. This is the nature of the distribution of capitals and work at the village level.  
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Public officers and indifference to the poor – There is a significant disconnect between governance and 
implementation, fund disbursal, and accountability processes in underprivileged rural India. There is also a 
wide variation in how MGNREGS functions in different states. A very famous public statement by the late 
Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi is often repeated and quoted: “If central government releases one rupee for 
poor, only 10 paisa (10%) reaches them.”  
 
Official government reports in organizations such as the Planning Commission of India point to other 
serious issues. The following quote comes from one such official report, and its insights point to rampant 
social problems connected to the operation of governance and government officers. In the public sector, 
officers are often more attached to the value and prestige accorded to the office and geographical location 
to which they are posted. Holders of positions that provide access to field players in the private sectors 
know that such connections can be converted into economic, political and social capital. Officers posted to 
poorer geographical areas with ethnic minorities including tribal and aboriginal populations see such 
postings as a punishment.   
 
Indifference towards the poor is no longer confined to the lower level officials, even the senior 
officers seem to be apathetic to them. This is reflected in the way IAS officers’ grade their jobs.… 
Posts in the Industrial and Commercial Departments and the corporations occupy a very high rank. 
These enable the IAS (Indian Administrative Services) officer to hobnob with industrialists and 
businessmen with whom he has class affinity. Next in the list would be posts which carry a lot of 
patronage and influence like a district charge, the Departments of Home, Establishment, Finance, 
…. The lowest rank goes to jobs where excellent performance would directly benefit the poorest, 
such as Tribal and Social Welfare, Revenue Administration, Land Reforms, Urban Slums, Rural 
Development, …. This kind of orientation has serious implications. The IAS officer is not so much 
worried [about] a transfer per se, as … being transferred to a job which everyone else considers to 
be an unimportant one.… No one realizes that in the process the adivasis (scheduled castes and 
tribes in India considered to be amongst the most underprivileged) and people of the backward area 
get punished for being saddled with an officer who has no interest in continuing there. (Saxena, 
2013). 
 
Devolution and panchayati raj: Increase in imbalance of power and capitals  
The panchayati raj system has existed from before MGNREGS, and as mentioned earlier comes with a pre-
existing set of loopholes and weaknesses. In many states with weaker political and administrative support 
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for MGNREGS, the devolved program structure, instead of bringing development, has actually further 
accentuated the imbalance of power and capitals (Saxena, 2013) and increased corruption. 
 
The village and symbolic violence 
Micro research connected to GoAP-implanted accounting and accountability practices must be interpreted 
through sociopolitical and cultural specificity on the ground. It is important to remind the reader here that 
the habitus held by the various individuals in the social hierarchy is constructed not only from decades and 
centuries of stratified village life but also from decades of public habitus reflected through implementation 
of other social services program through the panchayati raj or self-governance system. There was resistance 
from more than one stakeholder grouping to the new processes when they were tested and implemented. 
The earlier chapters have looked at visible resistance from local governance and other stakeholders, but 
there was a strong underlying resistance to change even from the rural villagers.  
 
Amongst the key stakeholders, rural citizens are widely considered to have the lowest levels of control, 
capital and power in both the program setting and rural social structure. In a patriarchal, agricultural rural 
India, ideas of citizen-based accountability have been connected to arrangements of social classes at the 
village levels and these classes’ understandings of their place and capital in the structure. Political structure 
at the village level in terms of elected representatives created an environment in which the powerful 
benefited by keeping the poor downtrodden. Thus, there was a conflict of interests wherein micro political 
leaders colluded with public officers to maintain power positions by encouraging the continuation of well-
established traditional village hierarchies and structures that favoured the interests of the existing rich and 
powerful in the village. Through the panchayati raj system, gram sabha and self-governance were already 
an implemented concept, albeit unsuccessfully at the village level, from prior to MGNREGS initiation. 
However, levels of program knowledge and awareness among the rural citizens were very low. 
 
This situation, along with existing sociocultural settings, had established a public-local habitus connected 
to the delivery of such social services program at the village level. The underprivileged rural citizens had 
next to no traditional symbolic capital or resources to begin with, so they had a clear understanding of their 
social and economic limitations and the powers held by locally elected representatives, landowners and 
moneylenders. This was exacerbated by lack of knowledge, awareness, or accountability, and by having no 
recourse to protest or address wrongdoings, as local government officials were also complicit in this 
arrangement (NLM interviews 1 and 2). It was a well-established sense-making logic that one could not, 
from the bottom of the social and economic order, make an enemy of the local rich and powerful. It was 
not villagers’ place to question or raise their voices against those who controlled access to basic necessities 
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of life, even in the setting of a program such as MGNREGS. Thus, there was also resistance and obstruction 
at the village level due to villagers trying to save themselves from immediate harm, even though in the 
longer run they stood to gain the most from the change. This is what Bourdieu calls “symbolic violence” 
(Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, pp. 272–273), wherein the social agents themselves contribute to the 
violence exercised on them.  
 
Innovative accounting and accountability practices 
Accounting in its functional role is seen to have two major roles, providing information for decision making 
and facilitating control (Jonsson, 2001, p. 522). The first role is said to be connected to alternatives and 
actions, while the second has been connected to accountability (p. 522). Both of these elements are reflected 
in the micro design. At the village level, program implementation is connected to several state-initiated 
multi-level practices and processes with roles for disadvantaged rural citizens. The largest of these are 
labour-budget construction processes and biannual social audit processes. These are structurally supported 
by a host of smaller subprocesses that include financial and operational data collection and analysis, 
creation of management accounting records, banking and fund disbursal processes, complaints, recourse 
and action-taking processes, and holding of regular gram sabhas. Both these practices could merit a 
chapter’s worth of analysis but in this dissertation, I discuss both these practices more briefly so as to focus 
on the multitude of rich data available for analysis towards the research questions of this chapter. 
 
Budgeting practice 
Accountability as built into the public sectors of democratic nations is associated with governance, financial 
efficiency and performance management connected to public and political accountability. Wildavsky’s 
(1964) seminal work on the political underpinnings of public-sector budgeting has sparked a huge 
accounting literature. Gray & Jenkins (1993, p. 53) define accountability in the public sector as “an 
obligation to present an account for, and answer for the execution of responsibilities to those who entrusted 
those responsibilities. On this obligation depends the allocation of praise and blame, award and sanction, 
so often seen as the hallmarks of accountability in action.” 
 
MAS and participative budgeting systems have traditionally been widely explored in accounting and 
organizational literature in specific settings (Ahrens & Chapman, 2004). Devolved budgets were introduced 
as a new conceptual framework in developed countries such as the United Kingdom (Hamson & Bird, 
2011). In keeping with the alternative literature that explores control and budgetary process to showcase 
more flexible modes of management (Frow et al., 2010), this dissertation makes a distinction between 
participative budgeting and “collaborative” budgeting and provides a different narrative of budgeting 
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practice towards understanding interactions that are shaped by the dynamics of power relations (and 
knowledge). Given India’s traditionally marginalized rural voice, this research site allows a contextual 
investigation into how players interact in this space, as well as entrenched social structures, attitudes and 
collective action (Medina, 2009), through the platform of accounting as a collaborative technology. 
 
With new public management (NPM) and public and social responsibility (Bracci & Llewellyn, 2012; 
Spence & Rinaldi, 2012), government departments have witnessed strong changes in environment (Smyth, 
2012, p. 230) and regimes of accountability (Roberts, 1991, p. 363). A related strand of this research, the 
budgeting and accountability literature, is quite established, though strongly attentive to developed-country 
settings. It answers to vertical and horizontal internal accountability in public organizations. Current 
research focuses on accountable management (Humphrey, Miller, & Scapens, 1993) and the changing 
nature of accountability in the government sector in light of new public management approaches (Parker & 
Gould, 1999) with greater delegation in budgeting (Mayston, 1998; Tooley & Guthrie, 2007) and 
implementation of government services (Preston, Cooper, & Coombs, 1992; Lapsley, 2008), with some 
papers exploring developing-nation contexts (Iyoha & Oyerinde, 2010). Devolved budgeting has seen some 
exploration at the municipal and city government level, largely in the United Kingdom (Llewellyn, 1998; 
Ezzamel et al., 2007). Of special interest is public accountability, defined by Sinclair (1995) as the “informal 
but direct accountability to the public, interested community groups and individuals” (p. 225). Connected 
to this topic are also the participatory and civil engagement models used by the World Bank in their social 
development work in developing and emerging economies.5  
 
In MGNREGS, the labour budget is the major accounting artifact of a lengthy public process at all three 
levels: the micro village level, the meso state-government level and the macro central-government level. 
This budget is an expression of the anticipated amount of work demanded as well as the timing for demand 
of such work (MoRD Operational Guidelines, 2012, p. 49) that includes an assessment of the labour 
demand; identification of works to meet the estimated labour demand; estimated cost of works and labour; 
and benefits from employment and asset generation (MoRD Operational Guidelines, 2005, p. 15). Though 
it is the mandated responsibility of the District Program Coordinator (DPC) at the district level, its 
construction begins at the gram sabha at the village level. The village household is its basic unit. 
 
6.1.2 Labour Budget (LB) entails planning, approval and funding under MGNREGA. Subsection 
6 of Section 14 of the MGNREGA mandates that the District Programme Coordinator (DPC) under 
                                                          
5 www.worldbank.org/en/topic/socialdevelopment 
148 
 
MGNREGA shall prepare in the month of December every year, a labour budget for the next 
financial year containing the details of anticipated demand for unskilled manual work in the district 
and the plan for engagement of workers in the works covered under the programme (MoRD, 
Operational Guidelines, 2008, p. 49). 
 
6.1.3 It is mandated that LBs be prepared in accordance with the process prescribed in sections 13 
to 16 of MGNREGA. This process is detailed in later parts of this chapter. The DPC has to ensure 
strict adherence to the principles of bottom-up approach from planning to approval of the selected 
shelf of projects by each of the Gram Sabhas (GSs) in the district (MoRD, Operational Guidelines, 
2008, p. 49). 
 
The first level of budgeting process is the village gram panchayat, responsible for the Annual Development 
Plan, which involves the assessment of labour demand and construction of a prioritized “shelf of projects” 
that have technical and administrative approval. The gram panchayat is the crucial implementing agency. 
It is here that the most important element of this structure and process kicks in, the legislative power granted 
to the micro village level. It creates the difference between citizens who may contribute to the process and 
citizens who by law, as here, have a right to contribute to these decisions.  
 
There is a process for determining the date of a gram sabha, and also for communicating it to the villagers 
and other stakeholders. On the day of the gram sabha, there is a public meeting at which the participants, 
along with the panchayat committee or elected members representing the village, decide what works are to 
be taken up that year and in what priority.6 The block and district panchayat can add to this list of works 
but the gram sabha has the right to accept, amend or reject these additions. The gram sabha can also make 
a priority list of projects including or excluding these block/district additions. Administrative and technical 
approval for these projects is given by the janpad panchayat and processed by the village Secretary, who is 
also responsible for maintaining the muster-roll and keeping track of inventories of labour and materials. 
Each district has to prepare a shelf of projects, and panchayat raj institutions (PRIs) have a principal role in 
planning and implementation. 
 
In the gram sabha, they call all the people of the village. [Here] they will read the resolutions about 
what works the panchayat Secretary and ward members have selected. They will also ask the 
                                                          
6 http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/article3401398.ece 
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villagers in the gram sabha, if needed. That will also be included in the list and the list will be … 
approved [by] the people (BDO interview). 
 
Every month there is a meeting with ward members. In the gram sabha, ward members will voice 
the requirements of their area and after that works will be selected. If the funds they have [are] 
enough in the panchayat fund, then they will do that work. If more funds are required they will send 
[a request] to the District Collector, through the BDO. In the ward member meeting, they will 
collect a list of works which becomes the shelf of works (BDO interview). 
 
The labour budget process therefore begins with the government-approved dates for these special gram 
sabhas. Once the block office and the village council are informed, steps are taken to have this information 
available to the largely uneducated villagers, such as public drummers, who walk about drumming and 
make announcements of upcoming special gram sabhas; wall paintings; and information on the village 
notice board. In some cases educated villagers, village Presidents or volunteers or members of a local NGO 
could also be a part of this process. In the public hearing that is supposed to include but is not limited to 
stakeholders such as villagers, program beneficiaries, retired village members who are educated or have 
travelled beyond the village, the village governance committee, the block-level representative, district-level 
representatives and others including NGOs and other observers. Either through ward members bringing in 
work-project recommendations or through a collective public decision on projects that are needed by the 
village and are a good fit in terms of the number of villagers who have demanded work, the village comes 
to a decision.  
 
Each village goes through this process to make decisions on a shelf of works and their priority levels, which 
are converted into a written budget document through a relevant appointed government official such as the 
Deputy BDO. After being passed by the gram sabha, the labour budget is constructed and approved by the 
BDO at block level, and forwarded to the Program Officer (PO).  
 
She [the Deputy BDO] is a link between the gram Panchayat, BDO and DRDO. Her sole 
responsibility is the Labour Budget, as she is the one who calls from the panchayat to give all the 
works selected. She is the one who talks to the BDO directly. She collects, compiles and with a 
covering letter submits the Labour Budget to the BDO (Deputy BDO Interview). 
 
Project plans and decisions made by rural citizens in this special gram sabha are largely binding, based on 
the MGNREG Act. This is meant to grant power to the rural underprivileged not only to receive work but 
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also to be able to determine which projects to focus on. Once an approved budget comes up from the 
village/block level, as legislated by NREGA it cannot be turned down. MGNREGA regulation ensures that 
these decisions cannot be overturned by higher authorities, except to conform to the law (MoRD, 2012).  
 
4.4.6 Once all the Gram Panchayat Plans have been received, the PO will scrutinize the GP’s 
Development Plan for its technical feasibility. The Programme Officer will not reject a work 
proposed by the Gram Panchayat. If the proposal is not within the parameters of the Act, or appears 
technically unfeasible, the Programme Officer will return it to the Gram Panchayat for it to replace 
it with a valid proposal (MoRD, Operational Guidelines, 2005, p. 16). 
 
4.4.7 The Intermediate Panchayat will maintain the priority among different works indicated by the 
Gram Panchayats. It is possible that there may be a need for works that involve more than one 
Gram Panchayat. Only such works will be included by the Intermediate Panchayat (MoRD, 
Operational Guidelines, 2008, p. 17). 
 
4.4.8 The District Programme Coordinator will scrutinize the Block plans, examining the 
appropriateness and adequacy of works in terms of likely demand as well as their technical and 
financial feasibility…but in doing so, the priorities of the Gram Panchayat and the priorities of 
inter Gram Panchayat works as indicated in the Block Plan by the Intermediate Panchayats will 
be maintained (MoRD, Operational Guidelines, 2008, p. 17). 
 
This level of the budget is built with the technical aid of the local development officer who works with the 
panchayat plan. Though there is a master list of projects from the central government, the gram panchayat 
at the base level has the right and the responsibility to prepare and approve the list of public-works projects 
which will be undertaken when work is demanded. Decisions regarding types and duration of works and 
site selections are discussed and ratified at the village level through the gram sabha. The gram sabha is 
presided over by the head of the village governance committee (the sarpanch) or the gram panchayat or 
village President, committee ward members elected by the villagers, and government employees including 
the technical officer, panchayat Secretary, block development officer (BDO), and other officers (Interview 
#38).  
 
Social audit practice 
Social audit in its primary form was visualized as an accountability mechanism to extend the traditional 
principles of audit, responsibility and transparency (Owen et al., 2001, p. 83; Medawar, 1976; Sillanpaa, 
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1998) towards corporate social responsibility. More recently, newer formats of social audit have been 
diffused through devolved governance and organizations such as the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP). Enlisted in developing countries as a public participatory mechanism (Ansell & Gash, 
2008, pp. 544–545; Berthin, 2011) and a monitoring and assessment tool (Ebrahim, 2003; O’Dwyer & 
Unerman, 2008), social audits involving NGOs have attracted renewed interest (Unerman & O’Dwyer, 
2006; Owen et al., 2000). This public social-services sector, with its significant government funding, 
dramatic rises in service demand, and devolved multi-sector implementation, is under considerable duress 
(CUPE, 2014), raising crucial questions of accountability (Llewellyn, 1998). However, research focused 
on delivery of national social services (Smyth, 2012; Ebrahim, 2003), and accountability practices such as 
social audit within this, remain significantly underexplored (Llewellyn, 1998; Chenhall, Hall, & Smith, 
2010).  
 
The social audit was designed as an important pillar in MGNREGA program delivery. On an objective 
level, it was intended to provide a legislation-backed mechanism for citizen-based accountability and 
governance, supported by comprehensive verification of records and processes in the field by rural citizens. 
On a structural level it represents a partnership between state governance, various NGOs, and civil society 
for governance and accountability at a micro level. Section 17 of the MGNREG Act mandated that social 
audits be conducted in every state. However, no clear mechanism for how such a social audit would be 
carried out was mentioned in the Act or the initial program guidelines. It was the responsibility of each state 
government to set up a state-level MGNREGS social audit agency with a team of people who could deliver 
process knowledge, resources and commitment to the social audit process (MoRD, Operational Guidelines, 
2013, p. 10). Andhra Pradesh, through its Department of Rural Development, was the first state to make an 
independent effort to focus and invest in this.  
 
But what triggered Andhra Pradesh’s specific commitment to social audit? In 2006, at a point in time when 
the state government was formulating its state-level MGNREGS operational guidelines, a pilot social audit 
was carried out by the Strategies Performance Innovation Unit (SPIU) in three districts of Andhra Pradesh. 
At this point the panchayati raj system of public governance and its gram sabhas had already been in place 
for a significant time. The results of the audit brought up huge issues connected to financial deviations in 
the presence of regular checks-and-balances efforts as well as audit signoffs: 
 
So village people were not getting the opportunity to hold the panchayat structure or even the 
administration accountable, at the level of the gram sabha. It’s a fundamental failing – across the 
country. Not just Andhra Pradesh alone! (Director, SSAAT). 
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… More than 90% deviation was found at the last point of delivery, despite the documents and 
records pertaining to them having been cleared during financial audited. It was in this context that 
a decision was taken to make social audits an integral part of the implementation of the Scheme 
(http://www.socialaudit.ap.gov.in). 
 
But this could not have been the only motivation for such a significant political move. The government is 
also said to have embraced and supported social audits in part because this may have been considered a 
good political strategy towards gathering the support of India’s largest voter pool, the rural poor living in 
distressed socioeconomic settings (NY Times, 2010). Thus the GoAP, for various reasons, decided to create 
an organization to formulate and build a practice framework for social audit. Initially, the director of the 
organization was a government officer, but after 2 or 3 years, it was thought that these organizations should 
be independent from the government (Joint Director, SSAAT). In 2009, SSAAT was established not as an 
NGO but as an independent “society” set up and supported by the state government. At this juncture, it is 
also important to acknowledge again that while SSAAT is technically an NGO, it is connected to the state 
machinery through its funding by the GoAP. Much has been said about the dedication of the state political 
wing in creating the right environment and access to resources for the goals accomplished by SSAAT in 
the coming years.  
 
The state administration hired Ms. Sowmya Kidambi from the MKSS, a grassroots organization formed in 
1990 for rural-level constructive civil action and accountability movements in India in the state of 
Rajasthan. It was one of the earliest and most successful implementers of social audit–style public 
accountability mechanisms in India, adopted first by Andhra Pradesh and then set as a role model for 
MGNREGS. SSAAT was formally registered as an independent society on 15 May 2009. SSAAT’s 
mandate was to carry out regular and concurrent social audits across all 22 districts of Andhra Pradesh and 
it began its journey with two significant strengths. The first was the ideological, political and financial 
support of the GoAP. It is clear that this support, and the freedom of action allowed to SSAAT to function 
without interference, was key for the organization’s growth. The second strength was the relevant 
experience set of its founding members. All the operation staff hired later were also from the field of social 
activism, and so brought valuable experience to Andhra Pradesh’s social audit practice.  
 
Building the structure, capacity and practice – The process challenges were significant and many. On 
the audit information side, there needed to be a process blueprint; what a social audit would entail, what 
role SSAAT would play, who would access the program information, where and when such information 
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would be accessed, what mechanisms would be part of this process, and what results were to be expected. 
Additionally, who would take the process responsibility to support the social audit (including hiring and 
training of audit facilitators, door-to-door and physical verification, and reading out of the final audit report 
in the gram sabha)? Finally, due process: how could the social audit be conducted fully and fairly and in a 
way that mobilized rural villagers to participate in this endeavour? Aside from this were challenges 
connected to resources for building practice, human resources, technology, and infrastructure.  
 
From the perspective of rural citizens, decades-entrenched socioeconomic settings and habitus at village 
level were a huge hurdle. They were farmers or out-of-work farm workers from the lowest strata of India’s 
economy, economically distressed and oppressed for generations. There are issues of caste and class as well 
as limited access to information, awareness, education and financial resources. A large majority of these 
individuals had never travelled outside their own village or the surrounding village or two. They were at 
the mercy of local power holders for their very survival and believed that speaking out against local power 
holders would only bring trouble. Even in theory, standing up to locally powerful people in a social audit 
was one hurdle, but what would happen after this activity concluded and you and your family had to live in 
the same village and be dependent on the very same people for work, wages and other necessities? This is 
the individual and collective identity and habitus they understood, carried, displayed and acted on. 
Compared to the panchayat committee members, panchayat President, village Secretary, landowners, and 
moneylenders, and other power holders who fought for or supported those in these positions, rural villagers 
had little to no social and economic capital.  
 
Even if an honest person wins the village level elections, the system will finish him. If a sarpanch 
wants to remain honest within this system, he cannot! No work will reach his village! To get 
MGNREGS work to his village, he has to go to the Block Development Office, give under-the-
table money to the work office. Only then will he get the work commencement order. [For] Rs. 
500, you can buy a muster roll. The Junior Engineer (JE) takes about Rs. 1000, to measure for a 
construction and to enter it into the measurement book. If an honest sarpanch does not pay up to 
get all this, then he will get hit with claim after claim for recovery of funds overspent. So he has no 
option, when the whole system is corrupt (Director, SSAAT, interview) 
 
In line with this, some of the key imperatives that can and have led to an increase in conducting successful 
social audits (SSAAT, n.d.) include: 
 having (full) access to all information prior to conducting social audits, with sufficient time to 
assimilate information for verification processes; 
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 creating a social and administrative platform to enable social audits to happen at the village level; 
 creating conditions for government officials to be present and answerable to queries in special gram 
sabhas arranged for the social audit process, on a regular basis; and 
 ensuring that outcomes from social-audit gram sabhas have legal implications for those caught and 
penalized. 
 
Now, the access to program information, presence of government officials, nurturing the introduction and 
establishment of a SSAAT and ensuring legal implication are all imperatives that are work in progress. But 
progress has been slowly and steadily made. SSAAT began work on a very small scale with a handful of 
staff and a two-room office. Interviews with its Director, Ms. Kidambi, Joint Director Ms. Satyawani as 
well as field operatives such as assistant project directors, project leaders and field-audit members shed 
extensive light on how the process, the unit and the practice was gradually built up. Examining its progress, 
a few key observations emerge: 
 An organizational structure was created with only one agency known for social audit, having only 
one head office. There are no district or local offices and there was no connection to the program 
implementation, with no role in supervision or vigilance that would create a conflict of interest. 
 Attempts are made so that all documents with the required information and requisite formats are 
requested for, collated and made available to the Social Audit Unit (SAU) with photocopies at 
least 15 days in advance of the scheduled date of meeting of the gram sabha (MoRD, Operational 
Guidelines, 2013, p. 7).  
 There was investment in the inclusion and training of local rural youth in every social audit. These 
youths became beacons of public accountability and civil action in their local communities 
 Through a social audit, training the community began by sharing information with them and then 
encouraging them to attend gram sabhas and question the system. 
 Trust and support was built up at the rural level by providing means to awareness and education 
over multiple years of program implementation. 
 A legal sub-unit was created within SSAAT that contributed towards building a strong grievance 
redressal system. There was a slow building of organizational capacity within SSAAT to work 
towards consistent financial, organizational and legal action against public officers and village 
committee members found guilty of infractions, financial transgressions and corruption. Funds 
were increasingly recovered, while some staff were dismissed or suspended and police complaints 
filed for others (SSAAT, 2012; 2013).  
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The social audit is mandated to happen biannually and is conducted over a period of approximately 10 days. 
The process is initiated with SSAAT requesting financial and operational program information in specific 
formats from the block level (SSAAT, 2012; 2013). 
 Pre–social audit processes – The social audit schedule is drawn up and formal letters are sent to 
the respective officers at the district and block level. An advance team goes to the block a week in 
advance to check if requested records are ready. State and district resource persons (SRPs and 
DRPs) go to the villages in the block and recruit 40–70 educated youths to work as volunteers and 
be trained as village social auditors (VSAs). These youths are then divided into nine or ten teams 
and work with the other social audit stakeholders. 
 Social audit processes – The VSA team travels with the stakeholders. There is physical verification 
of records submitted by the block against what is actually on the ground. The VSAs go door to door 
to conduct individual family-based verifications as well. The process includes: 
o financial verification  job cards, muster rolls, wage payments, material records; 
o physical verification – works measurements in terms of both quality and quantity; quality 
control department is drawn upon if required; 
o awareness building – door-to-door verification also include information and discussions on 
rights and entitlements of wage seekers; 
o creating of records – recording of deviations, recording of complaints from program 
beneficiaries; statements, videos and pictures that record and evidence such deviations. 
 Social audit gram sabha – This is a special gram sabha convened by the village President that 
happens once the verification processes are complete. Here the findings of the social audit report 
are read out. Evidence is recorded by an impartial observer and there is an opportunity for those 
accused to accept their actions and make amends. 
 Block-level public hearing – This is a public hearing that happens at the block level once all the 
village-level social audits have been concluded. The hearing, presided over by the Project Director, 
is the platform at which all issues are heard, and for those found guilty there are recommendations 
made for future courses of action. The ombudsman takes note of all deviations so that further action 
can be taken on them. 
 Post–social audit processes – Using a laptop made available at the village level, the social audit 
report is compiled and uploaded onto a public domain, where it can be publicly accessed. Reports 
are sent to the district collector within seven days for further action taken. These include: 
o disciplinary actions against public employees found to be party to program deviations; 
o processes for recovery of misappropriated amounts (invoking Andhra Pradesh’s Revenue 
Recovery Act); 
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o filing of criminal cases in extreme cases of misappropriation. 
 
Officers of the vigilance wing at the district level (the DVO) are to follow up on these actions initiated. In 
turn state-level vigilance wing officers monitor the actions of the DVO through monthly meetings. 
 
Resistance 
Studies such as Labianca, Gray, and Brass (2000) look at the various aspects of resistance to change 
stemming from, amongst other elements, cognitive barriers to employees’ empowerment in a new decision-
making scheme. The requirement to change or not change cognitive frameworks (mental and schema) in 
order to make larger organizational change happen have been explored by many research studies; these 
cognitive barriers, consisting of both external and internal factors, can also be connected to Bourdieu’s 
notion of habitus and the distribution of capitals at the rural level in India, which has remained unchanged 
for decades. Public officers, other public employees and local elected representatives continued to 
misappropriate funds in different ways as the state government and SSAAT attempted to ramp up their 
operations. 
 
The earlier chapters have also looked at visible resistance from local governance and other stakeholders, 
but there was a strong underlying resistance to change even from the rural villagers. Alongside, there are 
still significant issues connected to rural villagers’ attendance at the gram sabhas, as elements of local 
intimidation still existed. New or amended routines require oversight and control of both processes and 
people in both the short and long term. As outlined by SSAAT in their 2012–13 annual report, there was 
resistance from more than one stakeholder to the new processes, where tested and implemented. The Million 
March held in Hyderabad in 2011, for the division of the State of Andhra Pradesh into two, created the new 
state of Telangana. During the March the social audit’s office in Hyderabad was seriously vandalized by 
protestors, representing the ire of those held responsible for their own corrupt and unfair actions.  
 
Change processes: The process of “convincing” 
 
Unfortunately, I think even within the governance paradigm, people who have been talking about 
panchayati raj, somewhere or other the notion of the panchayat being like a solution to everything 
has come about. And instead of actually empowering the structure of the panchayat and the gram 
sabha, we have empowered the sarpanch (village President) to become part of that entire nexus. So 
panchayat elections are fought – with caste lines, with class lines, with money and with muscle 
power (Joint Director, SSAAT, interview). 
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Practices such as accounting can play a distributive role in social and group settings. They have the potential 
to assist in the conversion of one kind of capital into another. The change processes are constituted by the 
systems and practices instituted by the state government at the meso and micro levels. But a process of 
convincing essential to the rural-citizen level. As outlined by Preston, Cooper, & Coombs (2002), contested 
accounting systems that are initially implemented with looser characteristics have to present arguments that 
help “close” the technology in order to make it an accepted part of the organizational, and in this case also 
the social functioning (p. 568). At the village level, this also translated into dependable systems and 
practices that would back the villagers as they attempted to participate in the governance and stand up for 
both their rights and project vigilance. These closing or convincing arguments of the state government in 
MGNREGS at the village level are represented below. 
 
The structure of MGNREGS is considered to have similar drawbacks to earlier such social service 
programs, and as such it was ineffective in creating an operational balance of powers at the village level 
that would allow the benefits of the program – work, wages and participation – to reach the poor. In practice, 
the gross measures of power and control formally and socially held by the President, Secretary and 
connected local power-holders in MGNREGS were strongly visible. The relative absence of dependable 
data for decisions, weak oversight, and lack of financial constraints (Pendlebury, 1994) in management 
accounting processes such as budgetary control, job costing, and audits was exacerbated by the multiple 
levels of governance involved in local decision making.  
 
In line with studies like Jonsson (1991), accounting processes gather meaning based on the manner in which 
they are drawn upon in contextual and cultural environments (Jonsson, 2001, p. 521). The MGNREGS 
blueprint with its participative budgeting, social audit, management accounting processes and artifacts 
created at the village level had strong accounting and accountability elements, but on a practice level, none 
of this power granted through accounting and accountability processes was found to be held by the gram 
sabha. In design, PRI had a key role as 75% of planning and implementation processes happen at the gram 
panchayat level in Andhra Pradesh. This means that the gram panchayat – the elected village representatives 
– are the key implementation agency (DoRD, Andhra Pradesh). The gram sabha, which includes villagers, 
elected panchayat and President, and CBO, was empowered to monitor all the works and employment at 
the village level as well as registration, issue of job cards and the timely payment of wages. They were to 
monitor works executed, muster rolls and payments made by other implementing agencies as well as 
maintaining muster-rolls at work sites and making payments. In keeping with the gram panchayat’s role in 
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works planning and implementation, it was responsible for, among other things, maintenance of key records 
for which the panchayat Secretary was the local custodian:  
 works registers – contract registers, material procurement registers, e-muster registers, e-muster roll 
receipt register, job application card register, employment register, works register, asset register and 
complaints register;  
 financial documents – voucher folder, cash book and register, stock register, monthly receipt and 
expenditure register, bank reconciliation folder; 
 weekly reports – on-site reports incorporating data on labour employed and material received, collated 
and displayed in the office of the PO;  
 monthly squaring of accounts – money released under MGNREGS to a village was to be accounted 
under three heads:  money held in bank accounts; advances to implementing or payment agencies; and 
vouchers of actual expenses.  
 
In line with this, a study by UNDP (Balassanian, 2006) suggests that any accountability mechanism in a 
developmental program would need to accomplish at least a few of the following functions to be considered 
successful: 
 establishing reliable, legitimate and pro-poor “rules of the game”; 
 increasing transparency and access to information and awareness; 
 establishing facts, broadening evidence and increasing objectivity; 
 mandating and maintaining regular monitoring and control; 
 improving access for the poor to recourse and arbitration; 
 moving accountability loops closer to the citizenry; 
 strengthening meaningful participation in the political process; 
 strengthening voice and ability to articulate. 
 
Establishing new process routines and “rules of the game”: The annual labour budget and 
the biannual social audit 
Feldman & Rafaeli (2002) link routines to connections, shared understandings, and group behaviour and 
change. They explore how routines can lead to interactions that build a network of ties and connections as 
participants communicate (pp. 313–315). Drawing on this, I connect accounting processes to routines, 
individual and shared understandings, and change. My conversations with local men and women as well as 
interviews with social audit members produced several insights about the increase in open discussions about 
public works and wages earned, with each other and with other officials visiting the village at various points 
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in time. Women mentioned being able to work, thereby increasing financial and therefore social 
participation; they also mentioned getting training in financial and banking aspects of the process from 
NGOs and CBOs. Interactions with individuals connected to the budget or social audit processes, state- and 
national-level monitors, NGOs and CBOs each brought a slightly higher degree of network ties to the 
outside world as well as process information from multiple perspectives. Many years of getting external 
knowledge and information from the budgeting process, NGO and CBO awareness drives, and training 
youth under SSAAT also seem to have contributed to comparatively more open discussions in the village 
about the financial outlays, expenditures and kinds of projects to be taken up in the village, as well as work 
received and the actions of President and Secretary. Such communication as discussed by Feldman & 
Rafaeli (2002) can be seen linked to a stronger and broader understanding of the roles, perspectives and 
knowledge of the other persons involved in the routine, though connections vary in strength. 
 
How does this literature become relevant to the setting of a rural village? Routines in organizations have 
been investigated as a source for creating internal structure that stabilizes processes and assists in 
completion of such process-based work. The literature on routines is strongly orientated towards formal 
structures such as organizations, linking routines to change, mechanization, organizational stability and 
learning (Feldman & Rafaeli, 2002). They are known to be an important part of organizational structure in 
terms of learning (Levitt & March, 2000), socialization and decision making (Feldman, 2000), generating 
what is called procedural memory (Cohen & Bacdayan, 1994). The village can be seen as a social 
arrangement with its own set of structures, capacities and intentionality, likened to arrangement in an 
organization, for or not-for profit. In the context of MGNREGA, many of the practices and routines at the 
village level initiated public-sector processes that either devolved to the village level or that have been 
extended to include the village as a process-level participant. With formal responsibilities and the right to 
ask for an account, these villagers become an integral part of the larger practices that have key village-level 
process components. Organizational memory (CFO, Andhra Pradesh, interview) was brought up multiple 
times in a significant interview with the CFO of Andhra Pradesh. The connections among the individual, 
the social, and physical environment and behaviour have been made by theories such as social cognitive 
theory in which, for example, routines allow employees to create models of learned behaviour through 
observations, assessment and memory of past experiences (adaptation-innovation theory). 
 
My interviews with national auditors and a study of demographics reveals that at the village level, many of 
the rural citizens initially had little awareness of or exposure to the larger world, as they had not travelled 
far in their lifetime. Traditionally, accountability relationships in publicly delivered programs that liaise 
with the panchayati raj system continue to be both convoluted and corrupted. For many years, there were 
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severe issues that plagued the program at every level in terms of financial and operational data. Reflecting 
an imbalance in power and oversight, local stakeholders would forge financials, add ghost workers, pay 
existing workers only a part of their wages, or block access to work for individuals and families not in their 
favour. An initial GoAP presentation lists several issues such as lack of program awareness; reports of false 
muster rolls and wage payment issues (ghost workers, fudging of amounts, payment of less than prescribed 
wages, women paid less than men); no comprehensive database to create financial and operational 
oversight; and, finally, a lack of public accountability. 
 
In the earlier years, in sharp contrast to other states, Andhra Pradesh decided to have a dedicated staff for 
MGNREGA that would decrease overburdening and spillover effects, while increasing work quality and 
control. This was only made possible because the political wing of the government augmented the central 
administrative funds. This allowed Andhra Pradesh to focus on the level of the individual citizen and the 
development of what is called “communitization of capacities” wherein technical, managerial and 
socialization skills are thought to aid in the creation of citizenship oversight and individual empowerment 
at the village level. 
 
The working group proposes to define capacity building not as ordinary shortage of staff and lack 
of training facilities, but as the dynamic process of developing, strengthening and institutionalizing 
the rules of the game, norms, standard operating procedures, skills, abilities, and resources that 
organizations, communities and individuals need to survive, adapt, and thrive in the fast-changing 
world of policy implementation (CEGC, 2010, p. 2; emphasis added) 
 
The introduction of new standard operating procedures, as well as accounting and operating technologies 
such as an integrated MCS, a real-time MIS, and policy, resources, manpower, infrastructure and 
technology, created a new environment for the program in Andhra Pradesh. Each implementation cycle 
brought changes in the way the program was implemented at multiple levels. As amended processes of 
budgeting, creation of accounts and social audits stabilized, new “rules of the game” were vocalized at the 
ground level, through each routine of program implementation. 
 
SSAAT has increasingly focusing on making sure that the frequency of it audits rise. Gram sabhas are said 
to be happening more frequently than before and there is some increase in effort by rural citizens to 
participate in the process by attending the meetings, asking for clarifications and voicing complaints. 
Though attendance is still an issue, standing up to the local powers would have been unconscionable a 
decade before in terms of personal safety and survival of the family. Local power-holders still hold 
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considerable sway but now villagers have a new capital. The most recent changes to budget construction, 
reporting, record maintenance, have also settled into public understandings at the village levels after a few 
cycles of implementation. The mass openings of post office bank accounts into which the e-FMS directly 
transfers funds created greater discussion, learning, knowledge and finally public vigilance (The Economic 
Times, 2013). 
 
The latest edition of the World Bank's annual report credits the government's flagship rural 
employment programme for not just unleashing a “revolution in rural India” but establishing a 
model of inclusive development (The Economic Times, 2013). 
 
Sanjeeva, a 26-year-old landless peasant in Allawada village of Chevella district near Hyderabad, 
has never seen a computer in his life, but [for the] past few months he has been realizing the benefits 
of a software solution, which has brought transparency and dignity for almost 11 million job seekers 
under India’s National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA) in Andhra Pradesh (AP). 
“Earlier, landlords and contractors used to pay around Rs. 40–50 every day, and even that payment 
was done as an obligation to us,” he says. “Now, I understand that using computer we are given 
wage slips and can demand any information anytime from the village officials – this thing has 
transformed our lives” (Economic Times, 2009). 
 
Routines can also be extended to understand how the concepts of organizational and procedural memory 
(Cohen & Bacdayan, 1994) could be applicable to the village level.  The process routines have been built 
up and down the chain from the block to the village and back. This has slowly brought about a shift in the 
way the program is perceived and run. Analysis of the interview data and responses from villagers as to 
how it was “before” brought up the insight that without really registering it as change, the village started to 
adjust and integrate these new program routines and accounting understandings into their sense-making 
frameworks. Over successive program cycles, the state government, SSAAT, NGOs and CBOs have 
worked towards strengthening local accounting and accountability practices as well as awareness. 
Combined with increased learning and knowledge acquisition, as MGNREGA practices and routines seem 
to have become more rooted at the village level, they also have become more accepted in regular village 
life, more integrated and established. As additional changes were made to program implementation and 
audit formats, each cycle addressed some loopholes that allowed corrupt practices. The villagers gradually 
became a little more cognizant of their increased capital, power of account and status in the village. 
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Local conditions vary from state to state, and strategic accounting and financial decision have to fit the 
specific set of conditions and challenges of that space. Fuglsang (2010) looks at localization and find that 
repetition and impact are key influencers in the implementation of new routines in public organizations and 
social settings. The acceptance of such routines is seen by Drejer (2004) as an innovation in service rather 
than change, characterized by an abrupt shift in diffusion and the displaying of learning, competence 
development and codification of knowledge. Change is also thought by some to be more indirect and 
unconscious. Along the lines of Drejer (2004), in the field of management accounting Wickramasinghe & 
Alawattage (2007, p. 31) note that constrictions and conflicts can lead to system changes through cycles of 
crisis and finding of solutions. Trajectories of growth and change, like the one initiated by the GoAP, are 
strongly connected to the history and the social and political economy of the space. Its routines and 
capacities therefore represent basic strengths and weaknesses and follow predictable patterns of how things 
are done (Zysman, 1994, pp. 243–283). To address these patterns, ground village-level accounting and 
accountability processes and activities have emerged as an important process focus of the state government 
strategy. But how does the state government affect practices in a way that creates geographical reach in 
terms of both distance and depth? To strengthen the program delivery system and create local 
accountability, they had to establish effective enforcement, oversight, and regulatory and accountability 
mechanisms at the village level. Accountability and accounting stood at the heart of this process.  
 
Increased access to and capacity to process financial and operational information 
 
And through the schemes like NREGA and other schemes, the kind of money that flowing into 
panchayats, incredible amounts.… [I]n Rajasthan I worked with MKSS for almost 10 years before 
I moved to the government – so the maximum money that would come to a panchayat could be a 
maximum of Rs. 20 lakhs in a year. That also a very powerful panchayat would end up getting so 
much money. Today crores of Rupees are reaching panchayats. In fact MLAs who have lost 
elections are happy to become sarpanches because there is more power there. (Joint Director, 
SSAAT). 
 
Corruption and malpractice were easier to manage in the presence of technological and information 
isolation. The new practices of budgeting and social audit serve not only as a mechanism of management 
and policy at the macro and meso level, but also to foster learning and citizen accountability at the micro 
level (Awio & Northcott, 2001, p. 76). Multiple cycles of MGNREGS have slowly created newer 
information, connections, realizations and learnings in the minds of powerful and less powerful rural 
citizens. More recent years have seen more frequent release of implementation data to the public through 
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wall paintings and village-level display boards, connecting to state program guidelines as well as various 
rules and regulations. The processes of budget creation, request for work, getting paid for work, due 
diligence processes connected to social audit, the special gram sabha where the social audit report is read 
and complaints and action-taken reports are discussed, have all contributed to small shifts in the individual 
and collective understanding of how the newer routines are run and where they stand in the larger scheme 
of things. These cycles have created communication among officials, SSAAT, NGOs and trained youths 
from outside and within the village; this has led to a rise in the level of learning and information that became 
shared in the village. The newer routines connected to each of these larger practices have changed ground-
level operating procedures and created a firm temporal structure (Feldman, 2000, p. 611). The growing 
presence of the vigilance wing, along with visits by state-level monitors, audit and vigilance teams 
strengthened the enforcement of program rules. Each set of challenges or resistance at the village level have 
led to changes and the testing of newer initiatives by the state.  
 
The block offices’ visits gave me a chance to sit down with the IT operator who walked me through data 
uploading and construction and maintenance of physical documents and processes. The block office was 
also the site for various training sessions for rural villagers. I took part in a training module for local SRPs 
for social audit run by SSAAT members. A number of male village youths sat on the ground and I watched 
as the social audit officials walked them through the reading and conducting of due diligence of a specific 
set of financial documents. I asked one of them to explain how the muster rolls and wages received were 
checked and they walked me through that process. There was only one local homestead selling home-
cooked food and as I walked with the SRPs to lunch, I continued our conversation and discussions. These 
discussions with the SSAAT trainers brought light to a host of issues to light such as difficulties in reaching 
villages, resistance by village elite against sending the youth out for training and lack of facilities for women 
trainers and social auditors. At the same site but in another room set up as a traditional classroom, I also 
got the opportunity to take part in a regular classroom-program information session by a local government 
employee, almost solely populated by women from local nearby villages. These opportunities for micro-
level communication and observation gave me a strong sense of how the program was unfolding, block-
level efforts and the opinions of those to which MGNREGS mattered intensely. 
 
Block officers not only had computers and IT operators on site but also cell phones equipped with the 
software to upload data. With the strengthening of the social audit practice, village-level program records 
and paperwork came to be requested for and obtained much in advance. This allowed better comprehension 
of financial and operational data that was passed on to the social-audit trained local youth as well as local 
villagers. There was an increase in awareness as these youths travelled outside their villages and brought 
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back fresh perspectives. As the audit processes progressed, larger numbers of rural youths, trained to 
conduct social audits in other villages, went back to their own villages armed with the skills to examine 
program accounts and take part in budgeting and social audit processes. There has been an increase in 
capacity to confirm financial and operational information, through stronger control and participation 
through the involvement of SSAAT-trained local youths, local officials and local NGOs. Local NGOs and 
CBO did their part in training women how to manage their post office bank accounts, to check for wages 
deposited and, finally, to withdraw funds themselves. The empowerment element of this story has a 
particularly strong connection with the rise in the presence of women in this program. Aside from practices 
such as wall-writing and advertising, there was a push to display of village records in the local office as 
well as access to computers. Social activists, trained by SSAAT and local NGOs, used the Right-To-
Information Act (RTI Act), which is similar to Canada’s Access to Information Act, to request village-level 
records at for projects held by the village Secretary and President. With these advancements, there was a 
corresponding increase in program awareness, information and knowledge of processes at the village level 
that accumulated through successive cycles. Thus, there was an increase awareness of the legitimacy of 
citizen rights.  
 
Increased mechanisms of controls and accountability and increased enforcement, transparency, 
responsibility and objectivity  
Aiyar, Mehta, & Samji (n.d.) make a key distinction between answerability and enforcement. In the first 
few years, program registers had significant issues connected to incomplete data and lagged significantly 
behind in terms of timely record-keeping. Without personnel and system to oversee such data creation, 
district and state governance could not monitor program performance in any way. Funds were sent down 
to villages for disbursing with minimum records of how such money was spent or where it ended up. Further 
investments were then made in at the block and village level, physical space, vehicles, computers, cellphone 
technology, training, personnel and building and strengthening of technological network. With the 
mandating and the gradual increase in frequency of monitoring and control both the GoAP offices through 
various control mechanisms, there was an increase in the frequency and accuracy of program data uploaded 
online. At the village and block level, some of the control mechanisms included external financial audits, 
surprise program audits, mobile courts and regular overseeing of action-taken reports.  
 
Over subsequent cycles, stronger oversight and punitive measures have been added to the creation and 
availability of records both from the government and from the social-audit process. Steadily, the system 
has increased in efficiency as more financial and operational data has become available to the state 
government for verification and decision making. With the establishment of the MIS, the rules of the game 
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have changed. Studies such as Tyre & Orlikowski (1994) explore change and the introduction of new 
technological platforms that have the potential for adaptation and increase in routinization through 
repetition and experience. Some of this information has since been passed on to the village level to aid in 
the development of public vigilance. It should also help in the verification of multiple stages of program 
implementation at the village level. Social audit and gram sabhas have the potential to give rural citizens 
an opportunity to audit, examine and verify financial expenditure, priority and quality of works and the 
performance of program staff. Real-time data have now significantly increased the level of verifiability in 
social-audit gram sabhas and helped to reduce instances of fraudulent and corrupt practices at the village 
and block level. Tied to all this was the essential component of the complaint redressal system.  
 
In tandem with this process, over the years SSAAT has slowly tested and evolved its process format for 
social audit specific to state-level issues and needs. Housed in the same office as the vigilance wing, it 
decided to recruit and train local youth in administering the social audit process. A study of the Social Audit 
Annual Reports available on the website from the year 2008–09 up to 2012–13 provides some measure of 
the road travelled by SSSAT and social audit in Andhra Pradesh. These reports, easily accessible not only 
to the general public but also to NGOs, CBOs and RTI activists fighting corrupt practices, not only provide 
information about the program performance parameters and actual performance, but also shed light on the 
development of the practice itself. The format, function and physical form of these reports reflect the growth 
and setting of the SSAAT and social audit practice in Andhra Pradesh. Compared to the scanned short 
report in the year 2008–09, the 2012–13 annual report is a professional document that is organized and in-
depth in its communication of the audit practice. Today, a few of the other documents and reports available 
online to the public on the SSAAT website include social-audit reports, action-taken reports, rapid social 
audit reports, SSAAT e-FMS reports and SSAAT expenditure details. Outlined below are a few of the 
measures initiated through the SSAAT that have had a significant influence on the functioning and 
implementation of the program and its control and accountability measures at local block and village levels: 
 
a) Limited role for panchayat President – Andhra Pradesh passed a ruling that limited the role of 
the village/panchayat President in the local processes to address another key agency issue in the 
panchayati raj or self-governance system at the village level. This was a significant change and 
Andhra Pradesh was the only state in India to take steps to limit the powers of the panchayat 
president. It ushered in an innovative solution to an agency problem that had long caused significant 
corruption issues. It was a remarkable step towards change in the material and technological 
arrangements at the village level. The introduction of modified mechanisms of data collection and 
oversight saw varying levels of success and acceptance.  
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b) Shrama shakti sangham (SSS) – Andhra Pradesh introduced the concept of semi-permanent 
worker groups called shrama shakti sangham, formed not by the gram panchayat or mate but by 
the workers themselves. Public works are executed through these groups, and not individual 
beneficiaries, giving them collective powers and information akin to labour unions (CAG, Audit 
Report, 2013). 
 
The introduction of these groups also strongly impacted administration and efficiency. It was said 
that field assistants, technical assistants and block (mandal) officials saw a significant reduction in 
the quantity of complaints. Wage seekers approached SSS representatives and resolved issues. 
Additionally, remaining complaints were presented in a more structured and efficient way in the 
monthly meetings, which made the resolution process more streamlined.  
 
c) Mobile courts – In 2012, in order to give rural villagers access to courts of local and timely justice, 
SSAAT introduced special mobile village criminal courts where First Class Judicial Magistrates 
conducted court hearings at the village level. These hearings not only create the physical 
opportunity to dispense micro-level justice but are also used to help monitor the implementation of 
the program in order to deal with corruption (The Hindu, 2012).7 This means that a summons trial 
can be held for quick resolution as the hearing happens in the village. The magistrates have the 
right to award up to two years in prison for those found guilty of creating fraudulent records, 
misappropriating public program funds, or non-disbursal of wage payments to program 
beneficiaries, as well as individuals abetting any of these activities.   
 
d) Linking social audits to the quality control wing – The social audit teams audit a wide variety 
of public works, from purely earthen works such as digging trenches to other works that are more 
intensive of materials. Due to this variety of works, lack of technical qualification and knowledge 
that can assist in the physical audit of such works has come to be a significant roadblock. Initially, 
work-related issues were referred on to the quality control (QC) wing by the presiding officers. 
Subsequently, in order to ensure that audit teams have the necessary resources, an order was issued 
to ensure that the QC teams went along with the social audit teams while the audit was in progress, 
and that both teams would together complete the physical verification of material-intensive works. 
                                                          
7 http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-national/tp-andhrapradesh/mgnregs-cases-special-mobile-court-
launched/article2937239.ece 
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This would not only help in the completion of the audit processes faster, but it would also reduce 
instances of further material-related issues.  
 
e) Disciplinary rules for fixed-tenure employees – FTEs include employees such as field assistants, 
technical assistants, computer operators and additional Programme Officers, whose services are 
contracted through the Society for Rural Development Services (SRDS). Initially, the social audit 
database included 125 types of issues identified through the audit process. These are nowadays 
categorized into seven broad types of offences. Employees indicted in any of these categories of 
offences are linked to the type of offence and its connected minimum and maximum penalties. 
 
f) Post–social audit follow-ups – These have emerged as being as critical to the program 
implementation as the social audit process itself. The Department of Rural Development of the 
GoAP has set up an independent wing to do the post–social audit follow-up. Previous rounds of 
social audit findings that led to the initiation of disciplinary actions against perpetuators also led to 
the FTEs challenging any such disciplinary action in a court of law on the basis of the principles of 
natural justice. Their argument was that they could not be fired from their position through the 
social-audit process because they had not been given a chance to defend their actions. To address 
this argument, GoAP then set up the vigilance wing at the district level. This was to ensure that due 
process was followed. “Show Cause” notices were duly issued to such individuals that had been 
found guilty under social audits, so these individuals received an opportunity to defend themselves 
in a personal hearing. 
 
g) Fixing responsibility for non-production of records – As detailed in the social audit process, 
SSAAT gives due notice to the block levels to provide financial and operational program 
documents at least 15 days before the audit. This is a key step as it sets the stage to provide the 
records against which actual financial and physical audit can be done. But getting this information 
from the block level has proved to be key challenge for the social audit process, causing a major 
hindrance to the social audit process. To address this issue of delay and non-provision of records, 
the GoAP issued a ruling memo (Appendix K: Memo # 2525) on 10 March 2013. The memo fixed 
the responsibility for producing the records on the Assistant Program Officer (APO). Failure to 
produce such records required for the social audit process would trigger an immediate suspension 
for the APO. In addition, only if records were provided of at least 75% of works on which 
expenditure had been made since the last social audit, would social audit processes take place. For 
public works under MGNREGA that were done in convergence with another government 
168 
 
department, the district collector was made responsible for making such records available under 
Section 25 of the MGNREG Act, failing which a fine would be imposed on him. 
 
h) Social Audit Independent Observers related initiatives – SSAAT has also started to focus on 
the independent observer system. Though this area requires significant additional attention, SSAAT 
current initiatives to strengthen the observer system in the field include (SSAAT, 2013): 
 training for independent observers identified by the government;  
 attendance and performance review of the observers in the monthly review meetings;  
 a proposal to have independent observers from civil society;  
 preparing guidelines for their performance. 
 
i) Onsite data entry and technical estimates – Another issue with the social audit was its earlier 
objective to make audit reports readily available to the general public. Before 2011, the existing 
model was to send all reports to an off-site state office that had the capacity to enter the data and 
reports onto a computer. However, not only did issues arise in terms of translation of audit reports, 
but there was also an added danger of information being lost in transit. In 2011, SSAAT decided 
to develop the capacity to generate such reports at the block level itself. 
 
In 2011 after a great deal of brainstorming it was decided that data entry of the social audit 
reports at the mandal (block) level would be done online so that the soft copy of the reports 
would go in a time-bound manner. Data management of the social audit reports in SSAAT 
continues to be an extremely challenging task. 
 
The system for capture of technical inputs for preparation of detailed inputs and 
generation of detailed estimates using the AP MGNREGS software is adequate, and is 
worthy of emulation in other states (CAG, Audit Report, 2013). 
 
Establishing accessible and accountable micro-level processes for complaints, recourse and 
arbitration 
The overall idea here was to improve access to recourse and arbitration for the rural underprivileged, 
strengthening their ability to articulate issues. Bourdieu’s subjective view of objectivity sees social classes 
in a particular field as defined by their nature and the relativity of their connection to each other. The habitus 
integrates how each class views itself and others. This subjective point of view, built over time, creates 
objective classes and defines the structure of the field and the roles of players – “structured and structuring 
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dispositions” (Bourdieu, 1980, p. 53). In MGNREGS, the social class lines at the village level have been 
built over generations and are clearly visible through capitals that are valued and the volume of such 
economic, cultural and political capitals held (Bourdieu, 2011, p. 47). Represented through Bourdieu’s 
“doxa,” such views and perspectives are, knowingly and unknowingly, carried and reproduced by players. 
Doxa are an “invisible power which can be exercised only with the complicity of those who do not want to 
know that they are subject to it or even that they themselves exercise it” (Bourdieu, 1991, p. 164). 
 
The GoAP and SSAAT focused on creating a structure that allowed rural villagers to express concerns, 
demand answers and hold public officials accountable. This includes toll-free complaints numbers, 
complaint days at block and district levels, and the presence of block and district officials at regular and 
social-audit gram sabhas where questions and grievances may be aired. Villagers experience increased 
accessibility to these offices as they have heard from the SSAAT youth about them. Although there are 
complaint days at the block level, some go straight to the weekly district level to complain (interview #55), 
skipping local governance and distributions of power. Some use the toll-free number. Some work with local 
activists to use RTI. The district-level legal department is tasked with keeping track of grievances made 
and constructing action-taken reports, identifying culprits among both village representatives and public 
officers, and pursuing legal and other recourse to punishment and recovery of public money. Support for 
various mechanisms of recourse includes a stronger district and state vigilance wing, multi-level audits and 
post-audit follow-up on financial and legal aspects of complaints.  
 
My field visits at the block and village level provided a healthy level of information on how various micro 
processes connected to larger program practices. Given my sociocultural knowledge of the field, the visits 
also brought surprises in the form of financial knowledge and awareness. Communications with individual 
and groups of the rural villagers displayed the conversation and free exchange of views and information 
relating to expectations from a gram sabha, the process of raising issues and complaints redressal, types of 
information to be disclosed and made available, documents presented, representation by public and non-
public participants in this meeting, and the track record of previous issues and complaints raised. 
Connecting this information to primary and secondary data reveals a difference in how rural citizens 
understand the financial workings of the program processes and their role in it. In one interview, a middle-
aged man who has worked under MGNREGS talked about knowing when his deposited wages or the costs 
associated with projects (available through wall painting) did not seem right, and the subsequent discussion 
on the same issue within the village. Insights such as these are indicative of the increased potential of citizen 
oversight, physical, operational and financial. Interviewees at the village mentioned that compared to 
“before,” they now keep a close watch over financial and operational aspects of the program. Multiple 
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cycles of sustained and supported implementation processes have contributed to an increased sense of 
ownership of these funds as the village discussed and figured out how “their money” from MGNREGA 
will be put to use in the village.  
 
MGNREGS: Performance and outcomes 
This section provides support for the earlier analysis through some publicly available quantitative data on 
the performance of the MGNREGS program nationally and in Andhra Pradesh. Extant research has 
identified a stronger trend towards performance measurement in the public sector.  
 
The NPM literature is prolific in its exploration of public performance management and the adoption of 
private sector management techniques (Brignall & Modell, 2000; Modell, 2004; Broadbent & Guthrie, 
1992; Hood, 1995) in public services delivery in developed nations. Extant literature has looked at the 
connection between strategic management and performance measurement.  Kloot & Martin (2000) focus 
on performance management in local governance using Kaplan & Norton’s (1992) balanced scorecard. 
Skaerbaek & Tryggestad (2010) connect accounting and corporate strategy through Callon’s (1998) notion 
of performativity. A very important factor is the functionality of accounting and accountability practices. 
Can their program impact at this level and be made visible through various parameters? Were public 
resources used efficiently and effectively at a national level and at the state level in Andhra Pradesh?  
 
A 2009 World Bank Report (IBRD-World Bank, 2009) argues that MGNREGS is hurting the country’s 
economic development and poverty alleviation by creating barriers to migration and internal mobility. The 
report states that “the current policies do not allow communities to fully capture the benefits of labour 
mobility” (p. 163). In direct contrast, the World Bank’s 2014 World Development Report and its 2015 
report “The state of social safety nets 2015” praise the achievement of the MGNREGS program: 
 
India’s rural employment guarantee programme MGNREGA has been ranked as the world’s largest 
public works programme, providing a social security net to almost 15 per cent of the country's 
population, World Bank has said. India is among the five middle-income countries running the 
world's largest social safety net programmes.… The top honours for public works programme went 
to MGNREGA (Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act) with 182 million 
beneficiaries or 15 per cent of India’s population (The Economic Times, 2015; World Bank, 2015). 
 
India's midday meal scheme has been classified as biggest school feeding programme, benefiting 
105 million beneficiaries.… The World Bank ranked the Janani Suraksha Yojna with 78 million 
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beneficiaries as the top-most social security programme with conditional cash transfers.… Also, it 
ranked the Indira Gandhi National Old Age Pension Scheme as the second-largest unconditional 
cash transfer social security programme in the world (The Economic Times, 2015; World Bank, 
2015). 
 
Audits and control regimes are not usually considered a strength of India’s public-sector accountability 
mechanisms. However, they are a key element for states aiming to achieve program objectives and improve 
MGNREGS implementation performance. As this shift of capital increased over the course of the program 
implementation, the monopolistic and oligopolistic power hierarchies at the village level became cracked, 
encouraging and strengthening involvement and participation in local accountability processes by rural 
citizens. This was reflected in the growing number of financial and operational complaints registered, 
number of staff investigated, penalized and dismissed, and amount of MGNREGS funds found to be 
misappropriated by SSAAT. In many successive program cycles, a substantial amount of misappropriated 
funds were recovered back. In many cases, public funds was recovered back from perpetrators. This set 
new examples and created a new norm of cognitive and sociocultural learning for the villages. 
 
The World Development Report 2014 has described the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural 
Employment Guarantee Act as a “stellar example of rural development.” At the heart of the World 
Bank’s endorsement is the direct cash transfer (to bank and postal savings accounts) component of 
the rural employment programme (Economic Times, 2013).  
 
A Comptroller and Auditor General audit (CAG, 2013, p. xi) conducted beneficiary surveys and found 
an improvement in both migration and quality of lives of workers. This included the income they earned, 
their expenditure pattern and their bargaining power. Payments in Andhra Pradesh are currently made 
through the postal departments and the VOs. Delayed payment is being tracked at five levels – the bank, 
mandal level (MPDO), VOs, post offices and smart cards. 
 
Report to the people (2006–10) 
According to the central government, in FY 2008–09, 45.1 million households were provided employment 
and 2.16 billion person-days of employment were generated. 68.6 million MGNREGA-related bank and 
post office accounts were opened to disburse wages in 2008–09. Funds available with the districts during 
2008–09 under NREGA was Rs. 373.97 billion. Of this, Rs. 299.4 billion were released by the central 
government while the opening balance contributed Rs. 42.26 billion. In 2008–09 73% of funds available or 
Rs. 272.50 billion were utilized in program implementation. Additionally, the MoRD increased 
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administrative cost from 4% to 6% of the total cost to provide additional support towards deploying 
additional personnel critical to implementation, including the gram rozgar sewak (village Employment 
Officer) at the gram panchayat level and program officer, engineers, and IT and accounts personnel at the 
block level. Up to FY 2008–09, 60 million job cards and 12 million muster roll records had been created 
on the MIS (MoRD, 2010). 
 
Report to the people (2011)  
According to this central government report, up to December 2011 the program has generated a cumulative 
11.12 billion person-days. In 2011, MGNREG provided employment to 37.7 million households generating 
1.20 billion person-days through the undertaking of approximately 8,251,000 public works across rural 
India (MoRD, 2011). Almost 70% of the funds released were expended on wages. Over the last six years 
the average wage earned rose from Rs. 65 per person-day in 2006 to Rs. 100 by 2011. In FY 2011–12 (up 
to December 2011) 3.77 crore households were provided employment and 120.88 crore person-days of 
employment were generated.  
 
Social audit 
In the year 2008–09, the total reported amount of misappropriated funds recovered through social audit was 
Rs. 58.9 million, while the number of government staff dismissed and suspended stood at 3,241 and 139 
respectively (SSAAT, 2009). By 2010–11, the total amount recovered through social audit was Rs. 209.5 
million, while the number of public officers dismissed and suspended was 3,111 and 561. The total 
misappropriated amount identified by the audit was at a much higher level of Rs. 1.05 billion (SSAAT, 
2011).  
 
In 2012–13, social audit was conducted in 20,946 gram panchayats in Andhra Pradesh. It found deviations 
of approximately 5.04% of the funds audited, which amounted to 2.97 billion of which approximately Rs. 
7.1 million was recovered. The total number of individuals held responsible for misappropriation were 
22,337, though this does not translate into number of officers dismissed or suspended. The total number of 
persons held responsible as per social audit has increased by 28%. Of these employees, Financial Advisors 
(FAs) make up by far the highest percentage at 72%, followed by village-level Technical Assistants (at 
17%, Assistant Program Officers (APOs) at 5%, MPDOs at 4% and the remainder 0at 2%. 
 
Role of accounting and accountability processes 
The preceding sections provide extensive, rich and detailed analysis of the various smaller elements that 
build up to make the MGNREGS program. I have also provided detailed analysis of the contribution of 
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important meso players such as the GoAP and the social audit practice by Andhra Pradesh’s SSAAT. The 
aim of this smaller subsection is to take a step back and connect this rich data and analysis to the larger goal 
of exploring and analyzing the role of accounting as an agent of learning, sense making and change at the 
micro level. 
 
As the world’s largest social security program (World Bank, 2015), the MGNREGS has a decentralized 
framework characterized by a distributed administrative and control system design that has to function 
across a variety of operational, physical (McCarthy, 2014) and hierarchical areas. Though this public-
private space is formally constructed and supported (Jenlink & Jenlink, 2008) by central and state 
governments, it is non-static and equally defined by its differential social access (Staeheli & Mitchell, 2004, 
p. 147) and distribution of local capitals at the village level. As the program has progressed through more 
than eight annual cycles, its accounting processes can be connected to various intended and unintended 
consequences (Burchell et al., 1980). In Andhra Pradesh it has proven itself to be flexible, tying the 
calculative economic to the organizational and the social. In the economic, accounting practices are seen to 
connect to various activities and financial flows, shaping the formation of the “possibilities of action” 
(Hopwood & Miller, 1994, p. 2) for the program. At an organizational level, it has allowed the central 
government (specifically, the Department of Rural Development) and the state government (GoAP) to 
track, benchmark and evaluate micro-level performances, but it is at the socioeconomic level in village life 
that accounting can been seen in its capacity to “change the world in different ways” (Hopwood & Miller, 
1994, p. 3). 
 
Invoking literature connected to cognitive learning and routines, the social audit platform along with the 
other public-grievance redressal mechanisms created new and shared ways of processing information and 
forming generalizations. It influenced the learnings and understandings connected to accounting and 
accountability data and practices in MGNREGS. Over the course of the program implementation, such 
patterns of conscious and unconscious reasoning and perceptions became imbued with shared meaning and 
embedded into thought process and behaviours at a local level (habitus). Slowly, newer understandings 
associated with the voicing of issues and seeing action being taken became a natural accepted part of the 
structure, sociocultural norms and understandings at the local level (habitus). This group-based learning 
also spreads the establishment of new routines and newer ground rules. It shapes how the users of these 
accounting and accountability practices, particularly at the village level, see themselves. These practices 
extend beyond the program to make an impact on the socioeconomic structures and arrangements in the 
daily lives of underprivileged rural citizens.  
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a) Accounting and accountability: Learning and sense-making agents 
 
The two biggest complaints against the MGNREGA, however, are ones that are not often aired in 
public, perhaps because they might show the critic in poor moral light. One, the MGNREGA has 
altered the power balance between the landless poor and their employers (agricultural landlords, 
labour contractors), making it less loaded in favour of the latter; two, by raising rural incomes, it 
has decreased distress migration to the cities, thereby reducing the numbers of the reserve army of 
labour, and increasing the cost of labour (The Hindu, May 2015). 
 
Though there is growing understanding of program budgeting, implementation and audit processes, one 
also has to consider the situatedness and embodiment of the rural villager in his social setting (Jaegher & 
Paolo, 2007, pp. 485-487). It is the everyday interactions with each other, with outsiders and with 
accounting processes that can lead to a change in perspective on how things can be done. Sense making is 
connected to a process whereby one attaches meaning to specific experiences (Weick, 1995). These 
meanings, experiences, and the resulting connections among things, places, events and people help an 
individual or a group form learnings and decisions about current and future actions and reactions. 
Individuals take certain actions based on such sense making, and the results of these actions add to their 
understanding of what may be the best options for future actions (Weick, 1988). In a similar manner I would 
argue that at the village level, accounting processes and artifacts connected to MGNREGS have acted as a 
learning and sense-making tool, shaping the motivations and actions of the villagers (Ahrens & Chapman, 
2007, p. 2). 
 
And this is how: For the villagers, accounting practices in MGNREGS have provided a unifying platform 
that link rural stakeholders to knowledge, learning and resources. This platform and the construction of 
artifacts has encouraged debate, discussion and communication not only informally with each other but also 
on formal platforms with external stakeholders. An example of this would be the special gram sabha for as 
best as their capitals allow them.  
 
Citizen-based accountability, one of Andhra Pradesh’s visions of MGNREGS, seems to have influenced 
the local habitus significantly. The inter-subjectivity of a cultural habitus exists beyond individual identities 
or individual habitus because it originates from and is perpetuated by a collective (Llewellyn, 2008). Visible 
power is definable with formal rules, structures, procedures and institutions. Yet power manifests itself not 
only in structured, formal decision making but also in other participative spaces such as community 
meetings and village-level consultations (Gaventa, 2006, p. 14). Hidden power connected to powerful 
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hidden individuals can influence visible decision makers and agendas, while invisible power can be an 
internalized version of power that includes beliefs, shared definition of culture, ideology, place in society, 
and acceptance of situations, shaping the level of participation. Here, adopting a practice-based approach 
can radically transforms our view of knowledge, meaning and discourse (Nicolini, Gherardi, & Yanow, 
2003). 
 
Conclusion: Continuing challenges 
This final analysis chapter has presented yet another level of analysis of the progression of MGNREGS. In 
keeping with the multi-level research perspective, the reader gets an increased sense of how the program 
unfolded at the micro level, the various stakeholders, and the practices and processes that make up the 
MGNREGS program in its final set of layers. The inquiry I provide at the district, block and village level 
adds an increased understanding to our view of the program. I also focus on the specific mechanisms such 
the labour budget and social audit that originate at this level. From the design of the program, we followed 
it to the state government’s efforts to build and implement a successful program. This chapter also gives us 
a clearer idea of what makes up the program at the ground level as the shifts and changes we see at the 
grass-root levels. The program implementation has come a long way from its origins eight years ago in the 
NREG Act. 
 
In spite of the changes and growth in the program outlined in this chapter, there still remain significant 
issues for program implementation and for the social audit process, requiring substantial program 
improvements.  
 
Though there is a growing awareness about the social audit process in the villages and amongst the 
beneficiaries, there remain significant challenges in getting more individuals to attend gram sabha meetings. 
Local-level socioeconomic power is still commanded by the rural elite and they continue to make efforts to 
intimidate the villagers and block their ability to participate. SSAAT has recently initiated the practice of 
hiring District Resource Persons (DRPs) based on the number of rural individuals they have mobilized to 
attend the social-audit gram sabha. The number of social audits in the last year has dropped mainly due to 
non-provision of records by block offices. As result, many audits could not be conducted as they were 
waiting for records, or took longer as teams waited in specific blocks for records or spent more time in the 
field trying to audit.  
 
The percentage of recovery went down sharply in the last financial year. Field feedback indicates a common 
perception of EGS employees that paying back of money for a recovery is an admission of guilt that will 
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lead to legal action against them later. Therefore, there has been a sharp decline in the instances of recovery 
(SSAAT). Even with all the progress made, there still exist opportunities for misappropriation along the 
delivery process line. Data recording, oversight and grievance redressal at block and village levels are still 
facing issues of capacity and oversight. Though identification of monies misappropriated and officers 
responsible is done by SSAAT, identified to have misappropriated, recovery of public funds by the 
vigilance wing in Andhra Pradesh has lagged.  
 
However, key progress in the form of the role of accounting in financial learning and sense making, and its 
contribution to the emancipation of underprivileged rural citizens, cannot be underestimated. I would 
reiterate the hundreds of years of accumulated sociocultural history that has led to isolation, poverty and 
lack of power for this lowest strata of the Indian social. Accounting practices and construction of artifacts 
connected the villagers to resources, knowledge and a platform for interaction with the outside world and 
with each other. In line with studies outlining the neglected dimension of the emancipatory potential of 
accounting (Dillard, 1991; Gallhofer et al., 2006; Gallhofer & Haslam, 2006, Gallhofer & Haslam, 2004), 
these processes and support have reshaped some of the long-held perspectives, attitudes, understandings, 
actions and sense-of-place understandings that earlier held both the rural poor and the local powerful.  
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Chapter 7: Concluding Thoughts 
 
Summary 
Funding and delivery in the social services field is populated by a variety of public and non-public 
organizations (Llewellyn, 1997; Ebrahim, 2003) and is undergoing a period of significant restructuring and 
changes in program delivery, citizen participation, performance evaluation and accountability, in both 
developed and developing countries. These conditions facilitate a unique set of observations and 
understandings as these program go through growth and transformative cycles. 
 
This dissertation began with the outlining of serious issues in India’s MGNREGS, one of the world’s largest 
social services workfare programs, which operates in rural India. Multi-level problems, related to inefficient 
program delivery and large-scale misappropriation of public funds, were accompanied by many other 
systemic issues. With the program built around accounting and accountability, the challenge for 
accountability was also a challenge for accounting practices and systems. For the most part, accounting 
practices and artifacts are largely presented as a part of the problem in public media. This motivated me to 
look at the public accounts, where I found not only wide diversity in state performances but also 
underrepresentation of sites that presented alternative possibilities of reform and change. 
 
Though central government is the designer of the program, it is not directly connected to implementation 
at the meso and micro levels. The central framework was passed from the MoRD to the state governments, 
which were responsible for interpreting and translating central program objectives and notions of 
accountability into state-level objectives and strategies befitting their own contextual vision, goals, 
resources and needs. This forced me to wonder about how accounting may have been enlisted differently 
at various levels in the struggles for implementation, accountability and transparency in the program. There 
was also the question of how non-dominant interests (rural citizens) fared in change processes in a program 
that envisioned rural citizens as a source of vigilance and control at the micro level, holding elected and 
government-appointed village officials to account. 
 
Consequently, following the unfolding of the program over eight annual cycles, I looked at public accounts 
generated by the MoRD such as operational guidelines and other formal communications. At the state level 
I examined primary and secondary public accounts of Andhra Pradesh, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh and Tamil 
Nadu that included official communications, reports, policy decisions and rulings. At the micro village 
level, I looked at primary and secondary accounts including audit reports from the Comptroller Auditor 
General (CAG), government communication, non-public research and media reports. These supplement 
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primary interview data collected from each level of investigation across central, state, district, block and 
village levels. 
 
Before exploring these primary and secondary accounts, however, it was important to have a theoretical 
framework and extant literature to underpin such analysis. Therefore, I have provided an overview not only 
of broader literatures connected to social services, public sector and accountability, accounting and 
accountability, but also of more specific literatures connected to each level of analysis: strategic MCS and 
accountability, routines and learning, budgeting and social audit, and power and emancipation. Drawing on 
Bourdieu’s practice theory and change frameworks, I have explored the role of accounting in the design, 
construction and implementation of accountability and larger organizational and social change processes 
through eight annual cycles of design and implementation. 
 
The first analysis chapter focused on the macro, central-government level and its vision of accountability. 
At the centre, the MoRD designed an overarching national program framework for MGNREGS applicable 
to all states. Amongst other things, it drew on a certain combination of policy, accounting and administrative 
practices and artifacts in an enabling role to articulate a program structure in keeping with the NREG 
legislation and its vision for the program. This chapter focused on how accountability is framed, 
communicated and diffused to the state governments as well as the struggles between the macro and meso 
levels. I drew on Bourdieu to outline the distribution of capitals and the struggles for power between central 
and state governments. 
 
The second analysis chapter focused on the meso layer – the state government, which draws upon practices 
such as accounting to construct a specific notion of accountability in the program implementation.  The 
state interprets the central vision to construct its own specific combination of people, resources, goals and 
objectives for the program. Faced with system inefficiencies and corruption, I have investigated the 
strategic enlistment of accounting practices and artifacts, particularly MCS, in accountability and reform 
processes in the state of Andhra Pradesh. I drew on Bourdieu’s practice theory and literature on strategic 
MCS to provide a practice-based perspective of accountability of a program in flux as players negotiate the 
field and its distribution of powers and capitals. The analysis explored the struggles and efforts of the 
Andhra Pradesh government over an eight-year period towards reform at the meso-micro level as it makes 
efforts to deal with systemic inefficiency and corruption within the organization. 
 
The final analysis chapter focused on the micro level – the program’s largest non-public stakeholder group, 
the rural citizens who are provided local work through MGNREGS. I have outlined micro level 
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socioeconomic oppression and struggle and investigate the functioning of accounting as a learning and 
sense-making agent. This is the level at which accounting also plays the role of distributive agent with the 
power to shape social relationships, the lives of villagers, and the resources they access. Towards larger 
change processes, I have examined how various mechanisms and processes can be connected through a 
gradual shift in habitus (as per Bourdieu) to financial and process learning, knowledge and awareness at 
the village level. 
 
Findings and implications of the study 
Two major findings follow from my attempt to answer my research questions. The first is that in 
MGNREGS, accounting is enlisted in multiple constitutive roles within the life cycle of a single social 
services program delivery process. Depending on the level of investigation and stakeholder interest 
represented, accounting is a part of the ordering, organization and multi-level change processes in 
organizational and social spaces (Neu, 2006, p. 391) in three specific contexts – the end-to-end process of 
framing, construction and implementation of accountability (macro, meso and micro levels); public-sector 
reform (meso and micro levels); and learning and emancipation (micro level). These enabling, strategic and 
learning roles, played out in uncertain and dynamic conditions, showcase the struggles and challenges 
through which, in practice, accounting can shape material arrangements –structure, players, habitus and 
field logics – in the field of social services in India.  
 
The second finding, at the meso and micro level of analysis, is connected to evidence alluding to the 
“making up people” (Miller & O’Leary, 1990, p. 483) – the influence of accounting on the actions and 
behaviour of players. In MGNREGS, instead of a priori grounding, we follow the change, reform, 
innovation and establishment of new accounting practices. The analysis points to different players at various 
levels understanding and enlisting accounting differently towards change processes (p. 483). More 
importantly, we see the manner in which accounting practices and artifacts influence people such as rural 
citizens and local governance officials – through the shaping of their powers, information, and the nature 
of accountability demanded and provided. This in turn affects the options, behaviour and actions of 
stakeholders as well as outcomes in the subfield. The theoretical notion of habitus also captures this 
internalization of field logics, understandings and capitals expressed in thought, impression and action. 
Specifically, I focus on the underprivileged micro-level rural citizens who gradually become constructed 
as “account holders” – more aware of and connected to the nature of economic and financial knowledge, 
democratic decision making, and holding themselves and other to account. Accounting becomes the means 
to learn new ways of implementation and financial visibility and calculation, and to increase their individual 
and group capacities to hold certain elected representatives and government representatives accountable. 
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The theoretical and contextual implications of this dissertation flow from Chapters 4 through 6, which focus 
on data analysis. 
 
The first implication is connected to conversations around “making accountancy practical” (Miller & 
O’Leary, 1990). In MGNERGS, not only is accounting constructed and influenced by its environment but 
it also influences the organization and the social, an effect to which Miller & O’Leary (1990, pp. 479–480) 
refer as “the organizational consequences of accounting.” This research project captures practice-based 
changes not only on an organizational level but also in the lived life of rural citizens in India. The analysis 
reflects decades of systemic domination of the rural poor. Moving away from “banality” as outlined by Neu 
(2001), accounting is seen as a dynamic social practice that is not only intentionally enlisted and shaped 
towards fulfilling specific functions in larger governance canvasses but also in turn shapes its contextual 
environment and subjects. Accounting is only a mechanism, a tool of visibility and quantification but a 
contributor to the transformation of socioeconomic relations through changes in the material arrangements 
and distribution of powers. Drawing on Bourdieu to capture both continuity and change (Reay, 2004), we 
see accounting practices playing an important part in redefining what we perceive as the practice of 
accounting and accountability as it intersects with the newer roles of government in the daily lives of India’s 
rural citizens. 
 
Second, this dissertation also focuses habitus as a process reflecting gradual and accumulated shifts in the 
habitus of players at various levels. The underlying tacit and explicit understandings, rules and learnings 
connected to the field and subfield in such change processes is continually redefined, renegotiated and 
institutionalized through the MGNREGS design and implementation process (Gherardi & Nicolini, 2000). 
This means that adding temporality and historical context, shifts in such habitus can be seen as a processes 
of internalization and externalization in this setting. 
 
Third, Bourdieu’s social produces the individual and the individual produces the social. I have utilized 
Bourdieu’s practice theory by exploring social services as a field, with state, district, block and village 
levels as nested subfields having their own specific sets of logics, habitus and capitals. MGNREGS can 
thus be seen to bring the social into the financial and the financial into the social. It produces sites where 
the financial is intentionally brought into the social through citizen participation in practices such as 
budgeting and social audit. Through such participation, accounting practices and construction of accounting 
artifacts influence the social understandings of rural citizens and other local stakeholders. In turn, we also 
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see how MGNREGS brings the social element of a welfare program into the bottom-up production of state-
wide and national budgets and audit processes that express local social priorities. 
 
Fourth, the notion of accountability represents different types of accounts. In this dissertation, we also draw 
upon public and citizen-based forms of accountability as interpreted and put into practice. The exploration 
of accountability acts as a lens through which larger organizational and social change processes can be 
observed.  Thus accountability serves as an instrument of analysis (Everett, 2001, p. 344) in this dissertation 
– an underexplored perspective in accounting research. 
 
Fifth, the multi-level perspective offered by this dissertation provides a processual view, following a 
program as it flows from a macro central design to micro implementation at the village level. In research, 
based on the research question(s), a certain phenomenon can be explored through various theories and 
frameworks. In most cases, this phenomenon, its influences, and connected stakeholders are analyzed or 
explained from the same level – a process that is known as individual level outcomes (Diez-Roux, 2000, 
pp. 171–173). In contrast, multi-level qualitative analysis of MGNERGS allows a more comprehensive 
exploration of group level interests, habitus, stakeholders and sociocultural influences at various stages of 
program development and implementation connecting to nested fields and subfields. 
 
Limitations of the study 
Bourdieu’s field, capitals and habitus – As with most interpretive theoretical frameworks, drawing on 
Bourdieu’s practice theory brings its own set of limitations. First, Bourdieu’s habitus has been challenged 
as being difficult to operationalize in terms of linking of social and mental structures. Habitus is 
unconscious internalization, which it has been argued may not be easy to observe purely through interviews. 
Bourdieu’s theoretical tools have been criticized for a structure that sees players as having only a finite and 
known set of capitals and strategies to deal with in a field, which could translate into an implied social 
determinism (Everett, 2001, p. 353). Though I did conduct in-depth interviews with individual at various 
levels and with different interest, recognition of possession of all important forms of strategy as well as 
legitimate and symbolic capitals are tricky to identify and analyze in a multi-level investigation such as 
this. The exercise becomes more complicated when one considers that based on what is valued in a field or 
subfield, some forms of capital can be converted into other forms, such as economic, raising additional 
issues about misrecognition. So overall, I may not be able to mount a strong defence of the criticism of 
implied social determinism in this research project. The analysis here is based on my understanding, 
perception, interpretation and triangulation of MGNREGS as a field with its specific players, capitals and 
habitus. 
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Definition and investigation of change processes – Research on change can be a contested notion in 
qualitative research. Literature reflects struggles with many such questions, including how to explore 
learning and change, what contributes to an increase in learning and knowledge transfer, and what role 
organizational routines play as one critical phenomenon in change (Pentland & Feldman, 2005, p. 793). 
Some of these constraints can be connected to the development of markers through which such changes can 
be observed and measured. In this dissertation, I adapt and use Fiol & Lyles’ (1985) summarized range of 
outcomes through which organizational shifts can be identified and analyzed. These include new insights 
and knowledge; new structures; new systems; new actions; or a combination of these options (p. 803). In 
the chapters devoted to analysis, I explore changes in structure, system, and the actions of actors as well as 
the role played by new understandings, insights and knowledge at macro, meso and micro level. 
 
Scale of the program – Many strategy and organizational studies have been conducted on a small scale in 
real time, allowing for a structured gathering of data, but this methodology would not be suitable for a large 
scale empirical study in a setting such as MGNREGS. For large-scale programs such as MGNREGS, 
focused on rural poverty and emancipation, providing a comprehensive critical examination of its change 
manifestations reveals some limitations in terms of temporal, geographical and official access. Being 
granted official access to the program sites, officers and documents felt like both a learning process and a 
small achievement. Still, I had to cope with many last-minute cancellations to sites where state governments 
were not comfortable with external scrutiny. Second, there were also some barriers to observing, 
documenting and measuring real-time changes in a longitudinal investigation of a vast program with 
complex local dynamics. To address this, I have gone through an extended process of triangulation of 
themes from primary data as well as significant amounts of secondary data from multiple sources. 
 
Research perspective and ontology/epistemology – A story can be seen from different perspectives. This 
is not strictly a limitation, as I believe no one perspective can provide a complete picture, if such 
completeness is thought to exist. As Pichert & Anderson (1977) examine, a researcher’s internal schema 
(epistemology and ontology) influence her perspective as well as which sites or phenomena are deemed 
interesting to research. Each researcher thus brings to the table his strength of perspective and interpretation 
on the nature of knowledge and its creation. These affect the manner in which the research questions are 
framed as well as the theoretical frameworks and methodology selected. To this end, my interpretive, 
inductive research orientation precludes alternative perspectives such as behavioural or positivist research 
that might lean more strongly towards deductive work, uncovering “reality” through statistical methods 
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based on numerical data. I believe that each dissertation and research study adds one more thread to the 
tapestry of our overall understanding of a subject. 
 
Limitations and biases of the researcher – Bourdieu has spoken strongly about reflexivity. As a 
researcher, I bring my particular sense of biases to every research project. In this research project, I have 
made every effort to be reflexive of my own biases, social conditioning and training as a researcher. But I 
also realize that being aware of one’s own biases is a learning exercise that grows with one’s experience as 
a researcher. 
 
There is also an element of localization wherein developing countries are known to have a specific set of 
issues connected to public reforms and corruption (Rahaman, Everett, & Neu, 2007) connecting to the larger 
role of organizations in stakeholder participation and governance (Crane, Matten, & Moon, 2004). Dar 
(2011), for example, explores the distinction between Western and non-Western accountabilities. She finds 
that local information can impact local levels of empowerment and that accountability at the micro level 
encompasses local power dynamics such as caste, gender and social status. During the data gathering 
process, I spent time in various state and district block offices and villages where I met with individuals 
connected to the program across a variety of positions and functions. I also made written observations of 
contextual environments and informal conversations that were a part of the interview but not digitally 
recorded. As a woman who grew up in India, I do possess a keener awareness than most Western researchers 
of the imbalances of power, resources and struggles that happen at such sites, but I cannot hope to speak 
personally for those who have lived below the poverty line in rural India for generations. 
 
Generalizations – Qualitative research grants most researchers the space to conduct detailed, rich and in-
depth data collection and analysis. However, such research has also raised questions about generalizations. 
Drawing broader inferences from particular observations seems to be widely accepted as a quality standard 
in quantitative studies but not in qualitative ones (Polit & Beck, 2010). I have to acknowledge that I have 
looked at smaller random samples which are to be representative of the overall field or subfield. Through 
inductive analysis and triangulations, I conceptualized broader themes and constructs from in-depth 
interviews and secondary data (Polit & Beck, 2010, p. 1452; Firestone, 1993). Such triangulation of data 
and generated themes, combined with rich, detailed, contextual descriptions and analysis, can produce 
genuine, insightful and authentic research insights and findings that, in the words of Thorn (2009, p. 1385), 
“warrant a degree of generalizability in relation to a field of understanding.” 
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Limited prior research in this field – Prior research studies form not only the bedrock of a literature 
review but also situate new contributions to the literature. The role of accounting in accountability is not 
new but the field of social services with its particular characteristics and objectives is particularly 
underexplored. In addition, the few studies that have been conducted have a singular-level focus, which 
makes it somewhat more challenging to establish the research problems being investigated. 
 
Future research directions 
With the steady growth in aging populations around the world and the economic displacement of 
underprivileged populations in many non-developed nations due to various natural and human-made 
reasons, social and developmental programs are going to play an increasingly important role in human 
affairs. Given the scale of this program and the scope of this dissertation, to my understanding a number of 
research directions emerge from this study. 
 
The first potential future research direction comes from the field of investigation. This particular research 
project focused on an underexplored research area in accounting in a non-developed-world site (Gray, 
Dillard, & Spence, 2009). Most of the current research is conducted on NGOs by agencies such as the 
World Bank. There is much more to be understood about the role of accounting in the delivery of public 
social services in developing nations and future research could address this gap. Additionally, my research 
project included many key stakeholder perspectives, but there are still other alternate discourses and 
important players such as self-help groups (SHGs) and community-based organizations (CBOs) that have 
both a stake in the program and significant influence on the micro-field, but whose voices are yet to be 
heard and investigated.  
 
The second direction comes from the nature of this investigation. The link between accounting and 
accountability has been firmly established by extant research. However, accountability is also seen as an 
ever-expanding concept (Mulgan, 2000). A more in-depth ethnological investigation could provide more 
opportunities to study and gain more nuanced knowledge of the role and functioning of accounting and 
accountability at individual and micro village levels. 
 
Third, as the MGNREGS program further matures, there is a need not only to study the mechanics and 
indicators of accounting and change processes but also to perform a deeper analysis of how specific 
phenomena such as corruption, resistance and social domination unfold, both in states that perform well in 
the program and in those that do not. Fourth, the social audit and associated collaborative budgeting 
practices are still evolving as implementation continues, and as understandings and changes accumulate at 
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both organizational and individual levels. The multi-level research approach used in this dissertation could 
create opportunities for similar research in other accounting areas. 
 
Finally, the meso- and micro-level investigations of my program focused strongly on the program 
experience in the state of Andhra Pradesh, with data from other state sites adding support or contrast to the 
analysis conducted and insights gained. If we are gaining increased understandings of accounting and 
accountability from Andhra Pradesh, there could be more to learn from (and for) states in India that are 
faring far worse with the implementation of MGNRGS. This could create future opportunities for 
comparative studies. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A: Administrative Structure of Panchayati Raj in India 
 
 
 
Source: MoRD 
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Appendix B: Administrative Structure of MGNREGS 
 
 
 
Source: MoRD 
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Appendix C: Work Flow at the District (Meso/Micro) Level 
 
 
Source: MoRD (NIC Initiative): Presentation, “NREGAsoft for National Rural Employment Guarantee 
Act” 
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Appendix D: Work Flow at the Block (Micro) Level – Program Officer 
 
 
Source: MoRD (NIC Initiative): Presentation, “NREGAsoft for National Rural Employment Guarantee 
Act” 
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Appendix E: Work Flow at the Gram Panchayat (Micro) Level 
 
 
Source: MoRD (NIC Initiative): Presentation, “NREGAsoft for National Rural Employment Guarantee 
Act” 
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Appendix F: MGNREGA Outcomes – National Financial Achievements at a Glance 
 
  FY 06–07 FY 07–08 FY 08–09 FY 09–10 FY 10–11 FY 11–12 FY 12–13 FY 13–14 TOTAL 
No. of districts 200 330 615 619 626 626 632   
Households provided 
with employment (Cr.) 
2.10 3.39 4.51 5.26 5.49 5.04 4.16   
Budget outlay 
(Rs. Crore) 
11,300 12,000 30,000 39,100 40,100 31,000 30,287 33,000 226,787 
Central release 
(Rs. Crore) 
8640.85 12,610.39 29,939.60 33,506.61 35,768.95 29,189.77 30,009.96 32,743.68 212,409.8 
Total available funds  
(Rs. Crore) 
12,073.55 19,305.81 37,397.06 49,579.19 54,172.14 48,805.68 45,051.43 42,265.45  
 
Expenditure (Rs. Cr.)  
[% of available funds] 
8823.35  
[73%] 
15,856.89  
[82%] 
27,250.10  
[73%]  
37,905.23 
 [76%]  
39,377.27 
[73%]   
37,072.82 
[76%] 
39,657.04 
[88%]  
37,468.65 
[89%] 
243,411.4 
Expenditure on wages  
(Rs. Crore)  
5842.37 
[68%] 
10,738.47  
[70%] 
18,200.03  
[69%] 
25,579.32 
 [70%] 
 25,686.53 
[68%] 
24,306.20 
[70%] 
 27,128.36 
[72%] 
26,096.81 
[74%] 
163,578.09 
[70%] 
Expenditure on 
material (Rs. Cr.) 
2758.77 
[32%] 
4617.47 
[30%] 
8100.89 
[31%] 
11,084.49 
[30%] 
11,891.09 
[32%] 
10,650.48 
[30%] 
10,403.31 
[28%] 
9159.32 
[26%] 
68,665.82 
[30%] 
Total Works taken up 
(Lakhs) 
8.35 17.88 27.75 46.17 50.99 82.51    
Total works completed 
(Lakhs) 
3.87 8.22 12.14 22.59 25.90 18.56    
Total job cards issued 
(Cr.) 
3.78 6.48 10.01 11.25 11.98 12.39    
 
Source: MoRD, 2013–14, p. 9 
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Appendix G: MGNREGA Outcomes – National Program Budget and Program Expenditure 
 
 
Source: MoRD, 2013–14, p. 9 
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State of Andhra Pradesh – MGNREGA 
Appendix H: SSAAT Organizational Structure 
 
 
 
 
Source: SSAAT  
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Appendix I: MGNREGS Outcomes – Andhra Pradesh 
 
 
 
Source: SSAAT Annual Reports 2008-2013, http://www.socialaudit.ap.gov.in/
MNREGS-ANDHRA PRADESH-SSAAT 2008-2009 2009-2010 (as on August 1, 2010)2010-2011 20 1-2012 2012-2013 2014-2015
Number of Blocks where Social Audit (SA) was conducted 1,464        2,070       3,389        1,082        - -
Total amount identified as misappropriated (in Rs. Crore) - 81.97 105.41 135.81 298.14 704.85
Total Amount recovered through SA (in Rs. Crore) 5.9 15.3 20.6 0.7 - 20.6
Number of Field Functionaries implicated - 33,798     16,688     16,063     22,337     -
Total Number of staff dismissed based on SA findings 3,241        3,864       3,111        - - 20,378     
Total number of staff suspended so far 139 1435 561 - 698
Number of punishments imposed - - 32,917     
Total number of police cases booked so far 548 555 229 - 82
Number of Departmental Inquiries / Disciplinary Action 
under progress 1211 1557 - - -
Number of State Resource Persons (SRP's) 100 70 70 77 86
Number of District Resource Persons (DRP's) 450 659 695 875 855 855
Number of Village Reseource Persons (VRP's) trained 60,000     60,000     80,000     33,575     - -
Number of independent observers attended 3,251        
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Appendix J: Redesigned MIS Webpage  
 
 
Source: nrega.ap.gov.in 
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Appendix K: Andhra Pradesh – MGNERGS Policies and rulings – 2006-2014  
Source: nrega.ap.gov.in 
 
2006 Notice to ensure bank/post office bank account shall be opened in 
the name of the individual labourer only 
Memo No. 10063/RD.II/2006; dated 
22.03.2006 
 All MDOs of 13 EGS districts to become familiarized with EGS 
software package and procedure for maintaining files (instructions 
issued)  
Memo No. 10063/RD-II/2006; dated 
15.04.2006 
 To monitor EGS program, District Collector may organize EGS 
mandals into blocks of 2–4 mandals, each under a designated 
district-level Inspecting Officer; IOs will undertake regular 
inspection of EGS works, participate in weekly mandal-level 
meetings, conduct inspection of work, record observations, take 
proper follow-up action and monitor the action taken on the 
inspection reports by the concerned officers 
Ruling- G. O. Rt. No. 1555  
(http://www.rd.ap.gov.in/EGS/EGS_G1O
Rt_No_1555.htm)  
2007 Selection and positioning of village resource persons Memo. No. 23771 
 Filling up of vacancies of Technical Assistants in NREGS-AP 
districts – delegation of powers to district Program Coordinators, 
NREGS-AP (orders issued) 
Go. Ms. No. 506 
 Rural connectivity – laying of cement concrete roads (orders 
issued) 
 
 Implementation of NREGS-AP at mandal level – permission to 
hire a jeep granted to MPDO & PO, EGS  
Circular No. 1740/EGS(P)/2006; dated 
02.02.2008 
2008 Maintenance of muster rolls (certain guidelines issued); works, 
maintenance of measurement books (certain guidelines issued) 
Circular No. 653 
 NREGS-AP – rural connectivity – all-weather roads – laying of 
CC roads (further guidelines and orders issued) 
Go. Ms. No. 45 
 Implementation of NREGS-AP at mandal level – permission to 
hire a jeep granted to MPDO & PO, EGS (further instructions 
issued) 
Circular No. 1740 
 Permission to open SB accounts in any nationalized bank gramted 
to MPDOs at mandal headquarters for payment of salaries 
Circular No. 2013; dated 03.01.2008 
 Software application – release of Version 5.5.2 (changes made to 
information) 
 
 Instructions for affixing photos on job cards in districts of 
Vishakhapatnam, Godavari, and Krishna 
Circular No. 438; dated 11.02.2008 and 
07.02.2008 
 Videoconferencing of Chief Minister with District Collectors held 
on 21.02.2008 
DoLr No. 12310 
 Payment to labour through village organizations in Phase III 
districts (instructions issued) 
Circular No. 312 
2009 NREGS-AP operationalization of central fund management 
system through nodal banks (orders issued) 
Go. Ms. No. 406 
 AP conducting of social audit rules, 2008 Gazette; dated 16.01.2009 
 RD – NREGS-AP – works under rural connectivity project 
(certain guidelines issued) 
Go. Ms. No. 271; dated 08.09.2009 
 NREGS-AP – works in progress status prior to installation 
of software version 6.00 of PMP 
Memo No. 653; dated 18.09.2009 
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 NREGS-AP – implementation of schemes through fixed labour 
groups – establishment – IB wing to impart continuous training 
(orders issued) 
Go. Ms. No. 355; dated 18.11.2009 
 NREGA 2005 –  conduct of social audits in EGS – creation of the 
posts of social audit wing under NREGS-AP (orders issued) 
Go. Ms. No. 171; dated 29.05.2009 
 NREGS-AP – guidelines for mates (in Telugu – local language) Cir. No. 709 
2010 NREGS-AP – operationalization of central fund management 
system through nodal banks (orders issued) 
Go. Ms  No. 406; dated 
29.12.2009/01.01.2010 
 Implementation of scheme through self-help groups (SHGs) of 
SC.ST – ensuring entitlement to poorest labourers using NREGS 
Cir. No. 32; dated 18.01.2010 
 NREGS-AP – operationalization of central fund management 
system – creation of email ID for communication of CFMS 
Rc. No. 706; dated 05.03.2010 
 Formation of AP NGO alliance (APNA) for MGNREGS 
implementation (AP government partners with  rights-based 
NGOs to mobilize rural poor and empower them to make full use 
of entitlements guaranteed by MGNREGA) 
Go. Ms. No. 211; dated 04.06.2010 
 MGNREGS – sramashakti sangam – distribution of books 
(guidelines issued) 
Cir. No. 9; dated 23.07.2010 
 MGNREGS – Information display on street wall board to educate 
labourers  
Cir. No. 421; dated 21.08.2010 
 MGNREGS-AP – implementation of eMMS (guidelines issued) Cir. No. 555; dated 21.12.2010 
 MGNREGS-AP – eMMS – “Own your mobile” scheme – 
payment of mobile charges to service provider  (guidelines issued) 
Cir. No. 555; dated 16.12.2010 
 Rural development – nominating the members for state-level 
vigilance and monitoring committee (orders issued) 
Go. Ms. No. 368; dated 27.10.2010 
 Processes for transparency and accountability facilitating the 
participation of civil society in MGNREGS-AP implementation, 
in processes including muster verification, social audit and 
concurrent audit; inspections by vigilance wing; inspections by a 
dedicated quality control wing; grievance reporting and follow-up 
by an IT-enabled call centre 
Proc. 452; Preceding No. 452/EGS/PM 
(QC)/2010; dated 2.10.2010 
 MGNREGS – formation of “flying squads” (monitoring teams) at 
state level (guidelines issued) – formation of five “flying” 
monitoring teams with at least one technical and one non-
technical member in each team with proven high honesty and 
commitment levels – authorised to verify records such as muster 
rolls, and take up measurement, pay orders, and material 
payments – follow-up actions connected to reports submitted 
http://www.rd.ap.gov.in/EGS/CIR_NO_8
37_EGS_PM_DT_04102010.pdf  
 
Preceding No. 452/EGS/PM (QC)/2010; 
dated 2.10.2010 
 MGNREGS-AP – training for mates – partnership with APNA 
voluntary organization (Reg.) 
Cir. No. 9; dated 01.12.2010 
 MGNREGS – whistle-blowing “shankaravam" complaints 
against fraudulent people involved in EGS works – secrecy of 
complaints, names etc.   
Cir. No. 1453; dated 19.10.2010 
 MGNREGS – EGS employees voluntarily educate labourers to 
sign muster rolls from January 01, 2011 
Cir. No. 1453; dated 19.10.2010 
 MGNREGS – formation of flying squads at state-level (guidelines 
issued)  
Cir. No. 837; dated 04.10.2010 
 MGNREGS – transparency and accountability works division in 
execution of works appointment  
Proc. 452; dated 02.10.2010 
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 MGNREGS – information display on street wall board – educate 
labourers etc.  
Cir. No. 421; dated 21.08.2010 
 Formation of Andhra Pradesh NGO alliance (APNA) for 
MGNREGA  implementation  – addition of 38 NGOs to APNA 
list (orders issued) 
Go. Ms. No. 211; dated 04.06.2010 
2011 MGNREGS-AP – field assistants, technical assistants, computer 
operators, APOs, engineering consultants, MPDOs to provide 
work days (Reg.)  
 
 MGNREGS-AP – implementation of eMMS – GP abstract 
application for field assistants  
Cir. No. 555 
 MGNREGS-AP – providing rural connectivity to unconnected 
habitations (further instructions issued – Reg.)  
Cir. No. 477; dated 10.11.2011 
 MGNREGS-AP – constructions of GP buildings under BNRGSK 
through NREGS funds – issue of work commencement letters to 
WEMs in case of absence of elected local bodies (instructions 
issued – Reg.)  
Cir. No. 39; dated 20.10.2011 
 MGNREGS- AP – implementation of biometrics and GPS based 
eMMS in Nizamabad district – upload of e-measurements and e-
check measurements (guidelines issued) 
Cir. No. 556; dated 21.09.2011 
 MGNREGS- AP – implementation of eMMS – policy for transfer 
of mobile and CUG SIM cards (certain guidelines issued)  
Cir. No. 555; dated 30.08.2011 
 MGNREGS-AP – concurrent social audit – wall writing – social 
audit volunteers responsibility (Reg.)  
Cir. No. 572; dated 22.08.2011 
 MGNREGS-AP – special flying squad members from Bluefrog – 
reporting in districts – certification from PDs (Reg.)  
Cir. No. 555; dated 05.08.2011 
 MGNREGS-AP – linking up of eMMS and pay-order generation 
– implementation of eMMS (certain guidelines issued)  
Cir. No. 555; dated 16.07.2011 
 Requesting TCS to monitor and facilitate Additional  District 
Resource Persons (ADRPs) to take responsibility for half the 
mandals (blocks) in each district 
 Cir. No 14687; dated 02.06.2011 
 MGNREGS  – electronic muster verification system (eMVS) – 
daily verification of musters (Reg.)  
Cir. No. 555; dated 01.06.2011 
 MGNREGS-AP – monitoring of e-musters - new application for 
APOs (Reg.) 
Cir. No. 555; dated 18.03.2011 
2012 Implementation of eMMS – “Own your mobile” scheme (FA 
guidelines issued) 
Cir. No. 555; dated 21.12.2012 
 Payment of wages – AP smart card project – transition to Aadhar-
enabled payment system in four pilot districts (instructions issued) 
Cir. No. 6139; dated 07.12.2012 
 Monthly review meeting with field staff Cir. No. 1182; dated 25.10.2012 
 Implementation of eMMS – progress in uploading of photographs 
and GPS coordinates mandatory (guidelines issued) 
Cir. No. 555; dated 06.09.2012 
 Action for termination of underperforming FAs Cir. No. 491; dated 30.08.2012 
 Positioning of family members/near relatives as customer service 
providers (CSP) – embezzlement of government funds 
(instructions issued) 
Cir. No. 1740; dated 27.08.2012 
 Execution of works – feedback from District Vigilance Officers Cir. No. 522 dated 08.07.2012 
 MGNREGS training strategy – planning of training for year 
2012–13 
Cir. No. 1090 dated 08.07.2012 
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 Strategic planning – July–October 2012 Cir. No. 1090 dated 23.06.2012 
 SSS training by APNA – resolving resource fee Cir. No. 1283; dated 02.06.2012 
 Designation of AO of DMMA as District Complaint Redressal 
Officer (DCRO) 
Cir. No.1074; dated 02.06.2012 
 Electronic muster verification system (EMVS) (certain guidelines 
issued) 
Cir. No.727; dated 25.05.2012 
 Implementation of eMMS – link with pay order Cir. No. 555; dated 25.05.2012 
 Conduct social audit every month – wall writings about payments 
etc. 
Cir. No. 572; dated 17.05.2012 
 Transparency and accountability – works deviations in the 
execution of works – apportionment of responsibility and 
recovery (certain amendments issued) 
Proc. 452 
 Procurement for desktops, printers and UPS systems (Reg.)  Cir. No. 3685; dated 27.02.2012 
 Job card verification and data entry – (guidelines issued) Cir. No. 38; dated 18.02.2012 
 Instructions related to broadband connectivity – BSNL and 
APSWAN connectivity and location details (Reg.)  
Cir. Rc. No. 1338; dated 17.02.2012 
 Implementation of eMMS – e-measurement and e-check 
measurement (guidelines issued)  
Cir. No. 555; dated 03.02.2012 
 Implementation of biometric- and GPS-based MGNREGS GP 
System in Niziamabad district – GP abstract link with pay order 
(Reg.) 
Cir. No. 556; dated 13.01.2012 
 Conduct concurrent social audit every month – village-level wall 
writings of  monthly information – responsibility for APNA 
NGOs (Reg.) 
Cir. No. 1256; dated 21.01.2012 
 Social audit guidelines to Project Directors – QC wing and social 
audit teams for smoother implementation 
Cir. Rc. No. 1214; dated 7.01.2012 
2013 1. MGNREGS-AP – utilization of services of APNA NGOs in 
formulation of SSS 
2. MGNREGS-AP – Formation and strengthening of SSS 
federations (SSSF) 
3. MGNREGS-AP – Formation and strengthening of SSS  
Memo 4055; dated 21.11.2013 
 Delay compensation system – responsibility for record 
maintenance  
Cir. No. 616; dated 01.11.2013 
 Implementation of annual performance review  and contracts 
issues (Reg.) 
Cir. No. 4779; dated 09.09.2013 
 Direct benefit transfer – MGNREGS-AP – transition to Aadhar-
enabled payment system in the entire state from 01.08.2013 (Reg.)  
Cir. No. 6139; 28.06.2013 
 MGNREGS-AP – initiation of disciplinary action against mates 
involved in embezzlement of funds (deviation of provisions of 
MGNREGA instructions issued)  
Cir. No. 3479; dated 24.06.2013 
 Smart card project – MGNREGS – disbursement of wages – 
stopping of supply of printed acquittances for carded payments  
Cir. No. 28; dated 19.06.2013 
 Certain guidelines for demand-capture work allocation – e-muster 
ID mandatory for work opening and pay order generation 
(instructions issued – Reg.) 
Cir. No. 1766; dated 24.05.2013 
 Smart card – disbursement of wages to MGNREGA  beneficiaries 
– monitoring of prompt disbursement in districts (Reg.)  
Lr. No. 254; dated 10.05.2013 
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 Transparency in works – establish worksite boards Cir. No. 653; dated 27.04.2013 
 Strengthening of SSS – voluntary organization role (Reg.)  Lr. No. 1197; dated 15.04.2013 
 Performance audit conducted by internal audit party in 
Mahaboobnagar district – enhancement of wage rate (certain 
instructions issued – Reg.)  
Cir. No. 1258; dated 21.03.2013 
 Attend ZS meeting at district level – awareness among female 
SHG leaders of labour demand capture and unemployment 
allowance (Reg.) 
Lr. No. 1766; dated 08.03.2013 
 QC Verification of allotted works online by CQCO – poor 
motivation by  APOs & MPDOs to co-operate with QC team – 
action  to be initiated against Field Functionaries  
Cir. Rc J1 2745; dated 23.02.2013 
 SSS creation of master trainers – phase II visit to villages – 
strengthening of SSS (guidelines issued) 
Cir. No. 1197; dated 31.01.2013 
2014 MGNREGS-AP – mandatory uploading of e-muster attendance – 
linking with pay-order generation (Reg.) 
Cir. No: 555; dated 09.07.2014 
 MGNREGS-AP – review of performance of GP – provision of 
FAs and senior mates 
Cir. No. 4779; dated 21.04.2014 
 MGNREGS-AP – submission/production of relevant records – 
QC team during verification of works (instructions issued – Reg.)  
Cir. No. 188; dated 05.02.2014 
 MGNREGS-AP – organisation of wage seekers into SSS – 
selection and positioning of mates (certain instructions issued) 
Cir. No. 173; dated 10.01.2014 
 MGNREGS-AP – positioning senior mates (attendance) – 
responsibilities – remuneration – provision of mobile phone 
(further guidelines issued – Reg.)  
Cir. No. 491; dated 10.01.2014 
 CRD – Sexual Harassment of Women in Workplace Act 2013 – 
internal complaint cell (Reg.) 
Lr. No. 12310; dated 07.01.2014 
 MGNREGS-AP – FAs – implementation annual performance 
review – revision of performance parameters for period 
01.07.2013 to 30.06.2014 (instructions issued) 
Cir. No. 4779; dated 03.01.2014 
 MGNREGS-AP – shrama mitra first-phase trainings 100% 
complete – ready for second-phase training (Reg.) 
Memo 1404; dated 13.12.2013 
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Appendix L: MGNREGS Process Flow – Electronic Fund Management System 
 
 
Source: MoRD 
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Appendix M: Andhra Pradesh – Muster Roll Payment Cycle 
 
 
Source: MoRD 
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Appendix N: Details of Interviewees and interviews cancelled or declined 
 
 Designations of interviewees Interviews 
declined 
Language 
Macro Director, Assistant Director, department 
secretary (MGNREGS and Social Audit) 
National Level Monitors (NLM), NLM audit 
coordinating agency 
- English and 
Hindi 
Meso 
(State 
level) 
CFO’s of MGNREGS in state 
governments, social audit departments, 
finance, operational, audit and vigilance 
departments  
2 (+2 
informal 
declines) 
English and 
Hindi 
Districts  District offices implementing 
MGNREGS, Vigilance officers 
2 English and 
Hindi 
Block  BDO, deputy BDO, Assistant engineers, 
drafting officers, data entry officers 
4 Local 
languages 
Village Social audit teams, panchayat presidents, 
Union Councillor and program 
beneficiaries 
- Local 
languages 
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Appendix O - Ethics Approval 
 
 
 
Memo 
 
To: Akhila Chawla, Schulich School of Business 
Graduate Program in Business Administration 
 
From: Alison M. Collins-Mrakas, Sr. Manager and Policy Advisor, Research Ethics 
(on behalf of Duff Waring, Chair, Human Participants Review Committee) 
 
           Date:   Friday, September 13, 2013 
Re: Ethics Approval 
 
A Practice approach to Accounting and Accountability in the social services sector 
- A micro-level analysis 
 
 
I am writing to inform you that the Human Participants Review Sub-Committee has 
reviewed and approved the above project.  
 
Should you have any questions, please feel free to contact me at:  ________or via email 
_________ 
 
     
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
    Alison M. Collins-Mrakas M.Sc., LLM 
    Sr. Manager and Policy Advisor,  
Office of Research Ethics 
 
 
  
Office of research 
ETHICS (ORE) 
  
5th Floor, 
Kaneff Tower, 
4700 Keele St. 
Toronto ON 
Canada  M3J 1P3 
Tel  _________  
Fax _________ 
www.research.yorku.ca 
Certificate #:   STU 2013 - 132 
Approval Period:     09/13/13-09/13/14 
 
Approval Period:     09/13/13-09/13/14 
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Appendix P - Informed Verbal Consent Script for Participants 
 
Dissertation Topic: A Practice approach to Accounting and Accountability in the Social Service 
sector – A Micro-level Analysis   
Researcher:  Akhila Chawla, PhD Candidate, Schulich School of Business, York University, Toronto, 
Canada.                        
Email address: __________ 
 
I am a PhD candidate in the Accounting Department of the Schulich School of Business at York University, 
Toronto, Canada. I am researching accounting and accountability practices focusing specifically on the 
Mahatma Gandhi Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA) program in rural India. I will explore 
the experiences and opinions of adult Indians who have participated in this program as recipients through 
employment/social audit, or are/were a part of its planning, implementation and audit processes. The 
purpose of my dissertation is to create a better understanding of the role played by accounting mechanisms 
and processes in the implementation of accountability processes in social services programs such as 
MGNREGA and in the socioeconomic lives of rural Indian citizens who took part in this program. 
 
I ask for your consent to participate in approximately a 60-90 minute interview/discussion with me. You 
will be asked to talk about your opinions, knowledge, impressions and experiences of MGNREGA program 
and its processes. This interview/discussion will be used as interview data for my doctoral dissertation. I 
will tape record our interviews, transcribe them and finally translate them to English (my final data).     
 
I do not foresee any risks or discomfort from your participation in the research. Benefits of the research 
accrue in the long-run when the research generates more and wider understandings of the role of accounting 
and accountability practices in the social services sector and specifically in India’s MGNREGA program, 
which may be of interest to academic researchers, the Indian government and other international public, 
private and non-profit sector social services and research organizations.  
 
Your interview participation is completely voluntary and you may choose not to participate at any time. 
Your decision not to volunteer will neither influence the treatment you may be receiving from me, nor will 
it  influence the nature of your relationship with me or York University either now, or in the future.  
 
You can choose to withdraw from participating at any time. If you decide to withdraw from the study, all 
data generated from tape recording and transcription will be immediately destroyed. In addition, after the 
interview has taken place, you preserve the right to ask me at any time to erase certain or all parts of the 
tape recorded interview and/ or its transcriptions if you decide to do so for any reason. Your decision to 
withdraw from the study, or to refuse to answer particular questions, will not affect your relationship with 
me or York University either now, or in the future.  
 
All the information that you provide will be completely kept in confidence and your name and / or any 
identification will not appear anywhere in the research project, in its publication and dissemination. You 
may choose a made-up name to be used in reference to you and your comments in my dissertation. I will 
use audio tapes to record the interview and gather the data. I will store the recorded tapes, their transcriptions 
and translations in a securely locked box (with me during fieldwork in India and later in Canada at my 
residence and office) for up to seven years as I write up my dissertation and connected papers. It will then 
will be destroyed (shredded) completely. For your information, no one except me will have access to the 
recorded tapes, their transcriptions and translations.  
 
If you have any questions or concerns, please feel free to contact me or my graduate supervisor, Professor 
Dean Neu, either by telephone _______or email, _______.  Alternatively, you may also wish to contact 
Graduate program Director at the Schulich School of Business, Professor Eileen Fischer (telephone 
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________; e-mail: _________). This research conforms to the standards of the Canadian Tri-Council 
Research Ethics guidelines and has been reviewed and approved by Human Participants Review Sub-
Committee, York University’s Ethics Review Board. Further questions and concerns about the research 
process may be  directed to the Senior Manager and Policy Advisor for the office of Research Ethics, 5th  
Floor, York Research Tower, York University (____ and e-mail: ______)  
  
